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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the concept of Agencification against the backdrop of Public Sector 
Reforms in Nigeria in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. These reforms had 
components and elements of New Public Management (NPM). New Public Management 
ideas of public sector management and governance have been influential in reform strategies 
across the world since the 1980s. Notwithstanding its popularity, New Public management 
approaches and methods have attracted controversies in areas of practical applications and 
‘context’ domain. Evaluation of New Public Management reforms in Developing and 
Developed Countries have produced mixed results, somewhat a hazy picture which cannot be 
categorised as either a success or failure (Overman et al. 2015). NPM, as a policy 
development tool and management initiative, raises more questions than answers. An 
assessment of NPM and public governance models by academics and public policy analysts 
have generated phrases expressions such as ‘implementation habitats’, ‘cultural 
homogeneity’, ‘unstructured complexity’, ‘matrix of governance’, choreographies of 
governance ‘appropriateness milieu’ etc. (Lieberthal, 1995; Swyngedouw, 2001; Jessop, 
2004), to describe the rather complex nature of public sector reforms.  
The main aim of this thesis is to understand the behaviour of an agency whose original design 
is inspired by the New Public Management (NPM) doctrines. The Tertiary Education Trust 
Fund (TETFund) Nigeria is the selected case study in this research. The objectives of the 
research are tied to the various narratives on NPM reforms and Agencification deliberations 
like the drivers, accountability, transparency, doctrines of autonomy, structural 
disaggregation, contractualisation, ministerial relationship, cross functionality, independence 
and governance (e.g. state- society relationship). 
In the context of Nigeria, the implementation of NPM inspired reforms elicits several distinct 
analyses given the volatile politico-administrative structures and the oscillation between 
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political regimes and systems, e.g. parliamentary (1963-1966) to Military (First Junta,1966-
1979, Second Junta 1983-1999) and to Presidential (1979-1983, Interim Presidential 
administration 23rd June1993-17th Nov. 1993, 1999-Present).  
This research adopts a single case study research design and qualitative data collection 
methods. The research findings offer a unique insight into New Public Management Reforms 
in Nigeria and this enables us to draw some tentative generalisations about the organisational 
behaviour of public agencies in the context of a developing country such as Nigeria. 
The research unveils an interesting finding that the TETFund does, to a large extent, display 
some form of autonomy. In contrast to what existing literature emphasis on problems and 
obstacles to NPM implementation in developing countries, e.g. corruption and political 
decay; the TETFund operates as a semi-autonomous organisation- in a political context which 
provides formidable challenges to an NPM agency. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.0. Introduction 
The swathe of public sector reforms, of varying degrees of intensity, in the past four decades 
continues to impact on governance and public sector management across the world. These 
reforms alter operations and functions of the public sector, and the relationship between the 
public and private spheres. In developed countries, reforms have taken different forms, e.g. 
the breakdown of established ministries, re-organisation of work culture and job contracts 
and the establishment of new autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies and agencies. These 
transformed the processes of recruitment, training, promotion, and (if necessary) dismissal of 
public servants, the legal and administrative relationships between the citizens using public 
services and the organizations providing them (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).  In Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, a shift from centralized and 
consolidated public sector to a more decentralized, structurally devolved, autonomous bodies 
have become the rule (Christensen and Laegreid 2003, 2006; Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 
2010). The reforms were implemented to enable the effective running of public sector 
organisation and improve service delivery. These reforms put citizens at the centre; a useful 
method for promoting inclusivity, involvement, participation and engagement. Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2011) define public sector management reform as deliberate changes to the 
structures and processes of public sector organizations for efficient and effective delivery of 
public goods and services. 
In developing countries, in this instance, of Africa, the implementation of public sector 
reform was triggered by the following factors: influence of Bretton Woods Institutions, 
changes in politico-administrative structures, frameworks and governance paradigms (from 
military dictatorship to democratic forms of governance), internal pressures from various 
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democratic and social movements and groups such as trade unions and professional bodies, 
(as in the case of Nigeria- the Academic Staff Union of Universities, the Nigerian Labour 
Congress) and other similar bodies and organisations whose interests centre on social justice, 
equality and democratisation ideals and principles.  
At the centre of public sector reforms are the New Public Management (NPM) frameworks, 
principles and ideologies mainstreamed into the management and delivery of public services. 
Indeed, NPM is controversial when we consider definition, the core principles, philosophical 
foundations, usefulness and contexts analysis. The apparent failures of these reforms have 
been captured in various Reports produced by World Bank, International Monitoring Fund 
(IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and institutions 
responsible for promoting public sector reforms (see, e.g. Basheka and Sebola, 2015). This is 
covered extensively in Chapter Two titled- New Public Management and Public Sector 
Reforms in Nigeria. 
In the 1980s, some African countries embarked on comprehensive public sector reform 
programmes, assisted by international bodies and institutions (ECA, 2003). These reforms 
focused on the operations and activities of public sector institutions/ civil service like 
ministries, parastatals (state owned enterprises), and extra-ministerial departments. Likewise, 
the reforms were economically driven and informed by doctrines of NPM and IMF’s 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). In Nigeria, public-sector reforms were influenced 
by problems of governance (e.g. dysfunctional public institutions), macro-economic policy 
failures and international interventions such as the implementation of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s (e.g. Adedeji, 1993; Onimode and Synge, 1995). 
In Nigeria, public sector management is undertaken by the civil service (Monye-Emina, 
2012).  The civil service performs an important role in promoting sustainable socio-economic 
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development (Anazado et al., 2012; Monye-Emina, 2012). According to (Anazado et al., 
(2012) the civil service is a body of officials employed by the state to carry out functions of 
the government under the direction, ultimately, of the head of government. Maikudi 
(2012:72) defines the civil service as a well-organised body of permanent departmental and 
ministerial paid officials in executive arm of government, charged with the responsibility of 
implementing government policies and programmes in accordance with prescribed rules and 
procedures. The foundation of Nigeria civil service was laid by the British colonial 
administration (Maikudi, 2012).  In Nigeria, pre- and post-independence, there have been 
thirteen public sector reforms (e.g. the Hunt Committee 1934, the Bridges Committee 1941, 
the Tudor Davies Commission 1945, the Harragin Commission 1946, the Gorsuch 
Commission 1954- 1955, Morgan Commission 1963, Adebo Commission, 1971, Udoji 
Commission of 1962-1974; the Civil Service Reorganisation Decree 1988, the Ayida 
Commission of 1997, the Dotun Phillips 1997, the 1999 Obasanjo public sector reforms and 
the Oronsanye Committee on Civil Service Rules and Financial Regulations (constituted in 
2005). These reforms were carried out under different government systems, e.g. civilian, 
military, parliamentary, presidential, and federal to quasi-federal. Whereas, public sector 
reforms are a systematic intervention directed at the structure, operations and procedures of 
public service that, in turn, directly affect delivery of public services in general (e.g. Monye-
Amina, 2012), civil service reforms, on the other hand, refer to the purposeful modification 
of management systems of the service with the goal of maximising administrative value and 
service delivery (Anazodo, 2009, cited in Anazado et al.., 2012: 17).  
The literature on public sector reforms in Nigeria from the 1970s, states that these reforms 
were triggered by a range of factors including, but not restricted to, implementation of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programme (although this assertion 
is demystified in this thesis as it relates to the establishment of the TETFund- the case study 
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used in this thesis), strike action by Academic Staff Union of Universities, trade unions and 
representatives of other bodies; and social, political and economic problems, impasse and 
imbroglio. Consequently, various agencies and parastatals were established, for example, the 
Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) of Nigeria, whose organisational behaviour over 
time is the object of the analysis presented in this work. 
The Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment, Etc.) Act (2011) which repealed both the 
Education Tax Fund Act no. 17, (2003) and the Education Tax Cap. E 4 laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria (2004) established the Tertiary Education Trust Fund. The Education 
Tax Fund (ETF), as the agency was first named at inception, was established by Decree no.7 
of 1993 afterwards replaced by Decree 40 1998 which renamed the Fund as Education Trust 
Fund. Following the transition from military to democratic rule in 1999, both Decrees were 
renamed Acts No. 17 and Education Tax Cap. 4 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, 
respectively. The repealed Acts had conferred the responsibility for imposing, managing and 
disbursing this fund, or tax, to public educational institutions (both state and Federal owned) 
in Nigeria at all levels, (that is, Primary, Secondary and Tertiary). The 2011 Act mandates 
that an annual tertiary education tax will be assessed, collected and administered by the 
TETFund for the rehabilitation, restoration and consolidation of Tertiary education in 
Nigeria. The Act therefore removed primary and secondary levels of education from the 
scope of TETFund. The tax rate was to be 2 per cent charged on the assessable profit of any 
company registered in Nigeria, as specified in the Companies Income Tax Act 2007, or the 
Petroleum Profits Tax Act Cap.354 LFN 1990. The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) 
is responsible for assessing and collecting this tax from all registered companies in Nigeria. 
This Act empowers the FIRS to facilitate collections by devising processes and procedures, 
as it may deem necessary. By the provision of this Act, the FIRS will pay the tax into the 
Fund’s account in the Central Bank of Nigeria.  In return, the Board of Trustees (BOT) will 
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approve a return showing the name of company making payment, the amount collected, the 
assessable profit of the company for the accounting period and such information as may be 
required by the Fund for the proper administration of the Tax. Besides, the Act specifies that 
before disbursing funds to its beneficiaries, the Fund must set aside in each year an amount 
not exceeding 5 per cent of total monies accruing to it in the preceding year to meet the cost 
of administration and management of the Fund, for the maintenance of any property acquired 
by it or vested in it and generally to pay for services rendered to the Fund as well as for 
project monitoring and for meeting all the needs of the Fund necessary for the due 
administration and implementation of the purpose of the Act.  
Although, the Fund was established in 1993, it commenced operations in 1998 following the 
inauguration of the 1st Board of Trustees. Conversely, following the review programme of 
the Obasanjo administration, the Board was dissolved and a new one constituted in 1999. 
Previously mentioned, the Fund has a mandate to use funding and project management 
approaches for rehabilitation, restoration and consolidation of education at all levels. 
Between 1999 and 2011, the mandate, functions and scope of operations of the Fund was 
amended in response to the reviews undertaken by Federal Government of Nigeria. As an 
illustration, the 2011 Act restricted its mandate to tertiary education in Nigeria, which 
explains the change of the Fund’s name from Education Trust Fund to Tertiary Education 
Trust Fund. 
Certainly, the operational frameworks of TETFund reflect principles and frameworks of New 
Public Management-Agency. This provided justification for the selection of TETFund as a 
case study- bearing in mind that it operates in a non- NPM context. There are elements of 
performance contracting, autonomy and structural disaggregation in the operations of the 
Fund (the concept of agencification is covered extensively in Chapter Three).  Of course, the 
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adoption of New Public Management frameworks was foremost in the several public-sector 
reforms carried out by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) from the 1980s upwards. 
Specifically, the 1974 FGN-Udoji Report, recognised that the public service was bureaucratic 
and unadventurous, and reluctant to transit from an “administrative” to the “managerial 
culture”. The Report advanced several principles and processes- recommending, “a new style 
public service”, with results-oriented management systems operated by professionals, 
consultants and specialists alike. Accordingly, Udoji Report 1974 advocated the adoption of 
a set of management techniques, e.g. Project Management, Management by Objectives 
(MBO), Programme and Performance Budgeting System (PPBS); a radical detour from the 
traditional, hierarchical and bureaucratic systems of public sector management and 
organisation. The core message of Udoji Report is that the implementation of these 
techniques and frameworks would create a result-oriented system of public service 
management and services delivery. Therefore, one could deduce that establishment of 
government agencies like the Tertiary Education Trust Fund was envisioned as a solution to 
bureaucratic clutches of the Ministerial system and fragile civil service, so principles of New 
Public Management could be practiced, enhancing effective performance management and 
accountability practices. This raised important questions on contextual implications like 
whether NPM agency can be operationalised in developing countries, or whether issues of 
autonomy, performance, contracting and structural aggregation exist in the operations of the 
Fund- (for instance, the operationalisation of NPM elements in a non- NPM politico-
administrative setting). Likewise, what is the appropriateness of the New Public Management 
model to Nigeria’s public sector? Is it mere rhetoric or has it gone beyond management 
rhetoric? What is the level of applicability to all aspect of public sector management? What 
are the implications of the model on public service management in Nigeria? These are the 
issues raised, explored, examined and addressed in this thesis. 
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1.1. Aim and Objectives  
The principal aim of the research is to understand the behaviour of a New Public 
Management (NPM) - driven Agency in the context of a developing country, in this case 
Nigeria. The Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) is the unit of analysis. This is 
achieved through qualitative data collection methods and the scrutinizing of various streams 
of literature on public agency behaviour and New Public Management principles, drawing on 
different theoretical perspectives and their relevance to public sector management in Nigeria. 
This will enable the researcher to unpack the behavioural patterns of TETFund together in 
comparison to ‘fictional’ models of how NPM public agency should behave according to the 
various NPM models and principles advocated in literature on public sector management. 
This research, after a thorough, preliminary literature review of the principles, doctrines and 
actual behaviour of NPM-inspired public agencies, will address three objectives: 
• To detect the extent to which NPM doctrines have penetrated and shaped the 
organisational life of the public-sector agency under examination (TETFund); or 
rather have been factually rejected- though albeit nominally adopted- as they are 
spurious to the organisation and its context; 
• To discuss the mainstreaming of NPM into public sector management in Nigeria, by 
using the TETFund case, and, 
• To generate potentially transferrable knowledge and ideas for the development of 
public services agencies in similar contexts. 
The research questions are: First, what is the behaviour of an NPM Agency in a non-NPM 
context; and second, what influence is NPM having on public management in a developing 
country, with the TETFund as case study and Nigeria as the cultural and politico-
administrative context. 
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1.2. Background to the study 
Deteriorating infrastructure and structure of the country’s education sector, such as poor 
training, staffing and resources, rapid personnel turnover, unrest in the form of student riots 
and universities staff strike action combined with falling standards of education, the increase 
in illiteracy and low-level numeracy paved the way for negotiations on educational crises in 
Nigeria in the 1980s. The TETFund was established based on the outcome of a series of 
negotiations between the Federal Government of Nigeria, representatives of the Academic 
Staff Union of Universities and the private sector. The Academic Staff Union of Universities 
of Nigeria had an agreement with the Federal Government, part of which led to the 
introduction of a 2% Education Tax on assessable corporate profit. At that time, it was a 
solution to inadequate funding of Universities (Odebiyi and Aina, 1999). With the Education 
Tax Fund Decree no.7 1993 (which subsequently became known as Education Tax Fund Act 
no. 17, 2003, following the democratization process in Nigeria in 1999), the 2% education 
tax from assessable profit of all registered companies for the restoration rehabilitation and 
consolidation of education at all levels in Nigeria was established. The Decree No. 7 1993 
was repealed and replaced with Decree 40 1998 which established the Fund as a Trust Fund 
and renamed it the Education Trust Fund.  At the advent of a civilian regime in Nigeria this 
decree was renamed the Education Tax Cap. E 4 laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004). 
The Tertiary Education Trust Fund (Establishment Etc.) Act (2011) repealed and replaced 
both Acts of 2003 and 2004 mentioned above and renamed the Fund the Tertiary Education 
Trust Fund with a mandate for the restoration, rehabilitation and consolidation of Tertiary 
education in Nigeria from a 2 percent annual education tax on the assessable profits of all 
registered companies in Nigeria. 
Political and Economic situations in Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s are also useful 
frameworks to explore the establishment of TETFund. Firstly, the problem in the education 
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sector was a miniature of the more general economic crisis of the 1980s. For example, the 
dramatic rise in the world oil prices in 1970’s meant Nigeria became a wealthy nation, and 
resulting in a situation which, the US Congress Report then described as ‘dynamic chaos’. In 
common parlance, it was claimed that the then Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
noted that money was not Nigeria’s problem, but how to spend it (Osoba, 1996). In the 
1980’s, the country experienced growth and expansion of its economy accompanied by a 
rapid growth of various parts of the public sector including education (Moja, 2000). Because 
of falling oil prices in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Nigerian economic output slowed, and 
this affected the funding of various sectors of the polity, including the education sector 
(Moja, 2000). Therefore, the government could not sustain socio-economic interventions and 
support (Jega, 2000). Oil revenue dropped from $69.08 million US Dollars in 1985 to 
51.31million US Dollars in 1986, and a debt burden of 20 Billion US dollars. The GND per 
capita during this period fell from $1,160 in 1988 to $300 in 1993, and this led to inflation 
(Jega, 2000). This affected several sectors for example healthcare, transportation, and 
education.  
In 1986, on the recommendations of IMF and the World Bank, the Federal Government of 
Nigeria began implementing Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). The budgetary 
restrictions of SAP and the depreciation of the Nigerian currency (the naira) affected public 
sector provisions, as well as public and social policy interventions. According to Jega (2000), 
the political and social problems combined with the reckless, insensitive and irresponsible 
policy actions of the government prompted the collapse of public sector provisions. Obi and 
Ake (2004) posit that ‘market-led economy’ created a multitude of problems, amongst which 
was increased control of the policy process in Nigeria by the International donor 
communities and the Bretton Woods Institutions like IMF and the World Bank. The 
privatisation of state owned companies is an example of policy transfer and SAP initiatives. 
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As reported by Ayo-Sobowale and Akinyemi (2011) high level of corruption, favouritism 
and mismanagement, lack of economic diversification, poor investment in development 
programmes in education and healthcare, and other sectors impacted negatively on social and 
economic situations. The impact was felt more by the universities between 1992 and 1996 
due to lack of funding support from successive military governments (Dike, 2001; Ayo-
Sobowale and Akinyemi, 2011). 
Conclusively, the TETFund was instituted against a backdrop of social, economic and 
political problems. This raised fundamental questions on the operations and behaviour of 
TETFund considering a range of contextual issues such as:’ Is the politico-administrative 
framework conducive to the operations of an Agency?’, and, ‘Can an NPM agency function 
within a non- NPM setting?’ These questions are given sufficient attention in the review of 
literature and the analysis and discussion of research findings.   
1.3. Thesis Structure  
Chapter Two assesses critically the New Public Management (NPM) literature; it highlights 
and discusses the principles, philosophical underpinnings and the influences it has had on 
public management around the world. It considers different definitions (that is definitional 
inconsistencies and disagreements) and it’s mainstreaming into public management in 
developing countries, addressing the successes and failures. It investigates the idea of post- 
NPM as espoused in recent literature, albeit new frameworks both imagined and proposed.  
The arguments on culture and context- the variegated explanation of tapestry and canvas of 
national landscapes, in the application and implementation of NPM principles are also 
explored in terms of effects and implications, and imagined interpretations judging on 
literature.  It then links the NPM to public sector reforms in Nigeria, with the prime objective 
of identifying the trend in the absorption and adoption of NPM frameworks. This chapter 
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also examines the idea of culture and context and how it is important to the understanding of 
organisational changes, behaviour and public sector reforms, country wise. Evident in the 
arguments presented in the chapter, is how societal and organisational cultures shape the 
context of NPM reforms, at policy adoption, formulation and implementation, and evaluation 
stages. The questions of compatibility of reform initiatives and culture, and governance 
structures create more questions, than answers it is contended here- a continuum rather than 
an end, so to speak.   
Chapter Three reviews the concept of 'agencificiation’ and scopes out the aims and objectives 
of this thesis. It investigates how agencification became a global phenomenon in public 
administration and management, exploring definitions, international adaptations and 
modifications and contextual debates, and mainstreaming into public sector management in 
both developed and developing countries around the world. Furthermore, the notion of 
modern public agency, which includes performance contracting, autonomy and structural 
aggregation, is discussed.  Based on current debates, it explores whether all the three 
elements are essential foundations to the structure and operations of an agency and /or 
whether they are meant to operate in tandem in any given context.  
Chapter Four discusses the methodology and data collection methods used. As such research 
paradigms and methods are preliminarily discussed, along with aspects like data collection 
techniques, tools and data analysis. The choice of method is the single case study research 
design. In addition, controversies surrounding the use of single case study as it relates to the 
research questions, the richness and density of data, process of distillation of findings and the 
value to qualitative research are presented. The fieldwork questions focused on the behaviour 
of agency, that is, autonomy, performance contracting and structural disaggregation 
identified by scholars as the three core elements of agencification, and strategic management 
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initiatives. Congruently, this chapter reviews components of the philosophy that underpins 
methodological approaches in general, and the research design for this thesis.  
Chapter Five reports on the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) the case study and  its 
operations alongside the three key elements of agencification (autonomy, contracting 
performance and structural disaggregation). It provides a description of the functions and 
behaviour, the operational strategies of TETFund, through a narrative supported by findings 
and data from the interviews conducted with key stakeholders, employees and beneficiaries. 
It establishes that these three key concepts can be found in the behaviour and functions of 
TETFund, to some extent, as specified in literature examined. This chapter, based on the 
findings of the case study, provides a discussion of reforms and questions some of the current 
assumptions about the New Public Management, ‘agencification’ and whether it works in 
developing countries, in general, and Nigeria.  From the interview findings, it is claimed in 
this chapter that some of the contextual debates that have been identified in relation to 
failures of public sector reforms in Africa, (such as corruption, ethno-regional cleavages, 
politicisation and favouritism), are non-existent in the Tertiary Education Trust Fund 
(TETFund)- the case study. It also examined why this has been the case with TETFund, in 
the hope of identifying a workable model, or theory, that can be used by other agencies in 
Nigeria and/or perhaps more broadly within Africa. The chapter explores other relevant 
debates on public administration and strategic management and other contextual issues.  
Chapter Six provides a summary of the various arguments mentioned and discussed in the 
previous chapters. It reflects on the limitation of the research approach used in this thesis and 
offers possible recommendations for future research on public reforms in developing 
countries.  
 
 13 
 
Chapter Two 
New Public Management and Public Sector Reforms (PSRs) in Nigeria  
2.0. Introduction  
The public management principles and approaches experienced significant changes in the 
mid-twentieth century. The impact is continuing in the twenty-first century, with the 
introduction of new frameworks and modifications of principles in the existing frameworks. 
The reasons for these changes are diverse, e.g. political, economic and social factors, 
information technology, and general changes precipitated by globalisation. However, central 
to this modification of public sector management is the New Public Management.  Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2004) note that NPM represents a global wave of administrative reforms that has 
had an impact on the public sectors of many countries over the last 25 years. The reasons for 
these NPM-based reforms are captured in expressions such as improving efficiency and 
effectiveness in the delivery of public services and user satisfaction, the reduction and cutting 
back on excesses and other forms of public expenditure, and managerial accountability and 
transparency (see, e.g. Christensen and Laegreid, 2013:1). NPM is associated with the 
political move to the right in the 1980s, in both America and the United Kingdom (notably 
under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher). In most academic literature on public and 
social policy, this period was when neoliberalism and the notion of laissez-faire and freedom 
became dominant in political narratives and policy interventions (see, e.g. Boston, 2013). 
Therefore, it is unsurprising, that New Public Management exhibits elements of 
neoliberalism, e.g. privatisation, performance management, and the liberalisation of the 
economy in general (Noordegraff, 2015). Hood (1996) argues that the idea of NPM became 
widespread because of globalisation and the influence of various international bodies (IMF 
and World Bank). Despite these controversies and ambiguities which surrounded its 
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introduction, definition, application and implementation, NPM has become popular 
worldwide, even with countries that were (or are) classified or deemed culturally resistant 
(see, e.g. Laking, 2005, Verhoest, 2013). Drawing on the narratives above, it is necessary to 
examine the influence of NPM in Africa and Nigeria to provide a basis for the aims and 
objectives of the research to unravel. Therefore, this chapter will cover the diverse debates on 
NPM, essentially its definition, principles and ideas/ contents, implementation and 
application in various settings and what the consequences have been- that is, an assessment 
of successes and failures. It will also explore public sector reforms in Nigeria from the 1980s 
to identify elements of New Public Management. It also reflects on examples from other 
African countries. In addition, it examines and discusses the idea of culture and context in 
relation to public sector management reforms.  
2.1. The New Public Management 
In the 1950s, public management reform was different- because it was treated as a technical 
or legal, rather than a political or economic matter; and it was national and sectoral (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2011). However, from the 1970s, public management reforms changed, 
particularly through the influence of NPM. Consequently, NPM significantly altered the 
dynamics of public sectors across the world. As Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) observed, NPM 
has reshaped many public agencies – particularly at the operational or service delivery level – 
to become more firm-like responding to ‘market-like’ conditions and operating with 
principles of quasi-markets. The doctrines and principles of NPM is hinged on the new 
politico-economic approach of the 1980s and influence of the New Right political ideology 
then dominant in the America and Britain. This concerned the free market neoliberal policies 
(as mentioned above). The radicalising events around the world, and the perceived failure of 
the welfare model (influenced by the Keynesian Economic Model), also precipitated the 
emergence of the NPM model as a solution to socio-economic and political problems and 
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upheavals of the mid-1970s and the 1980s. At the social and economic level, there was the 
shrinking of the working class, the questioning of large public service provisions and the 
failure of various welfare reforms to produce desired results (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). High 
modernism, for example rapid changes in science and technology created changes in the way 
the society and government operate, and it equally triggered the first wave of NPM reforms 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The conditions and events mentioned above provided a potent 
brew for the rise of the New Right ideology (Kritsol, 1995). Therefore, the NPM governance 
model altered the operations of public sector organisations and agencies by moving them 
closer to private sector models, underpinned by neoliberal free market doctrines (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015).  According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) the 
reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s tended to fragment public sector organisations, 
producing fewer large, multi-purpose forms and more single, or limited purpose 
organisations, each pursuing more explicitly defined sets of goals and targets, specific to 
certain aspects of public service delivery.  
 
Notwithstanding the popularity of NPM across the world, evidence suggests that there had 
been resistance from some countries, classified as ‘low’ NPM jurisdictions- e.g. France and 
Germany (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015).  These NPM alternatives 
are the New Public Governance (NPG) and ‘Neo-Weberian State (NWS). New Public 
Governance focuses on collaboration, what works, evidence-based policy, joined-up 
government, whilst Neo Weberian State centres on promoting a high-quality and user-
friendly ethos- thereby creating responsive services (Hood, 1991, 1995; Ferlie and Ongaro, 
2015). NPG’s core claim is to modernise the traditional state apparatus, with a shift to more 
professional, more efficient, and more responsive to citizens, and its purpose is to include 
diverse social actors in both policy making and implementation (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011:22; Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). In the case of NWS, the business model plays a 
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subsidiary role in this, but the state remains a distinctive actor with its own rules, methods 
and culture; authority is exercised through a disciplined hierarchy of impartial officers 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011:22). Indeed, NPM-driven reform has attracted controversy from 
various circles. For those on the left of the political divide, it was considered a way of 
mainstreaming neoliberal ideology and Washington Consensus into governance, ideas 
associated with Bretton Woods Institutions (such as IMF and the World Bank). The political 
left views it with suspicion, because it is an appendage of neoliberalism.  For the political 
right, NPM is solution to numerous problems threatening the public sector- a pragmatic way 
of responding to changing spheres of society in the twenty- first century. However, the 
critique of NPM extends beyond the left and right divide of the political spectrum; as the 
argument tend to move to that of pragmatism. Despite these philosophical and intellectual 
divide, it is intriguing to note that NPM reforms were adopted in developing countries in 
Africa, under different circumstances; as such the results and impacts on governance are 
different (as discussed in section 2.3).  
 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) see NPM as a two-level phenomenon. At a higher level, it is a 
general theory or doctrine which advocates the notion that public sector performance can be 
improved using business concepts, techniques and values that reflects neoliberal economic 
ideologies and principles.  At the more specific ordinary level, NPM is a bundle of specific 
concepts and practices, including: (1) greater emphasis on ‘performance’, especially through 
the measurement of outputs; (2) a preference for lean, flat, small, specialized (disaggregated) 
organizational forms over large, multi-functional forms; (3) a widespread substitution of 
contracts for hierarchical relations as the principal coordinating device; (4) a widespread 
injection of market-type mechanisms (MTMs) including competitive tendering, public sector 
league tables, with performance-related pay, and, (5) an emphasis on treating service users as 
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‘customers’ and on the application of generic quality improvement techniques such as Total 
Quality Management ( TQM) (See also Pollitt, 2003; Christensen and Laegreid, 2011, 2013).  
According to Christensen and Laegreid (2013:3), one primary characteristic of NPM is the 
adoption, by public organisations, of the management and organisational forms used by 
private companies’, a major detour from the traditional model which is about isolation from 
private sector models and any form of business-oriented models, likewise the restriction of 
the influence of public officials in the handling of contracts and other forms of financial 
dealings (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Christensen and Laegreid, 2013). The NPM model is 
about the blending of both management principles of private and public sectors (Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2013). The proponents of NPM argue that its principles offer more flexibility 
in view of changing times (in terms of economics and information technology), and 
situations and events happening around the world both at physical and temporal levels 
(Christensen and Laegreid, 2013). This point was further enunciated by Christensen and 
Laegreid (2013) noting that NPM provides managers in the public-sector organisation the 
opportunity to apply discretion in the day-to-day running of their organisations; somewhat a 
conduit for efficiency and effectiveness. These managerial and management models is related 
to ideas of devolution, delegation of authority and autonomy (some of these ideas are 
explained in the agencification narratives- see chapter three). This is associated with basic 
management models. The first model describes the idea of letting the managers manage 
based on the idea of devolution. According to Christensen and Laegried (2013:3) the second 
model focuses on making the managers manage, influenced by the idea of incentives, 
decision-making and strategies. The second model inadvertently will lead to exposure to 
competition, contract management and market orientation (contracting out, purchaser-
provider models) (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:3). With NPM there is the notion of 
performance management, cost-cutting and budgetary discipline, since the pre-NPM public 
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management structure was accused of financial recklessness and lack of accountability.  The 
increased use of formal performance indicators represents an attempt to quantify the 
activities of public organisations more extensively, while ex-post scrutiny and auditing are 
ways of connecting and comparing goals and actual results (Christensen and Laegried, 2013: 
3). The underlying principle is that good results should be rewarded while poor results should 
be punished (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:3-4). This is connected to Michael Power’s 
Audit Society: the rituals of verification- that describes the audit explosion as one of the 
hallmarks of the twenty-first century. 
Indeed, economic principles of budgeting, competition to mention but a few are central to 
New Public Management. Likewise, it advocates diverse administrative principles, what 
Pollitt (1995) describes as a sort of ‘shopping basket’ of different elements, useful to those 
reforming public administration. Reformers claim this diversity would create some elements 
of flexibility in its adoption and implementation. According to Christensen and Laegreid 
(2013) what this flexibility entails is that some of the reform elements may be inconsistent, or 
in conflict, with one another. More reason why NPM reforms have been labelled as ridden 
with ambiguities, conflicts and problems of implementation. However, Pollitt (2005) believes 
due to the variety of elements that NPM has, it offers public leaders some form of flexibility 
in the areas of public sector reforms. However, Christensen and Laegreid (2013, p3) note that 
the ambiguity makes reform inconsistent and potentially conflicting.  
According to Christensen and Laegreid (2013:3), one important set of NPM reform measures 
is structural, and it involves splitting up public organisations through horizontal and vertical 
specialization (structural devolution), whether inter- or intra-organisational. The main 
vertical change introduced by NPM was increased structural devolution, meaning a trend 
towards more autonomous agencies and state-owned enterprises (Christensen and Laegried, 
2013:3). A further main reform element was increased horizontal specialisation, based on the 
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principle of the single purpose organisation, ‘which makes different organisational units’ 
roles purer (Gregory, 2003).  This is discussed extensively in relation to the concept of 
agencification in chapter three.  
Purportedly, these NPM ideas have created a different form of public service management 
and delivery. For example, in the 1950s, the public sector was treated as a technical or legal, 
rather than a political or economic, matter, and it was national or even sectional (strictly 
managed and driven by the government), (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). The essence of 
more recent NPM reforms is, at times, said to signify a switch from government to 
governance (distillation of processes of management), a major attempt to modernise 
traditional bureaucracy, thereby making it more professional, efficient and citizen-friendly. 
Under NPM, the perception of citizens as users or consumers exists and this is seen in its 
increased emphasis on service-orientation, user participation and satisfaction, and 
responsiveness to demands from customers, users and clients, (Christensen and Laegried, 
2013:4). In the academic literature on governance and NPM, governance is the process and 
method of creating a more representative and inclusive approach, in contrast to the idea of 
government, which NPM advocates view as a traditional, somewhat antiquated horizontal top 
down management approach. Nonetheless, it is essential to note that NPM advocates 
disregard governance as an alternative to government, because government remains one of its 
principal constituent elements (Stivers, 2009; Pollitt and Bouchaert, 2011). Therefore, the 
argument is about management and processes that govern the activities of a modern public 
sector organisation or services.  
Following the introduction and implementation of NPM, the public sector was exposed to a 
range of neo-liberal market principles (ranging from performance management, competition, 
market, quality and choice for citizens, and the diffusion of models of strategic management 
originally developed for the private/ commercial sector), in variance to the operational rule of 
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the centre which was the primary focus of public sector management before the introduction 
of NPM (e.g. OECD, 1995).  
According to Ferlie et al. (1996) there are four different aspects of NPM: the efficiency 
drive; downsizing and decentralisation; the search for excellence, and, public service 
orientation. NPM promises to integrate these themes, linking efficiency and accountability. 
Other distinctions are between ‘hard NPM tools’, which address accounting, auditing, and 
performance measurement, and ‘soft NPM tools’, which include things like human factors, 
user-orientation, quality improvement and individual development (Christensen and 
Laegried, 2013:4).  
NPM ideas have been implemented to different degrees, at a different pace and with differing 
emphases in different countries and sectors (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:4).  Research 
findings suggest the degree of variation between countries as it relates to success and failures 
(discussed further in section 2.3). Consequently, Christensen and Laegried (2013:4) debate 
whether NPM is a kind of generic reform-wave, or whether it is primarily suitable for some 
types of public policy areas. This question is usually linked to issues such as the effects and 
implications of NPM reforms. For example, questions have been asked on the use of market-
oriented models and forms of management, as a tool of efficiency. However, this has yet to 
be evidenced by facts as there are different results from various countries around the world. 
This is further complicated by issues of context and the fact that NPM reforms are introduced 
for different reasons. Therefore, drawing a pattern of analysis from the implications and 
effects of NPM reforms is being problematic and challenging.  According to Christensen and 
Laegried (2013:4) the effects are often assumed or promised, and there are few systematic 
and reliable studies on whether they occur, so hard evidence is often lacking.  In addition, it 
is difficult to establish whether improvements in performance are the result of NPM, because 
there are many other factors that require consideration. Nevertheless, few studies have 
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demonstrated a favourable macro-economic effect for NPM (Christensen and Laegried, 
2013:11). 
2.1.1. New Public Management Reforms and Context Discourses 
 ‘It is largely accepted as a fact that national cultures affect the structure and performance of 
Public Administration (Andrews, 2008) 
The formulation and implementation of reform policies are shaped by economic, cultural, 
social and political factors. The extent to which governments are receptive to internationally 
propagated NPM doctrines, and how these ideas are actually translated into decisions and 
actions, is influenced and moulded by what is called ‘implementation habitats’ (Verhoest et 
al, 2012:47). At the core of the analysis of implementation habitats lie cultural values at the 
societal level and politico-administrative system. As such NPM reforms are not culturally 
neutral.  More reasons why the implementation of NPM within countries vary is because it is 
based on organisational cultures, societal values and administrative traditions. Verhoest et al 
(2012) argue that organisational cultures act as a filter and influence, either in a positive or 
negative way, the receptiveness of organisations to managerial reform ideas and initiatives. 
Therefore, it is argued in some academic quarters that cultural homogeneity is the strength of 
NPM and can equally act as its weakness (see, e.g. Bouckaert et al 2010; Verhoest et al 
2012).  
 
Often, the success or failure of policies hinge on these factors. The comparative study and 
analysis of public administration literature highlights the importance of such contextual 
factors because they serve to measure the outcomes of reform policies. According to Pollitt 
and Bouchaert (2011), the standard comparative analysis of public management reforms in 
the ‘advanced’ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
has stressed the major influence of contextual factors on the formulation, implementation and 
outcomes of reform policies. Pollitt (2013a: vx) notes that the many prominent academic 
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authorities on comparative public administration and management recognize that contextual 
factors such as constitutions, cultures, political systems or politico-administrative traditions, 
do have major effects on stability and change - even on what can be ‘good government’. 
Therefore, there is a consensus amongst public management analysts and experts that context 
is crucial in understanding the outcomes of public policy interventions, in both developed 
and developing countries respectively. 
 
Research reports on public sector reforms worldwide, produced by multi-national 
organisations such as the Economic Commission for Africa, (ECA), the OECD, the World 
Bank, (WB) and the International Monetary Fund, (IMF), also recognise the importance of 
contextual issues (as confirmed by Pollitt, 2013 a & b and other World Bank Group Research 
Paper). Their respective research reports highlight, to a large extent, the various intricacies 
and interplay of contextual factors in the formulation, implementation and outcomes of 
policies. The concept of ‘context’ itself has been said to operate at the macro, meso and 
micro levels, with each interacting in a way that impacts significantly on the outcomes of 
reforms or policies. As such there is no one single context, but rather a range of multiple and 
intersecting contexts and these can be cultural, ideological, temporal, political or economic in 
nature (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015, also discussed below).  
 
According to Ekaette (2005) for any nation, the structure and features result from a complex 
interplay of its socio-economic aspirations and development objectives, cultural influences, 
political considerations and the evolution of public service administration. These arguments 
have led to a range of terms used to somewhat encapsulate the rather variegated nature of 
context, such as, ‘no size fits all’, ‘institutional transfer,’ or ‘local contexts,’ etc. Clarke 
(2013) notes that public service organisations operate in many and remarkably diverse, 
‘houses,’ (cited in Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). Certainly, the cultural, societal, politico-
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institutional and administrative context in which public organisations function or operate is 
directly relevant to understanding the behaviour of an organisation (Clarke, 2013, cited in 
Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015).  
 
Therefore, it is argued in this thesis that a range of factors have influenced public sector 
reforms implemented around the globe and these factors are contextual in nature. In 
developed countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), Canada and 
Australia, radical changes in public administration and management systems were driven by 
economic and fiscal crises within the state, the influence of neo-liberal ideas, like public 
choice theory and the criticisms of the old public administration, changes in political and 
ideological context like the New Right ideas, the failure of welfarism, the development in 
information technology and the growth in the role of management consultants (ECA, 2010; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). In the African continent, and in other developing countries of 
the world, public sector reforms were driven by economic necessities, the democratization 
processes and the search for administrative efficiency in the delivery of the quality of goods 
and services to the public (ECA, 2010). It is worth mentioning however, that reforms in 
Africa were inspired by, or have parallels in, the public administration reform experiences of 
both countries outside Africa (Adamolekun and Kiragu 1999; Caiden and Sundaram, 2004) 
and the influence of Bretton Woods Institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Dzimbiri (2008:45) argue that donor countries and agencies recommended reforms to 
developing countries in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes, which were 
economic, political and administrative in nature. For example, the economic reforms related 
to the liberalisation of the economy, the denationalisation, privatisation, or involvement of 
private sector methodologies and the emphasis on the market. Political reforms have focused 
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on issues of democratization, decentralisation, public accountability and the people’s 
engagement and participation (e.g. Dzimbiri, 2008; ECA, 2010). Those administrative 
reforms advocated include de-bureaucratization and the downsizing of the public service, 
with the aim of reducing of corruption to enhance productivity. These ideas are embedded in 
the Washington Consensus, to an extent importantly revised nowadays, yet influential in 
many past and present reform programmes across Africa (ECA 2003a &b; 2010). 
2.1.2. Context:  The Theoretical Arguments 
“The general concept of context assumes entities that are related to each other 
and form a large, tissue- like entity that has no explicit boundaries.” (Pollitt, 
2013b: 4) 
 
In recent years, public administration and management research have focused on the idea of 
context as the yardstick for measuring and illuminating our understanding of comparative 
public policy interventions. According to Peters (2013) all institutions function in a complex 
environment, structured along certain behaviours which either nurtures or constrains their 
opportunities and operations. Andrews (2008) note that social context is also likely to impact 
on the way public institutions are perceived by the public itself, that is, as legitimate or not. 
Invariably, the successes of institutions are largely contingent upon creating some regularity 
of behaviour (Peters, 2013). However, the use of a contextual, analytical framework for 
evaluating public policy interventions and reforms in nation states is not devoid of 
controversies. As Proeller (2013:219) mentioned, whilst there exists a common agreement 
that context influences public management (and vice versa), there are no standard references 
on how to integrate, model and operationalise contexts, or variables of contexts, or how to 
embed and frame these within public management research. A similar point is also made by 
Ferlie and Ongaro (2015), that there has been limited information or discussions on how 
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context affects the strategy of an organisation in the public sector, as well as on why strategic 
management in the public policy literature is thin on matters of context.  
The word context originates in Latin: ‘contextere’ means to weave together to make a 
connected whole (Rugge, 2013). Context has been defined as the background, the 
environment, or the set of circumstances that surrounds an event or the behaviour of an 
organisation or institution (Proeller, 2013: 219).  Van Dijk (2009) notes that context is what 
is relevant to a situation, or operations, of an organisation. Examples of context for John 
(2006) are the situational opportunities and constraints that affect the existence and meaning 
of organizational behaviour, as well as functional relationships between variables. Bamberger 
(2008) sees context in the form of situational factors, such as from industry-, sector-, or 
economy-wide characteristics, to normative and institutional structures and regimes.  
Conclusively, context includes structural, cultural and functional elements that exert both 
direct and indirect influences on the outcome of policy interventions and operations of an 
institution, organisation or a nation state (De Jong et al. 2002).  
Discourses on institutional transfer also deliberate the idea of context. It entails the 
reproduction of an institutional pattern in a context different from the one in which that 
pattern was generated (Rugge, 2013).  Within this framework of analysis, Rugge (2013) 
notes that there are three facets to the word context: (1) it denotes an object of undetermined 
extension (2) denotes one object but evokes two. There is no context without that which is 
contextualised; an object is, or should be, put into a context. In this case, the contextualised, 
or ‘contexted,’ relates to an institutional pattern that belongs to one context though 
transforming to a new one, supposedly ready to receive it, and, (3) a metaphor for context 
suggests a palimpsest or fabric as the institution intended for transfer is woven into another 
institution and into others more numerous and diverse. Rugge (2013) reports that, for the 
advocates of ‘intransigent context,’ ‘context is made up of diverse, cohesive, consistent and 
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homogenous elements; so much so that no exogenous pattern or institution modelled in a 
foreign context can ever intrude into it’. As such, any form of external heterogeneous 
element will be refused, rejected or distorted (Rugge, 2013). 
O’ Toole and Meier (2013) identify three key contextual variables: political, environmental 
and internal. Political context are issues such as unitary versus adversarial powers. 
Environmental context represents the extent of complexity, turbulence, munificence; the 
presence or absence of social capital; the extent of development. Internal context represents 
the extent of goal clarity and consistency, organizational centralization versus 
decentralization, and the degree of professionalism (O’ Toole and Meier, 2013). On the other 
hand, Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011: 48-49) ideas of context focuses on public management 
reform worldwide; based on five key contextual variables: the state structure; the nature of 
executive government; the relationship between political executives and top civil servants; 
the dominant administrative structure, and, the degree of diversity among the main channels 
through which ideas come that fuel management reforms (cultural and functional elements).   
Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) provide a broader-based analysis of contextual issues in public 
management discourses.  The authors contend that context play an important role in strategic 
management of a public organisation, an argument that extends the position posited by Pollitt 
and Bouckaert’s (2011) and O’ Toole and Meier (2013). According to Ferlie and Ongaro 
(2015:122-123), context affects what we label ‘the strategic space’ of a public services 
organization, constituted by: (i) the autonomy that a public services organization enjoys (a 
precondition for strategy to form, the alternative being the absence of any strategy for the 
organization, perhaps partly filled by mere tactical behaviours, individual maximizing 
behaviours, or bureaucratic politics taking place); (ii) the political– societal expectations 
towards a public services organization (what is expected of a public service organization 
strategy, as a key legitimating dimension), and, (iii) the obligations and accountability bases 
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under which a public services organization operates (what public managers as ‘strategists’ 
are accountable for, to whom and how). In contrast to views which dominate the policy and 
academic literature, this states that strategic management is generic and universalistic and its 
applicability and usefulness cannot be ignored in the present day public management. Ferlie 
and Ongaro (2015) believe strategic management in the public sector is context- sensitive 
and context-dependent. The researcher believes the argument offered by Ferlie and Ongaro 
(2015) is pertinent to understanding the context of agencification in Nigeria and the Tertiary 
Education Trust Fund. Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) argue that context is constituted by both the 
‘politico-administrative’ context, i.e. the relatively stable feature of a political– 
administrative system, and the transformative effects of administrative reforms occurring in 
each jurisdiction. This point is relevant to the case of TETFund as the establishment of the 
agency and modification of its interventions through the amendments of its enabling Act 
occurred under different politico- administrative frameworks, alongside public sector reforms 
going on in the country (Nigeria) at various periods in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.  
Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) identified four key important variables on context. First, that there 
is not one context, but rather multiple and intersecting contexts, i.e. multidimensional and 
hydra-headed in nature, and cross cutting. This means that ‘context’ should be conceived of 
in the plural, as ‘contexts’ (cultural, economic, temporal, political, and spatial). Second, 
contexts are both factual and conceptual. Whilst factual refer to entities or dimensions of 
social reality (e.g. where? when? who? and what?), conceptual contexts involve interests, 
motivations, paradigmatic view and methodological preferences of the subject of know- that 
is the person researching or the author). Third, ‘contexts’ is constitutive of action rather than 
just a mere backdrop: action simply either ‘is in context’, or it is not. Four, is about analysis 
of the mechanisms and processes (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015: 124-125).  
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This research uses the work of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), O’Toole and Meier (2013) and 
Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) as the analytical frameworks to unpack context, and the various 
elements identified by these authors will be examined in chapter five as part of the analysis.  
Also, the researcher agrees with the notion when exploring context, strategic management 
matters are of utmost importance (see, e.g. Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). According to Ferlie and 
Ongaro (2015) strategic management in public services organisations is both contingent 
(models of strategic management have nowadays enhanced applicability to many 
contemporary public sector organizations compared to what they had in the past) and 
perennial (strategic management is part and parcel of managing public services 
organizations, or at least managing them where improving performance is one goal). 
TETFund since inception has been focusing on improving performance towards attaining its 
vision, mission, goals and objectives (see Chapter Five).  
2.2. History of Nigerian Civil Service 
The civil service  in Nigeria  has its origin  in the colonial service that was set up by the 
British authorities as the administrative machinery of government in Nigeria for the 
implementation of government policy, routine maintenance of law and order, simple tax 
collection and operation of a modicum of socio-economic services meant apparently for the 
benefit of Britain and British Colonial administrators in terms of self-sufficiency (Phillips, 
1985; Adegboroye, 2006; Lawal and Oluwatoyin, 2011). Following the amalgamation of 
Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914 by Lord Frederick Lugard the civil service 
become more unified. In terms of the structure, the higher rung of the ladder of the colonial 
service that is executive, judicial and legislative was occupied by the British, although 
traditional rulers were co-opted into the colonial power structure. It is worth mentioning that 
during this period the civil service was politically neutral towards the colonial struggle.  
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Political and policy decisions were carried out in the colonial office in London and by British 
colonial officials in Lagos.  According to Phillips (1985) the system benefitted from the fact 
that the top echelon of the civil service was made up of British colonial officers (from 
governor downwards), who by virtue of their positions, also constituted the political class. 
They also appeared to be better educated in the Western sense, than the Nigerians in the 
lower levels of the civil service then.  This dual role of the civil service (civil servant as well 
as political boss) gave the service the relative calm, anonymity, and neutrality which it 
enjoyed during the period (Phillips, 1985).  
With the creation of three regions-North, East and West in 1954, three regional civil services 
emerged. From the services, emerged what laid the foundation of civil service structure in 
Nigeria and from the late 1950s and 1960s, the service became Nigerianised and politicised, 
with ethnic politics and struggle which is still dominant in modern day civil service in 
Nigeria.  
After independence, the civil service expanded its activities from maintenance of law and 
order and simple tax collection to issues such as social and economic development of the 
country.  The civil service became major player in policy formulation and implementation. 
Subsequently, the number of civil servants and number of Ministries and Departments 
increased rapidly from 1960s onward (Phillips, 1985). 
The civil service reform started with Hunt Committee in 1934 and Bridges Committee in 
1941, however, the most significant reforms began in 1945 with the Tudor Davies 
Commission. Since that period (1945), there have been more than 12 of such reforms in 
Nigeria, with varying focuses and complexities of coverage, in terms of their attempts at 
installing more appropriate structures and conditions of service and the need to improve the 
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efficiency and service delivery.  Pre -independence there were five commissions set up to 
review the activities of the civil service.  
In 1945, Tudor Davies Commission was set up to review wages and general conditions of the 
civil service by the British colonial administration. This was followed by the 1946 Harragin 
Salary review Commission, which looked at wages and general conditions of service.  The 
Report of the commission on the Civil Services of British West Africa, 1945-46 by Sir 
Walter Harragin, Kt. C. M.G., Chief Justice, Gold Coast divided the service into ‘senior and 
junior’ service and it covered the four British West African territories of Nigeria, the Gold 
coast, Sierra Leon and the Gambia. It established the two-service structure of ‘senior service’ 
(formerly Groups 1 and 2, almost entirely staffed by Europeans) and ‘junior service’ 
(formerly Groups3 and 4, almost entirely staffed by Africans) heralded the recruitment of 
some few Nigerians into the Senior Service.  It also recommended a Limited Authority 
Service Commissions (for junior service postings only) and dealt with issues such as the 
terms and conditions of Service, Housing, Pensions, Allowances and some individual Job 
Grading. However, the aspect of pensions addressed concerned the benefits of the civil 
servants and their eligibilities in the then Pensions Acts and Schemes and did not consider 
the broad aspects of Pensions as a method for facilitating manpower mobility throughout the 
economy (Public Service Review Commission, 1974:211). 
The Commission Report on the Public Services of the Government in the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1954-55 by L. H. Gorsuch, on its part made a review of the remuneration and 
structure of the Service. It noted the absence of a viable middle category in the Service 
created 5 main Grades. The aftermath of this Report made possible abolishing Senior and 
Junior Services and putting in place instead a five Grade Service structure that had parallel 
classes for both administrative and professionals’ cadres.  It is instructive to note that this 
development remains the basic structure of the Nigerian Federal Civil Service today.  
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Similarly, the report focused on issues such as the Nigerianization of the service, terms and 
conditions of service, as well as training, organisation and methods, and delegations of 
authority within the service. As a result, it proposed a new set of salary scales, based on the 
revised grade structure for the Service. These proposals are of significance considering the 
fact that they reflected the newly-created Federation of Nigeria on 1st October 1954 and the 
consequent demands this constitutional and administrative change made upon the public 
services.  
In January 1959, the A.F.F.P. Newn’s Committee recommended the integration of Ministries 
and Departments as well as defining the roles and functions of Permanent Secretaries within 
the Service. This report focused primarily on integrating existing Ministries and Departments 
of the Federal Civil Service, defining the role and functions of Permanent Secretaries within 
the service and putting in place an administrative machinery for control of Government 
expenditure as well as establishment matters. However, it excluded in its recommendations 
issues that had to do with wages, salaries, or conditions of service. The committee’s 
recommendations, which were modelled after the U.K. situation, were accepted by the 
Government.  
After Newn’s Commission, was the Review of Salaries and wages Report by the 
Commission appointed by the Governments of the Federation, Northern Region, the Eastern 
Region and the Southern Cameroons, in November 1959 headed by L.N. Mbanefo. This 
Commission’s review contained itself to matters related to salaries and wages, but neither 
recommended any alterations as it affects salary structure or grading within the Services nor 
considered matters concerning terms and Conditions of Service. However, it did consider the 
effects of the cost of living as against the existing salaries of Public Servants and the need to 
align Regional and Federal wage rates following workers agitation for competitive wages as 
well as commenting on the disadvantages of using review committees and commissions. 
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After independence a number of committees and commissions were set up by the Federal 
Government to provide recommendations on how to develop the Public Sector. The 
independence of Nigeria in 1960 was achieved by various nationalist movements in Nigeria 
who had used the indigenisation of the civil as a campaign slogan during their struggles. 
Thus, with independence British officials in the civil service were replayed by Nigerians 
following the Nigerianisation policy adopted then by Nigerian leaders (Ogunrotifa, 2012: 
13).  This did not come without attendant problems amongst which are shortage of skilled 
manpower, inefficiency, politicisation and agitations for improved wages. These culminated 
into a general strike in 1963 which forced Government to set up the Morgan’s Commission 
to address issues raised by the workers particularly those relating to wages and conditions of 
service of Junior Workers. The Commission not only considered issues contained in its 
mandate but went further to recommend a grading the entire Service of the Federation, 
covering all the five grades levels and introduced for the first time ever a minimum wage for 
each region of the Country (EL-Rufai, 2008). 
Similarly, it did recommend the establishment of a National Wages Advisory Council which 
could keep pace with cost of living changes and make recommendations to Government. This 
followed on Mbanefo Commission’s recommendations on the need to create some form of 
monitoring machinery within Government as the answer to wage and salary adjustments, 
rather than setting up commissions and committee from outside the government. 
In 1966, the Elwood Grading Team/Commission was established to examine the anomalies 
in the grading of posts and to propose a uniform salary for officers performing identical 
duties. This grading exercise which resulted from Morgan report did not alter Gorsuch 
Committee’s recommended structure of the public service but attempted to rationalize the 
grading of individual posts or groups of posts within that structure.  It also went further to 
comment on disparity of wages in the Public Services (i.e., ‘the levels of the higher salaries 
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are already too great relatively to the levels at the bottom.’) and noted that salary levels in the 
more senior reaches of the services should not be increased. This echoed the 
recommendations made by the Morgan commission (Olaopa, 2012). 
In 1971, the Adebo Wages Commission was set up with a term of reference to look into 
wages and salaries at all levels of the Public Services and in Statutory Corporations as well as 
in all State-Owned Companies. However, the Commission went beyond its terms of 
reference and made comments and recommendations on many subjects.  These included: 
creation of a new 20 grade salary structure, qualification requirements, the role and 
responsibilities of the Permanent Secretaries, management of Statutory Corporations, 
functions of the Trade Union Movement, etc. This was the first report that defined and 
distinguished three different forms of ‘structures’ in relation to the Civil Service as follows: 
(i) organisation of Government (ii) organisation of individual Ministries and Departments, 
(iii) payor grading structure. Lastly, this report recommended the establishment of a Public 
Service Review Committee to examine: the role of the Public Service Commission; structure 
of the civil service; conditions of service; and training arrangements. The significance of that 
Commission’s Report was that it broke the pre-1970 cycle of mechanical reduction of the 
problem of the service to one of compensation. The Commission’s Report thus signalled, 
prophetically, the administrative fault lines and systemic stress fractures of the inherited 
Weberian service structure; issues that are well beyond the confines of wages and salaries 
(Olaopa, 2012). 
In 1972, the Udoji Commission which was constituted to address issues relating to efficiency 
and effectiveness of the civil service in Nigeria had terms of reference which were broader 
and more exacting than those of any previous commission or review as they encompassed the 
whole of the art and practice of public administration in Nigeria excluding the Military 
(Public Service Review Commission Main Report 1974 p.1). The Committee identified the 
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need for the country to modernise its civil service and address the issue of shortage of skilled 
manpower which has been a problem since independence. It emphasised on improved 
personnel management in recruitment, selection, pay, promotion, appraisal, supervision and 
most importantly training.  It also noted that corruption was one of the serious problems of 
the Civil Service in Nigeria and recommended that Government must make it one of its 
prime objectives to control it. Similarly, the Committee also noted that the Public Servants in 
Nigeria were too enamoured by the ways things were done in other Countries as it affects 
organisation of Ministries and other aspects of administration but while these Countries were 
modernising many of their systems the Civil Servant in Nigeria had more reverence for the 
past than for the present or the future.  Many policies and management practices in the 
service the Commission noted were based on experience and guess work rather than on 
objective information obtained through reliable research. To improve on effectiveness and 
efficiency of the public service the commission observed that, an institutional research 
relationship between the Government and Universities must be established. It therefore 
recommended that an attempt must be made to bring to bear research results of the 
Universities on the problems of the Public Services in Nigeria. It also identified other 
problems affecting the Public Service and which need to be addressed and these are; 
animosity and jealousy between Public Servants rather than cooperation and team work to 
meet desired objectives of Government,  contest for power and rewards,  elitism which has 
its roots in the colonial period and which is noticeable in the Public Service which is divided 
into relatively airtight classes which stand in a hierarchy of power and prestige which is both 
undemocratic in spirit and an obstacle to efficient management, reluctance of superiors to 
delegate responsibilities to subordinates  and observed reluctance of subordinates to accept 
responsibilities, lack of appreciation of the role of specialised knowledge and professional 
training in the of the public service, lack of an indigenous lingua franca, which has resulted 
 35 
 
in people below the topmost positions in the  service conducting activities  in a language 
(English language) which ,in varying degrees they had not mastered and this affects 
efficiency due to poor communication, lack of time and number management which affects 
planning and  results oriented management objectives. It therefore, recommended the 
introduction of a new style management system that was capable of meeting the challenges 
of the 70’s and beyond through; a new conception of management which emphasises results 
oriented approach to public service, recruitment and training of skilled personnel and the use 
of scientific knowledge, understanding the concepts and application of project management, 
programme budgeting   and management by objectives, and motivation of human resources 
in the service towards achieving defined goals and effectiveness. 
In addition, it introduced the Open Reporting System for Performance Evaluation and 
established a Unified Grading and Salary Structure covering all posts in the Service. It 
created a unified senior management group for both administrative and professional staff for 
central management career.  Further recommendations of the commission are as follows; (1) 
a new, single public service staffed and led by professionals and officers who possess the 
requisite skills and knowledge and can apply such in setting goals and achieving targets; (2) 
the need for every public manager to be trained in project management, management by 
objectives, and programme budgeting; (3) the adoption of project management as a tool for 
inter-ministerial task execution to hone skills/competencies and ensure better integration of 
Government services; (4) greater delegation of human resource management functions to 
Ministries, Departments and Agencies(MDAs); (5) the decentralization of staff consultation 
and negotiation machinery; (6) the speedy treatment of disciplinary cases arising in the face 
of complicated disciplinary procedures and canvassed for recognition of Civil Service rules 
as part of the contract of service; and (7) the institution of an ombudsman (at both federal and 
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state levels) for the review of administrative decisions which are considered unjust (Public 
Service Review commission main Report 1974).  
2.3 Public Sector Reforms in Nigeria from the 1980 
2.3.1 Onosode Presidential Commission on Parastatals 1981 
This commission was set up by the Federal Government against the backdrop of persistent 
agitation by statutory corporations and state-owned companies and other parastatals for their 
inclusion in the unified grading and salary system for the public service following the 
recommendations of the Udoji Public Service Review Commission in 1974 (Report). The 
progressive reduction of their autonomy, pay and benefits in comparison to the civil service 
had started in 1968, following the recommendation of the working party on statutory 
corporations and state-owned companies under the chairmanship of Chief Michael Ani. The 
main thrust of these agitations was the degree of autonomy, higher salaries, and more 
generous fringe benefits and generally the better conditions of service (compared to the civil 
service) they enjoyed before the recommendations of the working party committee, 
(Onosode, 1981). 
They argued that the undesirable rationalisation neither reflected the differences in work nor 
its complexities; it did not take into consideration the main reasons for setting up the 
statutory corporations to operate outside the civil service. These parastatals questioned the 
appropriateness of their inclusion in the unified grading and salary system since, in their 
view, they differed from the civil service because they were profit-oriented, simply, and the 
nature of their work was not similar. They felt being asked to adapt the civil service salaries 
and grading system to be detrimental to their decision-making process as it brought them 
directly under the full control of the ministries, which had hitherto exercised only a distant 
supervisory role over them. They demanded unfettered autonomy to undertake their activities 
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without the interference of the ministries and the parastatals. They also called for the freedom 
of their various Boards of Directors to determine their wages and fringe benefits and being 
recognised as commercial and /or industrial enterprises with freedom to behave as such in a 
competitive market. Further, they agitated for remuneration according to the market value of 
their professions and industries and on a basis comparable to the private sector practice. 
Equally, they demanded the limits of authority for approval of contracts by their Boards and 
Management to be raised and for recognition as government’s expert advisers in matters 
relating to their operation given that this expertise lay in the parastatals rather than in the 
ministries themselves. They also asked for sufficient freedom to fix tariffs and other charges 
for services rendered to the public to make profit or at least to break even.  
The Onosode Commission was set up to address these concerns; the contentions had been 
protracted and had affected staff morale. Onosode Commission examined the operations of 
these parastatals, e.g. the organisation, structure, management and job content of all Public 
Corporations and Federal Government-owned Companies and other Parastatals (excluding 
universities). In view of the relationship between these and the rest of the Public Service and 
similar organisations in the Private Sector, it considered whether any Parastatals should 
indeed be removed from the present unified salary system; the justification for doing so was 
assessed and offered guidelines for fixing salaries of any such Parastatals removed from the 
said unified grading system.  
The Commission, amongst other things, recommended that Boards of these Parastatals be 
given appropriate authority to undertake their own responsibilities and from whom proper 
accountability should be consistently demanded. Similarly, it recommended that the 
Parastatals should be given more autonomy, especially for devising conditions of service 
appropriate to their employees and the removal of some of the Parastatals from the unified 
grading system.  
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2.3.2. Dotun Phillips Reform Committee 1986  
The Dotun Philips Reform Committee was set up in 1986 and it attempted to reform the Civil 
Service alongside the Structural Adjustment Programme of Government. The Committee 
examined the Structure, Staffing and Operations of the Federal Civil Service (Anazodo et 
al.., 2012). The recommendations of the Phillips panel were: to enhance professionalism; to 
align with the Presidential System of Government; to decentralize and delegate; to combine 
authority with responsibility; to enhance accountability; to enhance checks and balances; to 
implement a general modernisation of the Service, and, to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency as well as speed of operation. These recommendations were put into law through 
the Civil Service Reorganization Decree No. 43 (1988). Some of the most important 
provisions of the reforms were the abolishment of the Office of the Head of Service. 
Ministers, in addition to being the Chief Executives of their various Ministries had also 
become the Accounting Officers in place of Permanent Secretaries, removing the post of 
Permanent Secretaries and thus creating, in its place, the new political post of Director 
General who was to hold office at the pleasure of the President. Such an appointee was also 
expected to vacate office when the Government that appointed him or her completed its term 
of Office, unless re-appointed by an incoming Administration. The changes were to 
encourage the professionalization of the Service to stimulate specialisation and expertise 
thereby ensuring that officers develop a career in a Ministry or Department. The restructuring 
of Ministries was along Departmental lines to reflect the basic functions and areas of concern 
of the Ministry. Each Subdivision further Sub-divided into branches. These, too, were yet 
further sub-divided into smaller Sections. Furthermore, each Ministry was authorised to 
undertake the appointment, promotion and discipline of its staff under the General and 
Uniform Guidelines provided by the Federal Civil Service Commission (FCSC). Lastly, each 
Ministry or Extra-Ministerial Department was to be allowed to have up to three and not more 
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than five common services Departments, namely, Personnel Management, Finance and 
Supplies, and of Planning, Research and Statistics.  
The 1988 Civil Service Reorganization Decree 43 promulgated by General Ibrahim 
Babangida had a major impact on the structure and efficiency of the Civil Service. This 
reform gave a formal recognition to the politicization of the upper rung of the Civil Service 
and some other changes. For example, Ministerial responsibilities were merged with 
administrative controls as Ministers were not only the Political Head of the Ministries, but 
also the Accounting Officers. The designation of Permanent Secretary was replaced with 
Director General who was also recognised as Deputy Minister with a tenure concomitant 
with the Government that appointed them. The appointment of the Director General was no 
longer based on seniority as anyone from within and outside the Service could be so 
appointed. Further, the office of the Head of Service and the Officers’ Pool System were 
abolished (Igbuzor, 1988). 
2.3.3 Ayida Civil Service Review Panel 1995  
In 1995, the Government set up the Alison Ayida Civil Service Review Panel, in response to 
criticisms of the Dotun Philip Reforms. This panel recommended that Decree No. 43 of 1988 
be abrogated, because it discovered that the Civil Service was over-centralised and there 
were constant conflicts between cadres and poor drive for attainment of results and concrete 
performance. Similarly, the Panel found the Civil Service has low staff morale, suffered from 
inadequate staff development initiatives and reduced productivity.  
2.3.4. The Public Sector Reform 1999-2007 
In 1999, a range of Public Sector Reforms was initiative in response to weak economic 
performance, poor infrastructure, poverty and high level unemployment, corruption, lack of 
confidence in Government and massive debts. These were associated with prolonged Military 
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Rule. In his inaugural speech on 22nd May 1999, titled ‘the New Dawn,’ the President 
Olusegun Obasanjo described the kind of Public Service of his dream in the following words:  
‘…people–oriented rather than self- serving, innovative rather than the rule-
bound, capable of forging constructive partnership with outside groups rather 
than being insular; that is professionally competent and free from corruption; 
that constantly subjects programmes to relevance and effectiveness tests rather 
than being complacent; that uses hierarchical control as a means of 
strengthening management accountability rather than as a device for stifling 
initiative and creativity’. 
 
In order to achieve this goal, President Obasanjo later revealed his vision for the Civil 
Service and (by extension) of the whole Public Service as follows: a competent, professional, 
development-oriented, public-spirited and consumer friendly Civil Service, capable of 
responding effectively and speedily to the needs of the society; the restoration of the core 
values of the Service, such as political neutrality, impartiality, integrity, loyalty, 
transparency, professionalism and accountability; public service that is guided by equity, 
where things are done in the right way, based on extant rules and regulations, but with room 
for discretion, which should be exercised in the public interest; creation of a suitable 
environment where Civil Servants are assured of protection and job security in the faithful 
discharge of their duties and responsibilities; and, a competitive, well-remunerated, and 
motivated Public Service (Ogunrotifa, 2012:18). 
Conclusively, Public Sector Reforms by Obasanjo administration came from internal and 
external pressures. For example, in both Developing and Developed Nations, the role of the 
Government had changed from sole providers to that of enablers of job and wealth creation 
(this of course is in line with New Public Management).  Other factors responsible for this 
Reform are: economic pressures, technological advances and changes, need to manage 
resources and reduce wasteful Public Service expenditure, the need to improve citizens’ 
confidence in public services and goods, pressures from Non-Governmental organisations, 
 41 
 
Millennium Development Goals priorities, pressure from the International Development 
Partners and other Donor Communities demanding reforms as conditions for development 
grants as well as pressure from regional agreements (NEPAD agreement, for example).  
2.3.5. Initiatives towards Public Service Reforms 1999 
Between 1999 and 2001, Obasanjo’s administration reorganised the top hierarchy and the 
Directorate Cadre of the Civil Service. This, the administration argued is vital to progress in 
the Public Service. To achieve its reform the Presidency organised series of retreats for 
Ministers, Special Advisers and Permanent Secretaries to consider reforming the Civil 
Service. The Office of the Head of Civil Service produced a document containing a 
comprehensive strategy for reforming the Civil Service based on the directive of Federal 
Executive Council (2001).  The document was produced through a pilot study of seven 
ministries and agencies namely: Federal Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Federal Capital 
Territory, National Planning Commission, Federal Ministry of Information and National 
Orientation and the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation. The findings of this 
study were as follows: an aging Civil Service, in which about 60 per cent of the staff were 40 
years and above; the preponderance of unskilled Staff within levels 01-06 which constituted 
about 70 per cent of the entire workforce; the prevalence of ghost workers, symptomatic of 
the poor record keeping of  personnel records and payroll systems; stagnation at the higher 
levels, especially the Directorate Cadre, reflective of poor succession and career planning; 
absence of mission and vision statements, work programmes, corporate and individual 
schedules of functions; under-sourcing of key institutions; absence of working tools; erosion 
of professionalism and espirit de corps;  non-transparent and corruption ridden procurement 
System; abandonment of training courses to sharpen skills for Service, further accentuated by 
the decay of all training institutions; ad hoc responses to policy making, devoid of vigorous 
long–term policy analysis, consultation and monitored control; near absence of an IT-enabled 
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system of work operations; unproductive rule-based hierarchical system which stifles 
individual and corporate creativity, as well as accountability, and, a fundamentally flawed 
performance management system totally devoid of objectivity (Report of In-Country Senior 
Executive Seminar on Nigeria’s Public Service Reform, 2006:44). 
Based on these findings, the Government established the National Economic Empowerment 
and Development Strategy (NEEDS) in 2003. NEEDS is the National Strategy for Public 
Sector Reforms with a range of partnership drawing on stakeholders from States and Local 
Governments and National Assembly. It was deemed as a perquisite to good governance, and 
sustainable National Development.  
NEEDS have three main priorities informed by Macro Economic Framework:  job creation, 
provision of affordable housing, improving health care services, strengthening the skill base, 
protecting the vulnerable and promoting peace and security; promoting and encouraging 
private enterprise by creating an enabling environment for business to thrive, stabilizing the 
value of the Naira, diversifying the economy to reduce dependency on oil, privatizing, de-
regulating and liberalizing government-owned industries, developing infrastructure, 
improving agriculture and promoting other key sectors such as information and 
communications technologies, tourism, entertainment and financial services, protect the 
environment and ensure sustainable management of natural resources; and changing the way 
government operates by identifying the core business of government and adhering to them 
while allowing other stakeholders to run business and provide other services for which they 
have comparative advantage over government. Others include implementing accountability, 
transparency and anti- corruption measures and curtailing unbridled waste in the Public 
Service through pension reform, modernization of fringe benefits, national health insurance 
scheme and budgetary discipline (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on 
Nigeria’s Public Service Reform, 2006:44). 
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These key priorities are entrenched within the economic management, governance and 
institutional strengthening, Public Service reforms transparency, accountability and anti-
corruption reforms will be achieved through the establishment of the following: the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
It is however, important to note that regional initiatives such as the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) were 
incorporated into NEEDS. 
Key Areas of the Public Service Reforms of 1999 
The Public Service Reforms focused on five key areas:  
Budget and financial management: procurement system review, institutionalization of fiscal 
responsibility, accounting reforms and audit reforms; 
Accountability: due process, transparency and accountability in government transactions, 
establishment of Service Charters and institutionalization of compliance enforcement; 
Human Resources Management: decentralization of human resources management from the 
Federal Civil Service Commission to Ministries, Departments and Agencies, personnel 
records and payroll cleaning, staff cadre reviews, remodelling of recruitment and promotion 
procedures of the Civil Service, including the injection of competent professionals, young 
and bright people, experts with rare skills; introduction of a new performance management 
scheme; creation of professionally-manned Human Resources Management Departments, 
competent in manpower planning, career and succession manning, training and development 
etc., undertaking pay reforms, as a strategy for attracting and retaining talents in the service, 
massive capacity development and training and organisational culture change; 
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Operation and system: organizational restructuring and right-sizing, work process redesign 
and information and technology applications; 
Value reorientation and integrity reforms: This involves the development of a new 
generation of leaders of high integrity and a service driven by a culture of integrity (Report of 
In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria’s Public Service Reform, 2006:44). 
Similarly, the reforms affected Parastatals and their Management. For instance, there were 
over 500 government-owned Agencies, Parastatals and Corporations. Over the years, they 
have haemorrhaged government resources. The following are some of the measures taken in 
relation to the functions of the Parastatals: accelerated privatization through the Bureau of 
Public Enterprises(BPE); scrappage and/or merger of some Parastatals; review of mandate 
and amendment to the legal instruments through the adoption of incorporated legal forms to 
replace the legal status of Statutory Corporations; possible conversion of some Parastatals to 
Executive Agencies; total removal of subvention for certain categories of Parastatals; 
reorientation of Management of Parastatals towards self- sustenance,  profit making, cost 
effectiveness and cost consciousness;  establishment of benchmarks of recruitment/overhead 
ratio to capital expenditure; redundancy management and right-sizing; and re-
professionalization, and, Strengthening of the evaluation and monitoring mechanism of 
parastatals through the introduction of such accounting instruments such as service charter. 
In addition, regular survey of stakeholders’ perception and service delivery, peer review, as 
well as league-ranking parastatals based on predetermined corporate performance indicators 
is recommended (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria’s Public 
Service Reform, 2006:44). 
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2.3.6. The Oronsaye Committee and Recent Reforms 
During Obasanjo’s government, the Oronsaye thirteen-member presidential committee on the 
Review and Revision of Public Service Rules, Regulations and Procedures was constituted 
On Thursday 3rd February 2005. It comprised two Ministers of Cabinet Rank, five serving 
and one retired Permanent Secretary, a Commissioner from the Federal Civil Service 
Commission, Accountant General of the Federation, Auditor-General for the Federation, the 
Director General, Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON) and Director General 
Bureau of Public Service Reforms (BPSR) (Adegoroye, 2005). The Committee which was 
Chaired by the Principal Secretary to the President and Permanent Secretary, State House Mr 
Stephen Oronsaye, who later become the Head of the Federal Civil Service; had the 
following mandates: to immediately work out transitional arrangements to facilitate on-going 
Public Service Reforms, especially in the areas of recruitment/ appointments, deployment, 
discipline, performance management and incentives and voluntary exist incentives, among 
others; to study, analyse and review the existing January 2000 Public Service Rules, 
Financial Regulations, Circulars and other Extant Regulations and to bring them in line with 
the current reforms of government, taking into account, recently policies like monetization of 
Fringe Benefits, the Pensions Reform Act and Public Procurement Bill; to incorporate into 
the Revised Public Service Rules and Financial Regulations, other relevant rules and 
procedures that will ensure enforcement of compliance, strict observance of transparency, 
justice, equity and accountability in the conduct of Government business; to make 
appropriate recommendations that will ensure that the application of the Public Service Rules 
and the Financial Regulations on Public Officers is consistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution, and, to make any other recommendations on the Public Service Rules and 
Financial Regulations as may be deemed necessary (Adegoroye, 2005:6). 
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In April 2005, the Oronsaye Committee submitted an Interim Report to the President 
containing provisions on appointments, recruitment and deployments, performance 
management and incentives, discipline and exit from the service, pending the conclusion of 
its assignments (Adegoroye, 2005:6).  On April 16, 2012, Oronsaye submitted its report to 
President Goodluck Jonathan in which it recommended the reduction of the existing 263 
Statutory Government Agencies in the Country to 161.  In all, the committee recommended 
the abolition of 38 Agencies, merged 52 and reverted 14 Agencies to Departments in the 
relevant Ministries (Adetayo, 2014). The white paper was printed in March 2014 (Anuforo, 
2014).  
The Public-Sector Reforms of President Jonathan were anchored on his Transformation 
Agenda TA (2011-2015) and Vision 20: 2020 of his predecessor President Yar’adua which 
aimed at making Nigeria one of the top 20 economies in the world by the year 2020. The 
Transformation/Vision 20:2020 agenda aimed to address: decades of personalised rule that 
undermined the processes of governance and the integrity of their operators; the erosion of 
confidence of the Civil Service; weak Parliament that was short on confidence and at best 
tentative in its constitutional role of checking the Executive; a weak Judiciary would require 
time to recover from long years of Executive intimidation and interference; a Media that 
needed to find its voice again as the Fourth Estate; weak institutions around the country, at 
Federal as well as State levels and, unsustainable economic growth or development with the 
state of poor infrastructure, education and healthcare, limited job opportunities for the 
population, (Mid-Term Report of the Transformation Agenda (May 2011- May 2013) - 
Taking Stock, Moving Forward) 
The TA is not a standalone, strategic plan, as it builds on the foundations of the 1st National 
Implementation Plan (NIP) of the Nigeria Vision 20:2020 (NV20:2020). The implementation 
of the NV 20:2020 would be through three medium term Strategic Plans: 1st National 
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Implementation Programme 2010- 2013; 2nd National Implementation Programme 2014-
2017, and, 3rd National Implementation Programme 2018-2020 (Usman, 2013). The NV 
20:2020 is an expression of Nigeria’s intent to improve the living standards of her citizens 
and place the Country among top 20 economies in the World, with a minimum GDP of $900 
billion and per capita income of not less than $4000 per annum. Other objectives are to 
achieve fiscal prudence, fiscal balance, low inflation and availability of infrastructural 
facilities to propel the economy, (Mid-Term Report of the Transformation Agenda (May 
2011-May2013). 
In Nigeria, the Public Sector has experienced, or witnessed, a variety of government and 
governance systems or administration, e.g. Civil, Military, Parliamentary, Presidential, 
Quasi-Federal and Semi-Military. The Military and Quasi-Federal Systems have had the 
longest and the most profound impact on the sector. The reforms introduced the privatisation 
of goods and services such as electricity, transportation and communications. Similarly, 
Monye Emina (2012:19) notes that the Public-Sector Reform in Nigeria has entailed large-
scale worker retrenchment (retirement or outright lay-off) under the euphemisms of ‘down-
sizing’, ‘right-sizing’, ‘reorganisation’ and ‘restructuring’. In addition, some key 
Government Parastatals were removed from the mainstream Public Service and autonomous 
and semi-autonomous Agencies were established.  According to the ECA (2010:48) the 
Reforms in Nigeria were influenced by New Public Management. 
 
Progress has been made in relation to the Public-Sector Reforms in Nigeria since 1999. 
Firstly, waste curtailment through monetization of Fringe Benefits, the introduction of 
National Health Insurance Scheme, Pension Reforms, Service Compact with all Nigerians 
(SERVICOM), Procurement Reform, Integrated Personnel Payroll Information System 
(IPPIS) and the passage of a Fiscal Responsibility Act 2007/10 to ensure prudent 
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management of resources. The Pension Scheme, also known as the Contributory Pension 
Scheme, was introduced to address the problem of increasing difficulties on the part of the 
Government to meet pension liabilities to its workers - both those retired and those still 
working (Omisore, 2013:18). The objectives of the new Pension Scheme are to: ‘ensure that 
every person who worked in either the Public Service of the Federation, Federal Capital 
Territory or the Private Sector receives his retirement benefits as and when due; assist 
improvident individuals by ensuring that they save to cater for their livelihood during old age 
and, establish a uniform set of rules, regulations and standards for the administration and 
payments of retirement benefits for the Public Service of the Federation, Federal Capital 
Territory and the Private Sector’ (Omisore, 2013:18). 
 
Discussed above is how in Nigeria, all MDAs have a contract with their customers 
incorporated in Service Charters. This must be discharged, and it is used for measuring their 
effectiveness on quality and timely delivery of services (Adegoroye, 2005:2). The Charter 
details outlines ‘the mandate areas of the organisation, its range of customers, the range of 
services provided, quality expectations, schedules and time of delivery, avenue for lodging 
complaints and of seeking redress, among others’ (Adegoroye, 2005:2). SERVICOM- 
Service Compact with all Nigerians- which Abdullah (2008) referred to as the mother of all 
reforms, is an initiative aimed at achieving service excellence in public sector organisations 
(see Omisore, 2013:20).  The focus of SERVICOM is to ensure that the Vision and Goals of 
Public Sector Organisations are achieved (Omisore, 2013:20). The focus in the Charter is 
about improving service delivery, staff training, ensuring transparency and accountability, 
and empowerment of Citizens by responding to their needs (Abdullah, 2008, cited in 
Omisore, 2013:20).  In addition, every Government Department, Ministries, Agencies, and 
Parastatals must have a SERVICOM Unit. In TETFund, there is a SERVICOM Unit which 
focuses on service delivery. 
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The National Health Insurance Scheme was introduced to allow employees and 
dependants to register with any Health Care Provider (HCP) approved by Government 
(Public or Private), (Omisore, 2013:20). The objectives of the Schemes are ‘to ensure 
full private sector participation in health care delivery, every Nigerian has access to 
quality health care services, protect families from the financial hardship of huge 
medical bills, limit in the rise of cost of health care services, and ensure availability of 
funds to the health sector for improved services’ (Omisore, 2013:20). 
 
Secondly, restructuring of the Civil Service- (such as the Federal Capital Territory 
Administration, Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA’s) - was introduced 
with the aim to promote efficiency and effectiveness. Service-cleansing focused on the 
retrenchment of Grade Levels 01-06, consisting of cleaners, gardeners, drivers, messengers, 
and clerical assistants who form 70% of the core civil service. Thirdly, there was a focus on 
rules and regulations, e.g. strengthening existing training institutions such as the 
Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON) in Badagry. The Public Service Institute 
(PSI) was established in Abuja to train both middle level management and executive 
management (also discussed below). The major anti-corruption Agencies created are the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Similarly, the Code of Conduct 
Bureau and the Code of Conduct Tribunal were set up by the Federal Government as extra 
Ministerial Departments under the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Cap 56, LFN 
1990 (the functions and activities are discussed below). The Code of Conduct Bureau was set 
up to assist public officers to be accountable and to adopt transparent practices in carrying 
out their duties (Adegoroye, 2005). 
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The standards of behaviour expected of public officers are also clearly spelt out in the Civil 
Service handbook, and it is expected that officials who violate these provisions would be 
sanctioned in line with the law (Adegoroye, 2005). The Code of Ethics for Public Officers, as 
enshrined in the handbook further reinforce and expand the scope of similar codes contained 
in the Civil Service Handbook. Similarly, the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act 
(2012) and the Public Procurement Act (2007) respectively, were meant to address issues of 
transparency and accountability in the country (Adegoroye, 2005) (as discussed in Chapter 
Six). The Bureau of Public Sector Reforms (BPSR) was set up to oversee and sustain the 
reforms (ECA, 2010: 67). 
 
On 13 June 2000, the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC) through the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 was signed into 
law (Adegoroye, 2005; Aduda, 2007: 27). Its duties, as delineated in Section 6 (a-f) of the 
Act 2000, and can be summarised thus: Enforcement duties:- to receive and investigate 
reports of corrupt offences as created by the Act and in appropriate cases prosecute the 
offender (s); Prevention Duties - to examine, review and enforce the correction of corruption- 
prone systems and procedures of public bodies, with a view to eliminating or minimizing  
corruption in public life, and, Education Duties -  to educate and enlighten the public on, and 
against corruption, with a view to enlisting and fostering public support for the fight against 
it (Aduda, 2007: 27). 
Approaches to corruption by ICPC includes coordinating the establishment of Anti-
Corruption and Transparency Units ( ACTUs) in 145 Government Ministries, Parastatals, 
Departments and Agencies; carrying out studies on the systems, practices and procedures of 
44 public sector organisations, located in various states of the Federation, with a view to 
identifying the dysfunctionalities in the systems and the work processes of these sampled 
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organisations which encourage the acts of corruption in order to address them; carrying out 
public education and enlightenment campaigns on the ills of corruption with special focus on 
Public Sector institutions and youths; and developing a National Values Curriculum in 
collaboration with the Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council for 
implementation at all levels of the educational system (Adegoroye, 2005, see also Aduda, 
2007). 
EFCC was established in 2002. The enabling Act mandates the EFCC to combat financial 
and economic crime (Aduda, 2007: 27). The commission is empowered to prevent, 
investigate, prosecute and penalise economic and financial crimes and is charged with the 
responsibility of enforcing the provisions of other laws and regulations relating to economic 
and financial crimes (Aduda, 2007). EFCC operates through coordinating the enforcement of 
the following laws: Money Laundering (Prohibition Act 2004); The Advanced Fee Fraud 
(other related Offences) Act 1995; The Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial 
Malpractices in Banks Act 1994; as amended; The Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 
1991; as amended Miscellaneous Offences Act 1983 Other complimentary laws on economic 
and financial crime, including crime code and penal code (Adegoroye, 2005). 
In 2003, the government of Nigeria (among others) set up the Budget Monitoring and Price 
Intelligence Unit (BMPIU)- otherwise known as ‘due process’- to check widespread 
corruption, gross incompetence and related vices in public procurement and service delivery 
to citizens. The Unit aims to block the loopholes inherent in the reckless and dubious 
processes that contract awards often involve, and to ensure compliance with guidelines and 
procedures laid down for procurement in capital projects and associated goods and services 
(Aduda, 2007, xi). It was created to enforce standards in Public Sector Procurement. Prior to 
the establishment of the Unit, the Procurement System was ridden with corruption leading to 
huge losses to government.  With this current system, however, a mechanism has also been 
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put in place to detect and punish over-invoicing of government contracts. Unlike previously, 
where tenders are open to all bidders, contract awards now also undergo a process of rigorous 
review, oversight and certification by the BMPIU. This has curtailed the ‘looting’ of public 
funds and ensured value for money in all government transactions (Adegoroye, 2005). 
BMPIU is a progressive measure that promotes good governance and financial management 
at the same time ensuring provision of quality goods and services (Aduda, 2007). 
BMPIU was established with a remit: to harmonise existing government policies/ practices 
and update same on public procurement; to determine whether or not Due Process has been 
observed in the procurement of services and contracts; to introduce more honesty, 
accountability and transparency into the procurement process; to establish and update pricing 
standards and benchmarks for all supplies to government; to monitor the implementation of 
projects during execution with a view to providing information on performance, output and 
compliance with specifications and targets, and, to ensure that only projects which have been 
budgeted for are admitted for execution ( Aduda, 2007: 28). 
The goal of the BMPIU is to ensure full compliance with the guidelines and procedures as 
laid down for the procurement of capital and minor capital projects as well as for associated 
goods and services (Aduda, 2007:47). In terms of Implementation strategies, the BMPIU 
operates under the following guidelines: regulatory functions, certification functions, 
monitoring functions, and, training and advisory functions (Aduda, 2007: 20 29). The 
creation of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms in 2003 and its formal establishment in 
2004 provided an institutional platform to promote professionalism and ethical standards in 
the Public Service (Adegoroye, 2005). 
In addition, the National Planning Commission was established.  This Commission is 
responsible for the coordination of Strategic Planning Process of the country- including 
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monitoring and evaluation of policies, programmes and projects; policy research and advice 
to national and sub-national governments; formulation and coordination of national 
development plans- including oversight of the implementation of  TA and the NV 20:2020; 
monitoring and evaluation of policies, programme and projects; managing multi-lateral, bi-
lateral and regional economic cooperation, including development aid and technical 
assistance, and carry out surveillance on the economy; coordinating and production of 
official statistics and managing the National Statistical System; capacity development for 
efficient and effective utilization of resources and, generation of credible knowledge for 
national development, serves as secretariat to the National Economic Council  (Usman, 
2013:12). 
From 2010-2013, NPC championed various strategic initiatives: at Federal and State levels 
and implemented several reforms and initiatives- leading to improved outcomes (Usman, 
2013: 22) such as; 
Institutionalisation of strategic planning process at the Federal Level: cascading the strategic 
planning to sub-national levels and MDAs; professionalization of DPRs at the Federal Level; 
conducting Needs Assessment of State’s Planning and Statistical Agencies for enhanced 
service delivery; improvement in human and infrastructural capacity of the institutions;  
MDAs and States are encouraged to develop the culture of strategic planning, and, to align 
budgetary submissions of MDAs to the plan provisions 
Institutionalisation of Performance Management and Contracting: aimed at measuring 
ministerial and individual officer performance against negotiated performance targets; with 
the introduction of the PMS, the public service has recorded improvement and clarity in the 
alignment of institutional and individual performance (Usman, 2013) 
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At the level of government, there is awareness of the need to sharpen the skills of Public 
Service officers. This is being done through a mix of strategies including: repositioning of 
existing training institutions such as the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria (ASCON) 
Badagry, the Centre for Management Development, Federal Training Centres, etc; 
establishment of the Public Service Institute in Abuja to focus on both middle level 
Management and Executive Management training and development; strengthening the 
capacity of the Management Development Office ( MDO) in the Office of the Head of the 
Civil Service of the Federation for effective discharge of its oversight functions in the area of 
service wide training and development; adequately harnessing the opportunities provided in 
the area of training and development through the avenues of international cooperation as well 
a partnership with development partners such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, World 
Bank, Department for International Development ( DFID), and, realigning training curricular 
and current requirements in terms of needs service wide ( Adegoroye, 2005:5) 
Current strategies being implemented to promote ethical conduct in the Public Service 
include: creation and strengthening of anti-corruption agencies for strict enforcement of anti-
corruption laws; creation of more institutional platforms for enforcing standards; initiating 
reforms to combat corruption and promote transparency and accountability; balancing the 
power of Ministers, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and the Federal Civil Service 
Commission in the area of discipline; empowerment of the top hierarchy of the Service to set 
the moral tone in ethical conduct, and, creation of African Peer Review Mechanisms Desks 
in MDAs (Adegoroye, 2005). 
There are still some challenges inspite of the various initiatives described above. These are: 
the existence of ghost workers (although to some extent this has been addressed by the 
recently introduced Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information System-IPPS), lack of 
professionalism, resistance to reforms at institutional and individual levels, centralisation, 
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lack of customer orientation, capacity gaps, lack of integrated approach to service delivery 
(silo operation methods) and information sharing and management.  
2.4. NPM Inspired Public Sector Reforms in Africa  
In the 1970s and 1980s, Public Sector Reform was pervasive in most African countries; 
induced by economic conditions, democratization processes, administrative inefficiency, lack 
of accountability and presentation, excessive power, indifference to public needs and 
demands, weak public services, influence of IMF and World Bank, and international and 
continental push for Public Management Reforms (see, e.g. ECA, 2003, 2010; Ayee, 2008). 
Initiatives and Pan-African governmental agreements, e.g. New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African 
Union, are examples of continental push for public sector reforms. The reforms were 
underpinned by neoliberal ideology, modernisation of Public Management efficiency, 
establishment of Public Private Partnerships, citizen participation, accountability, 
Management by Objectives, free market principles etc.  The reform was an approach seen as 
necessary to rescue Africa from economic and social upheaval.  
The Public Management Reforms introduced across African countries, reflected New Public 
Management techniques and principles (ECA, 2003; 2010). NPM was used as a uniform 
template for Public Sector Reforms in Africa (see ECA, 2010). Nonetheless, the weak 
institutional capacities of some of the Countries in Africa made reforms difficult (AfDB, 
2005:132). For example, NPM reforms failed to address inherent problems of clientelism and 
neo-patrimonialism in the public sector of some of the African Countries (Ayee, 2008:26; 
ECA, 2010). Accordingly, the failure of NPM reforms in some African countries is 
associated with social, political and economic problems. Therefore, the argument would be 
that (also in line with the premise of this thesis) evolution, structure and feature of a 
 56 
 
country’s public sector is shaped by socio-political, cultural and historical experiences. This 
position is important for successful implementation of public sector reforms. 
In some African Countries, Public Sector Reforms produced remarkable results, e.g. 
Botswana. The success of reform in Botswana is often associated with the political, 
environmental and internal contexts of the Country. For example, Botswana has good 
institutional capacity: political stability, efficient civil service, constitutional order, law-based 
state and respect for the rule of law, state legitimacy, to good leadership succession (ECA, 
2010:7-8).  Notably, the Country concentrated on promoting economic market discipline and 
created enabling environment for public and private sector partnership to flourish (ADB 
2005; ECA, 2010: 7-8).  The following are examples of reforms adopted by the Botswana 
government: the ‘Botswana and its Vision 2016’, mainstreamed through NPM techniques 
such as Performance Management System (PMS), Work Improvement Teams (WITs), 
Computerized Personnel Management System (CPMS), Organization and Methods Reviews 
(OMRs), Performance Based Reward System (PBRS) and Decentralization (Dzimbiri, 2008; 
ECA, 2010). Correspondingly, through the rationalisation of ministries and government 
departments, a few Agencies were established. The reforms were successful in Botswana 
because of competent leadership and dedicated workforce (ECA, 2010: 7-8). 
In 1996, Tanzania adopted the Agency form of organisation as Public Sector Reform agenda.  
This was done to address failing economic and weak Public Service. According to Caulfield 
(2002) the Government of Tanzania launched the Civil Service Reform Programme with the 
objective of achieving a ‘smaller, affordable, well-compensated, efficient and effectively 
performing Civil Service. Following this, Parastatals accused of inefficiency and corruption 
were dismantled and privatised and some became Agencies (Caulfield, 2002). The Agencies 
in Tanzania had capacity problems as they experienced financial problems. For instance, 
most of the Agencies operated on vastly reduced Personnel and for those Agencies were 
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unable to afford to appoint new staff, Performance management responsibilities had fallen 
heaviest on the cadre of Professional Staff. According to Caulfield (2002) the resources of 
time and money were major problems. The Agencies also suffered from the problem of 
inadequate parenting. Permanent secretaries failed to grasp the important ‘Strategic 
Management’ role that they must play, especially and most importantly their role in 
Performance Monitoring (Caulfield, 2002). In addition, the wider political culture affected 
the performance of the Executive Agencies. Caulfield (2002) notes that perhaps the biggest 
difficulty for Tanzania’s Executive Agencies is the wider political culture that experiences 
power as very centralised on the President, where direct relations with the President and the 
Chief Secretary are what really count.  In this environment, the concept of Ministerial 
responsibility remains underdeveloped and the governance of Executive Agencies remains 
weak. Based on these experiences of reforms in Tanzania, one could argue that NPM style 
solution must be introduced with alternatives that take into consideration the socio-economic 
and political context of a Nation State. 
2.5. Summary  
NPM comprises neither a unified theory of, nor a random collection of, ideas about public 
management, but rather it embodies a kind of administrative argument based upon specific 
doctrines and related justifications (Barzelay, 2001).  Research particularly that which is 
country specific, has been able to identify successful implementation of NPM.  There is an 
emerging narrative, described as post-NPM, which is a modification or replacement to NPM, 
with diverse arguments around it, with some school of thought arguing that it is not an 
alternative. Post-NPM narratives are diverse in nature, covering issues such as terrorism, 
climate change and financial matters. NPM is still alive in many countries, and NPM reforms 
have been revised or supplemented by post NPM reforms (Christensen and Laegried, 
2013:13). NPM reforms have been a success in some Countries. NPM has capacity to adapt, 
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it is robust and flexible, even after a long period of NPM reforms and emerging post-NPM 
reforms (Christensen and Laegried, 2013:13).  
In Nigeria, numerous Public Service Reforms have been embarked upon since 1945, 
instituted by both Military and Civil Democratic Governments. Noteworthy is the Military 
take- overs in Nigeria between 1966, 1979, 1984 to 1999 and how this affected the functions 
and operations of the Civil Service. Consequently, Nigeria experienced about 35 years of 
Military Rule with only short periods of Civilian Rule (Anazodo et al.., 2012). Several 
factors triggered the various Public Sector Reforms in Nigeria, e.g. corruption amongst Civil 
Servants (impunity, lack of probity and accountability and transparency).  
The reforms ranged from wage review to conditions of service and structure. In part, sections 
of the review, which were informed by internal developments, international pressures and 
influences, ought to be considered. Such international pressure is the influence of Bretton 
Woods’ Institutions, a wave of public sector reforms in Developed Countries, and the 
ideological influences of Neoliberalism and the accompanying Public Government 
Framework- New Public Management (NPM). The influence of NPM dominated the 
Reforms from the 1980s, that is, the Dotun Phillips and Onosode Commissions, respectively. 
Some of the recommendations offered were in line with NPM doctrines - such as value for 
public money, responsiveness, outcome and output, contracting, purchaser/provider, 
autonomy, entrepreneurial management culture, steering, transparency, accountability, 
budget and financial management, human resources, enhanced checks and balances, general 
modernization of the service, and enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, training and 
development, professionalization of the service as well as speed of operation. In addition, 
elements such as scrapping of Ministries, Departments, Agencies, mergers and acquisitions, 
the creation of Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Parastatals, and the actual 
restructuring of existing Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Parastatals dominated the 
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reforms from the 1980s to 1999 and onwards. In 1990s restructuring, privatization, merger 
and scrapping of public organisations were some of the reforms introduced. The various 
measures introduced, albeit at different periods and forms, have a strong leaning towards the 
ideological position of neoliberalism- captured in the free market doctrines and principles.  
One of the agencies affected by this reform is the Tertiary Education Trust Fund, (previously 
referred to as Education Tax Fund and later Education Trust Fund), which was established by 
Education Tax Fund Act no. 17, (2003) and the Education Tax Cap. E 4 laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria (2004).  As noted, both laws were replaced by the TETFund Act 
(2011). Though this Fund was established in 1993, operations began only in 1998 with the 
inauguration of its first Board of Trustees. However, as part of the reform and review 
programmes of the Obasanjo administration (which was constituted after the 1999 
democratic elections in Nigeria), this Board of Trustees was dissolved and a new one 
constituted in 1999 with a mandate to use funding and project management for the 
rehabilitation, restoration and resuscitation of education at all levels in Nigeria. Between 
1999 and 2011, the mandate, functions and scope of operations of the Fund has changed 
often related to the various reviews undertaken by government. The current mandate of the 
Fund as enshrined in the TETFund Act (2011) is to manage, disburse and monitor the 
education tax for the rehabilitation, restoration and consolidation of public tertiary 
institutions in Nigeria. These and other issues, such as the behaviour of the Fund are 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six informed by the data from the fieldwork.  
Reforms in Nigeria have been criticised. For example, Monye-Emina (2012) claimed that the 
manner of implementation in Nigeria demonstrated a hastily designed programme - perhaps 
in line with the dictates of international donor institutions and agencies. There were also 
issues related to the payment of terminal benefits and entitlements to personnel disengaged in 
the process of reforms.  Also, some of the reasons highlighted for setting up the various 
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reform committees and commissions in Nigeria, persist - only, very limited progress has been 
achieved thus far. According to Monye-Emina (2012) privatisation and liberalisation, 
together with unemployment problems, tend to aggravate poverty in the country, widening 
the gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. Further, these various reforms have all been 
implemented without taking into consideration contextual issues (Omar, 2012). 
In the context of this research, the various reforms were introduced under different politico-
administrative settings- e.g. parliamentary, military dictatorship, democratic systems of 
government. The reforms were introduced because of both internal and external pressures. A 
review of the reforms (e.g. ECA, 2010) highlighted the fact that some of the reforms did not 
achieve or attain the stated objectives. Could this be due to contextual issues, which have 
been identified in a range of comparative public management reports and research? Or could 
it be that in some cases, institutional transfers do not actually work? In the case of Nigeria, 
why was an NPM agency introduced in a non-NPM setting when it was becoming partly out 
of fashion in other parts of the world- especially in some OECD Countries? These questions 
are examined in both Chapters Five and Six, in view of the TETFund operations and 
behaviour within the Nigerian context.  
In summary, this chapter has examined the various debates on New Public Management, its 
key principles and frameworks, and how it has been mainstreamed into public sector 
management since its emergence in the public policy debates. It is argued, drawing on a 
range of public sector reform initiatives, that NPM models of management has been 
mainstreamed into public sector management in Nigeria. In addition, the chapter reflected on 
NPM reforms in nation states in sub-Saharan Africa, concluding that the results have been 
mixed- in this case the importance of context also discussed.  
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The next chapter examines the concept of agencification, that is: the definition, scope, 
characteristics and framework of operations of an agency, and identified the concepts, 
relevant research aims and objectives. It discusses the various characteristics of 
agencification and how it is now the norm in various countries around the world.  
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Chapter Three 
Agencies and Agencification  
3.0. Introduction 
‘The agency idea is sometimes old, sometimes new, sometimes borrowed and sometimes 
untrue’ 
 (Talbot, 2004) 
 
The word agencification is now a buzzword in international circles (Pollitt et al. 2001), 
referred to as a contagious fever (Verhoest et al., 2012:4).  In many jurisdictions, it is a tool 
for ‘unbundling bureaucracy’ into different semi-autonomous organizations. 
“Agencification” is transfer of government activities to bodies vertically specialized outside 
ministerial Departments (Trondal, 2014:545). Agencification is about creating flexible, 
performance-oriented public sector organisation (Talbot and Caulfield, 2002; Pollitt et al., 
2004; Mortensen, 2016; Verhoest et al. 2012:3). According to Mortensen (2016:1) many 
public administration reforms in recent decades have implied a break-up of formerly 
monolithic bureaucracies into separate agencies. Certainly, introduction of agencification 
into public sector is driven by wide-ranging factors including, but not restricted to, politics, 
policy exigencies, administrative demands, modernisation and globalisation agenda. 
Agencification focuses on revitalisation of public service for citizens and de-politicisation of 
organisations by keeping them at arm’s-length, thereby reducing party political interference 
(Pollitt et al. 2004:2; Trondal, 2012).  
 
On policy exigencies, the focus is on rationalising specific goals and creating strategic tools 
for policy formulation and implementation. Indeed, agencies have become ‘big businesses, 
also, instruments of efficiency improvements both managerially and administratively, 
professional management, citizen empowerment and participation, and the reduction of 
political meddling,’ (Pollitt et al. 2004; Elton, 2014). International organizations and regional 
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bodies, such as World Bank, IMF, European Union, have set up agencies as part of their 
operations.  Trondal (2014: 546) note that currently, more than 30 EU agencies have been 
established. Apart from the geographical spread throughout the Union, EU agencies cover 
multiple policy areas; have various legal standings and formal powers, staffing, and funding 
provisions, and, engage in a web of relations with external institutions (Trondal, 2014: 546), 
referred to as ‘externalisation of task’ (Vos, 2003).  The growth of agencies worldwide is 
controversial e.g. such as definition, rationale for their establishment, roles and 
responsibilities, steering and control, autonomy, accountability, benefits or otherwise of 
agencies, national and international variations in roles and responsibilities particularly so 
contextual issues and organisational culture (Wethen-Hall, 2005; Verhoest et al., 2012).  
 
Whilst agencies, (whether semi-autonomous or Non- Departmental Public Bodies – NDPB’s) 
are not a new phenomenon (Schick, 2002; Pollitt et al., 2004; Dan, 2014), what is new are 
the structures, operations and functions (Verhoest et al.., 2012). Hence, agencies are an old 
idea, however its functions and activities in contemporary public management and 
administration is at a different level (Schick, 2002). In Sweden and United States of America, 
for example, agencies have long been part of government administration, while in the United 
Kingdom, large-scale Ministries had quangos before the spread of such Agencies; and 
developing countries have had Parastatals (Talbot, 2004). Correspondingly, international 
organisations and regional bodies also promote and encourage agencification programmes in 
transitional and developing countries, ‘with a few of the how to do it recipe’ or even, 
‘systematic guidance’ about what agencies were, are, or could be, (or about their strengths 
and weaknesses) (Manning, 2001; ECA, 2003 a&b; Talbot, 2004). Variations exists in the 
constitution of agencies informed by public sector administrative traditions and cultures of 
countries. For example, the United States of America and Australia have single agency 
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legislation, whilst some countries, like Tanzania, operate generic agency legislation (Talbot, 
2004). 
This chapter explores literature on agencification, agencies and public management. 
Highlighted in this chapter are the definitions of agency, its characteristics and public 
management functions. In this chapter, the key elements of agencification will be identified 
and subsequently used as part of the research findings and analysis. In the summary section, 
public sector reform in Nigeria (discussed in Chapter Two) is examined again in view of 
agencification agenda in Nigeria.  
3.1. Agencification: A Review of Literature  
‘Agencification’ or ‘distributed governance’ is one of the core elements of the New Public 
Management (NPM) and it is the most often implemented in administrative reforms around 
the world (Moynihan, 2006:1). In most literature, agencification is placed under the umbrella 
of ‘administrative decentralisation’ (Verhoest and Verschuere, 2002), a trajectory of public 
sector and organizational reform and modernization (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000), linked to a 
desired or intended future of public sector organization and management (Verhoest et al.., 
2012). Smullen (2004) likened administrative decentralization to agencification. 
Administrative decentralization is when the state seeks to create organizations that are more 
responsive to consumers, whilst at the same time retaining some form of control (Hambleton, 
1992). There are three identifiable choices with decentralization (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2000). The first is political decentralization, which is transferring authority to elected 
political representatives at a lower level in the state organization (e.g. from central to local 
government). Administrative decentralization represents the second choice and it entails 
transferring authority to another body (e.g. an agency), (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).  It 
concerns passing authority to another body selected by competitive means, (e.g. through 
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competitive tendering) and transferring authority by non-competitive means. Finally, the 
third choice is between internal and external decentralization (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). 
Internal decentralization is the transfer of power within an existing organization. It also 
implies that full political responsibilities of the Minister and the hierarchical ties between the 
Minister and the decentralized organization remain unchanged (Moynihan, 2006; Verhoest et 
al. 2012). On the other hand, external decentralization means passing authority to an 
independent external body, an organization that exists or is newly created (Pollitt, 2000). In 
contrast to internal decentralization, the relationship between the Minister and the 
decentralized body becomes a relationship that is legally both described and prescribed. 
Conclusively, agencification can be said to be a form of ‘organizational reform’ (Verschuere 
and Vancoppenolle, 2012; Trondal, 2014). 
In the last three decades, agencification has gained prominence in policy circles, as a form of 
apparent global convergence, with agencies quite fashionable in ‘the realms of public 
management and especially central government reform’ (Talbot, 2004; Verschuere and 
Vancoppenolle, 2012). Other ideas/ elements associated with the concept of agencies 
include: efficiency; customer orientation; service standards; transparency and accountability; 
innovative management; revenue generation, and resource (accruals) accountability. These 
elements appear in agency initiatives from the outset, sometimes as ‘add-ons’ as the 
initiatives evolve contingent on a range of factors, events and political changes, which could 
be at organisational or national levels. Agencies undertake public tasks, implement policies, 
regulate markets and deliver public services and other tasks that impact on everyday lives of 
service users, that is citizens (Pollitt et al. 2004; Moynihan, 2006; Verhoest et al.., 2012; 
Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012; Trondal, 2014).   
Moreover, controversies abound on what constitutes an Agency. As such, despite the 
popularity, there is no convergence about what constitutes an Agency (Fedele et al. 2007). 
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This is due to variation in national legal systems, organisations and political systems (Pollitt 
et al.., 2004; Wettenhall, 2005; Monihan, 2006). These differences are obvious in the various 
reports that have been written, which covers issues of implementation strategies and 
outcomes of agencies across the world.  Similarly, Smullen (2010) notes that the definition of 
agency is complicated by differences in institutional contexts and differences in translation of 
the idea of the Agency in different countries, reflecting both the complicated interior and 
exterior histories of the concept itself (see also Monihan, 2006). Recognized above is the 
confusion agencification generates (see e.g. Bouchaert and Peter, 2004). Subsequent 
paragraphs will explore the academic definitions of agency and the core elements of agencies 
and agencification. 
According to Talbot et al. (2000) to be an Agency, an organisation should be: at arm’s length 
(proximal or further) from the main hierarchal ‘spine’ of central Ministries/Departments of 
State; carry out public tasks (service provision, regulation, adjudication, and certification) at 
a national level; secure core staffed by public servants (not necessarily ‘civil servants’); 
financed (in principle) by the state budget (in practice some are financed up to 100% from 
their own revenues, but even here the state remains liable for their financial condition), and, 
subject to at least some public/ administrative law procedures (i.e. they are not predominantly 
or entirely private law bodies).  
Pollitt et al. (2004) argue that an agency must display the following attributes: Firstly, have 
its status defined principally or exclusively in public law (though the nature of that law may 
vary greatly between different national systems); secondly, be functionally disaggregated 
from the core of its Ministry or Department of State; third, enjoy some degree of autonomy 
which is not enjoyed by the core Ministry; fourthly, be nevertheless linked to the 
Ministry/Department of State in ways which are close enough to permit Ministers/Secretaries 
of State to alter the budgets and main operational goals of the organisation;  fifthly, is 
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therefore not statutorily fully independent of its Ministry/Department of State, and, finally, it 
is not a commercial Corporation.  
Examining the various definitions of Agencies, Dan (2014:223) notes three main 
interpretations of Agency functions: First, activities/processes (for example, budgeting, 
making accountability statements; organizing to produce services; and training staff);Second, 
outputs (for example, treatments/lessons/inspection/information delivered to service users; 
grants; and loans issued); and Third, outcomes (for example, improved health status for 
citizens; better economic growth; educational attainment for students; and increased citizen 
satisfaction with the quality of services). 
The definitions indicate that Agencies are not Divisions or Directorates within Ministries or 
Departments of State, and corporate bodies set up for commercial purposes. However, they 
are independent bodies that are free or almost free from direct Ministerial instructions. This 
is because Ministers/Secretaries of State can alter the budgets and the main operational goals 
of organizations without necessarily having to introduce new legislation, (Pollitt et al. 2004; 
Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012; Trondal, 2014). According to Verhoest et al. (2012) 
financial and personnel and management autonomy varies by organisation and countries.  
Nevertheless, they are ‘closer to’ the Ministerial/Secretary of State of core governments than 
independent ‘quangos,’ (Pollitt et al. 2004; Wettenhall, 2005; Verschuere and 
Vancoppenolle, 2012; Trondal, 2014). What is obvious is how Agencies have more 
autonomy - whether in terms of finance, personnel, organisation or any combination of the 
three than the ‘normal’ Divisions or Directorates in the core of the Ministry (Pollitt et al., 
2004; Wettenhall, 2005). Agencies are often headed by senior public servants operating 
within a framework agreed on by Ministers, but at arm’s length from the Minister and with 
some discretionary space in terms of achieving their objectives (Mortensen, 2016:1). An 
“Agency,” is an administrative body that is formally separated from a Ministerial, or 
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Cabinet-Level, Department and that carries out public tasks at a national level on a 
permanent basis, is staffed by public servants, is financed mainly by the state budget, and is 
subject to public legal procedures (Trondal, 2014). Matsuda and Manning (2000) assert that 
there are two types of Agencies: Type 1 Agencies operate within the executive, and 
consequently typically referred to as Executing Agencies. Type 2 Agencies restrain the 
executive power and are typically statutory commissions or autonomous regulators. With 
Type 1 agencies as proximal instruments of Ministries for policy implementation, they are 
expected to improve operational efficiency in service delivery areas through both greater 
managerial discretion and flexibility with relatively secure funding and organizational 
autonomy. Conversely, Type 2 Agencies are designed to give statutory independence to 
Agencies in charge of functions that require protection from politicians’ short-term 
orientation. In turn, this includes long-term policy-making, (e.g., monetary policy) or quasi-
judicial/regulatory functions (Matsuda and Manning, 2000).  In some instances, the State 
organisation of Agencies takes six different formats, as reflected in both public private law 
organisations (in terms of statutory regulations) and, at times, in Ministerial or non-
Ministerial organisation. (Tyne, 2004). Tyne (2004), indicate that the various combinations 
are contingent upon the different applications of the term Agency and this is often shaped 
principally by jurisdictional interpretations.  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of congruence as per the definition of Agencies, there are some 
apparent areas of agreement. These are: (i) that Agencies are structurally disaggregated from 
government (structural separation from the core of the Ministry) and, ii) they operate under 
conditions more like businesses than like government bureaucracy (Verhoest et al. 2012; 
Trondal, 2014). To Pollitt (2000) the process of agencification, through the creation of 
Agencies, starts from two conceptual core ideas: structural separation and performance 
contracting.  
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In the literature on New Public Management and Agencification, there are three core 
elements that are referred to customarily These are: (1) Structural disaggregation/ and or the 
creation of task specific organisations; (2) Performance contracting- some form of 
performance target setting, monitoring and reporting, and, (3) Autonomy- deregulation (or 
more importantly reregulating) of controls over personnel, finance and other management 
matters (Talbot, 2004). 
To Pollitt et al. (2004), Agentification is as a tripartite blend of doctrines: structural 
disaggregation; autonomisation, and contractualisation (see also Verschuere and 
Vancoppenolle, 2012; Wettenhall, 2005). According to Talbot (2004) these three central 
elements capture the idea of Agency around the globe and are apparent, in varying degrees in 
Agencies around the World. This is attributed to path dependency. For example, some 
organisations are already organised along disaggregated agency structural lines, so any 
reform will be limited to addressing ‘performance and reregulation components’. 
Accordingly, not all agencification-inspired initiatives embrace the whole Agency package; 
the possibility that the three reform components operate independent of one another or in any 
combination exists (Talbot 2004).   
There are disagreements amongst policy makers and academics, which supports this apparent 
convergence towards a united generic form of Agency (Pollitt et al. 2001). While some 
critics consider that the Agency-form is not as homogenous as it is been claimed, Bouckaert 
and Peters (2001) contend that whilst there are similarities in the way Agencies are created 
all over the World, the variations are also discernible - not only in terms of modus operandi 
of these organisations, but also their set up or establishment. Verhoest et al. (2012) note that 
these variations occur along the following dimensions: first, governance structure and the 
relation with Ministerial authorities; second, the degree of autonomy of these organisations, 
and third, the variety of tasks these organisations perform. These numerous changes or 
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challenges, according to Verhoest et al. (2012) have provided the basis for asking wide-
ranging questions in respect to the numbers, varieties and characteristics of Agencies 
Worldwide. 
As most literature on agencification demonstrates, there is an agreement that Agencies are 
guided by three core elements: structural disaggregation; autonomization, and 
contractualisation (Talbot, 2004; Wettenhall, 2005; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012). 
Depending on the reform the three may not be present at all, or may not occur at the same 
time, or may be in pairs, nonetheless, it is when these three come together that the full force 
of the ‘agency’ concept becomes most apparent (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). The following 
subsections will explore the three elements before analysing the challenges of the 
agentification processes and procedures in real terms. 
3.1.1. Structural Disaggregation  
Structural disaggregation involves splitting up of large bodies into a ‘parent’ body and 
various subordinate ‘Agencies’- mostly applied to splitting up ‘Ministries’ into a core central 
body and several Agencies carrying out specific tasks (Talbot 2004). Hence, it is a form of 
separation of policy details from executioner or purchaser (Talbot, 2004; Wettenhall, 2005). 
Clearly, this is a radical departure from the traditional public sector which was often highly 
aggregated and even quite independent regarding policy and strategies issues in some areas, 
yet equally tightly regulated by external government actors on a range of personnel, 
financial, purchasing and other matters of management (Graham and Roberts, 2004).  
According to Fedele et al. (2007) there are three core aspects to structural disaggregation: 
first, there is institutional distancing between Agency and Parent administration, which is 
often framed by legal imperatives and features. Pertaining to the legal aspect, the emphasis is 
on the workings of Agencies, particularly its power to determine the content of its own 
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statue, furnished by the presence of a Corporate Board representative, which highlights the 
plurality of stakeholders (Fedele et al., 2007); Second, the complexity of the task transferred 
to the Agency in terms of heterogeneity of its activities, functions and outputs. This does not 
concern the ‘degree’ of disaggregation, but rather the modality of it, which raises questions 
on whether an Agency operates in more than one policy area.  This is especially so with the 
heterogeneity of the agency’s output and the nature of the public functions performed, 
respectively, and, third is, the agency specialisation on operational tasks as an indicator of the 
existence of clear-cut distinctions between the responsibility of policy formulation and the 
responsibility of policy delivery. All agencies have legal status, given the fact that in 
legalistic systems it is almost a pre-condition for disaggregation (Fedele et al. 2007). Indeed, 
structural disaggregation impacts on multi-functional organisations, particularly where it is 
difficult to discern what funding and actions contribute to which functions.  
Other elements of structural disaggregation in literature are: creating an identifiable, separate, 
organizational structure with its own name; the body has single or small set of functions; 
functions usually are primarily about delivery, execution or provision and not about policy-
making; the body is given a clear ‘constitution’- in the form of some sort of legislation or at 
least a formal (if not statutory) ‘framework document’- which sets out its purpose, powers, 
and governance arrangement; it has a single, named individual - usually a Chief Executive 
(CE) responsible for managing and reporting on the new body. Such a person is, or can be, 
appointed usually- actually or potentially- through an open process, separate from the normal 
Civil Service recruitment;  the staff of the new body are usually different in some ways from 
mainstream Civil Servants, most often by changing their formal employment status, and 
finally, there is a drawing up of formal reporting arrangements and putting in place separate 
accounts for the new body (Talbot et al. 2000; Wettenhall; 2005; Verschuere and 
Vancoppenolle, 2012; Dan, 2014; Trondal, 2014). 
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Table 1 below provides an illustration of the workings of agency and its administrative 
doctrines as it applies to key areas of control, independence, specialization and decision 
making, stressing the idea of structural disaggregation as it applies to agencies.  
Table 1: Agency and Administrative Doctrines 
Administrative 
doctrines- 
Choice areas 
‘Ministries’ New style ‘Agencies’ Traditional ‘Boards’ 
Control Control exercised 
principally by levers 
of inputs (budgets) of 
processes. 
Control exercised 
primarily through 
outputs or outcomes. 
Control exercised 
principally by levers 
of inputs (budgets) 
or processes. 
Independence Direct control by the 
ministers in integrated 
classical bureaucracy. 
Direct control by the 
ministers through a 
mixture of direction 
and legal or quasi-
legal frameworks. 
Formally and legally 
independent 
‘boards’ with no 
direct ministerial 
control. 
Specialization Integration of policy 
and operations. 
Separation of policy 
making and 
operational 
implementation 
functions. 
Integration of policy 
and operations. 
Decision 
making 
Decisions made 
principally by rule and 
rote. 
Mostly local discretion 
with some general 
rules. 
Mostly externally 
imposed rules with 
some local 
discretion. 
Source: Hood and Jackson (1991). 
Several other reasons are advanced for disaggregating Ministries into small units called 
Agencies. According to The Rt. Hon Richard Luce, “by breaking down areas of 
responsibility in the Civil Service into tailor-made, discrete and clear-cut services, and 
moving away from a more amorphous body, we are likely to have a more effective Civil 
Service which will be of benefit to the government of the day and the public,” (cited in 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1990:52). Structural disaggregation is in the form of 
'separateness and differentiated governance structure which allows for specialization of 
functions and a clearer focus on client needs. It is also referred to in policy circle as the 
‘organisation divorce’ (OECD, 2002:6).  
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The separation of Agencies from their respective Ministries does not imply autonomy 
(Talbot, 2004). There is an argument that agencies, in some cases, or Countries, are regulated 
in areas such as personnel, finance, procurement and other issues that tend to limit 
managerial autonomy. Also, the complex nature and relationship between public 
organisations make autonomy very difficult to attain.  Questions have also been raised on 
separateness, with arguments bordering on whether separation is in degrees or absolute, with 
some agencies being clearly far more ‘separate’ but with none being entirely independent 
(Talbot, 2004; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012). Even in situations where there were 
legal groundings, structural independence and autonomy was mere formalities or, at times, 
even tokenistic. Talbot (2004), mention that agency ‘separation’ is more often like movement 
along a spectrum (or multiple spectra) rather than ‘quantum leaps’. (Talbot, 2004; Trondal, 
2014). In the UK, ‘agencies’ are said to be separate, but within the parent Ministry, and have 
no real legal ‘personality’ outside of their Ministry (or formal legal basis) and the staff 
remain civil servants. By contrast, in Japan and Tanzania, for example, new agencies have 
been established on a legislative basis, outside of ministries and their staff has ceased to be 
civil servants (Talbot, 2004). As such, qualitatively, there are different degrees of 
separations.   
 The functions (whether single or multi) they perform affect the independence of agencies. 
Revenue agencies in the UK and some Countries, for example, are multi-functional in 
character - they deal with tax collection, enforcement and other duties (cited in Talbot, 2004). 
The varied nature of functions, impacts on agency relationship with Ministries and other 
bodies and such structural and functional imbalances have consequences on the relationship 
between Agencies and Ministries in that they are less unbundled and far more powerful than 
might have originally been intended and in others the reverse is the case (Alexander and 
Agency Policy Review Team, 2002; Talbot, 2004).  Other identified complications include 
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the perennial focus - coordination dichotomy - of new bodies created with a greater focus for 
a single function and matters of better coordination across closely related functions (Talbot, 
2004; Trondal, 2014). 
How coordination and integration influence the functions of Agencies, are debates that get 
mentioned in structural disaggregation narratives. This is associated with the ‘multi-agency’ 
or ‘joined up government agenda’ idea that dominates modern governance approaches. As 
Talbot, et al. (2004) observed, the growth and spread of agencies in various countries have 
had significant impact on issues of ‘joined up government’. Although agencification is 
probably not responsible for this new emphasis on coordination, it has certainly contributed 
to it (Pollitt, 2003 Wettenhall, 2005; Verschuere and Vancoppenolle, 2012). Furthermore, the 
division between ‘policy and execution’ or ‘purchaser and provider’ has been generally 
accepted as part of agency programmes, even though some have always denied this was the 
aim of agencies (Kemp, 1993).  
The appointment of a Chief Executive can impact on the independence of agencies (Painter 
and Yew, 2012). The Chief Executive, who is solely responsible for a new Agency, is 
appointed from outside the traditional Civil Service ranks and this can affect accountability.  
Again, staged changes vary immensely and in some cases employees were removed from the 
Civil Service, such as in Jamaica and Tanzania whilst elsewhere, they remained fully within 
the civil service structure, as in the United Kingdom (Manning, 2001; Talbot, 2004). In 
addition, the issues on reporting arrangements for agencies also vary.  This is especially true 
in cases such as finance and account auditing where formal reporting is a major requirement. 
Structural disaggregation varies considerably and as such is less universal, being influenced 
by contextual issues and interpretations (Talbot, 2004).  
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3.1.2. Autonomization 
Government-agency relationships are underpinned by both legal and non-legal power, which 
inadvertently affects the extent of agency autonomy, or, conversely, the extent of government 
control (Tynne, 2004). Notably, both forms of power are fundamental - as the legal form 
embraces the agency roles; management of human and financial resources and the non-legal 
covers all aspects of agency life in one way or another. Just like other public law 
organisations, Agencies have legal power pursuant to a constitution and/ or statutes 
(including subordinate legislation), and they can receive this power by a process of either 
delegation or devolution, each having implications for their autonomy and control (Tynne, 
2004:96). On delegation, the power delegated to an Agency is usually power that is vested in 
a Minister and related to specific role, a central personnel body (such as a Public Service 
Commission, for human resource matters) and a central financial body (such as Treasury for 
financial resource and administrative means) without reference to the legislature. This power 
can be withdrawn or revoked (Tynne, 2004). Notably, in such a situation, the delegator can 
continue to exercise power even though it has been delegated.  What can be deduced from 
the above is that this represents a situation where there exists a weak form of Agency 
autonomy because of the existence of strong central control and management. Conversely, 
regarding delegated power, we have a situation where power is invested in an Agency by 
Constitution or Statue. Therefore, power is removed from the hands of Minister, personnel or 
financial body and the Agency can operate with a considerable degree of autonomy from 
Central or Ministerial control.  Due to this type of arrangement, power can only be 
centralised by constitutional rearrangement.  That is why it is argued in some academic 
literature that to critically examine the autonomy of Agencies, it is imperative to understand 
the difference between delegation and devolution. The significant task of any research on 
autonomy and agency is to determine where control lies in individual Agencies-in an 
 76 
 
autonomy graph centralisation-delegation would be placed on the vertical axis and 
centralisation-devolution on the horizontal (Tynne, 2004). 
Certainly, automatization is not entirely new. Autonomization is how much discretion 
organisations or individuals have in taking decisions, as well as how much they can be 
circumscribed by specific rules or their own normal standard operating procedures. However, 
in relation to Agencies and within this context, autonomization applies to issues of regulation 
within government, that is, how a separated-out, disaggregated organisation be subject to 
decision making by externally imposed rules and how much discretionary decisions they can 
make themselves. According to Verhoest et al. (2004), autonomy is the level of decision-
making competency (discretion) of an organisation. Equally, there are two types of 
autonomy, located at strategic or operational level: managerial autonomy and policy 
autonomy. Managerial autonomy entails the right of an Agency to take decisions on 
managerial issues, concerning, for example, personnel and financial management 
independently without recourse to the parent Department or Ministries. This can occur at 
individual transactions or employees (operational) level or at the level of general rules where 
criteria apply regarding the use of these resources (strategic). Policy (implementation) 
autonomy implies the discretionary authority of Agencies to decide on certain aspects of the 
initiation and implementation of policies without particularly needing the approval of parent 
Departments or Ministries, e.g. prioritization of activities to be performed (operational), the 
delineation of the target group of the policy implementation, the quality and quantity of 
outputs and the policy instruments to be used or deployed (strategic). 
Autonomy is also referred to as re-regulation and they have often been confused with 
decentralisation and independence. Talbot (2004) notes, whilst structural and regulation 
changes often go together, they are not the same because it is perfectly possible to have 
structurally separated organisations, which have equal, lesser or even greater levels of 
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regulation than their parent bodies. Regulation means the laid down standard operating 
procedures and rules within government on how public bodies must operate and function.  
The concept of de-regulating as a government policy, according to Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992) has come to be associated with structural change represented by agency-type 
initiatives (Behn, 2001) and wider decentralisations as well as disaggregations, (Hood et al. 
1999). The arguments are that public organisations have been Weberian rule-based 
bureaucracy, which is ideal for creating fair and independent organisations in the past 
(Barzeley, 1992; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Denhardt, 1993). This is necessary considering 
the mountains of unnecessary ‘red tape’, which hinders efficient management of the public 
sector.  
Therefore, it is assumed that the creation of Agencies should be closely followed by a 
significant amount of de-regulation because this will allow for the freeing up of new bodies 
from much of the superfluous accretions of decades of over-enthusiastic rule- makers 
(Talbot, 2004). Regarding Agency programmes, regulatory change has taken several forms 
ranging from personnel, finance purchasing, equality, to probity and ethics, etc.  
In some cases, it might be freeing Agencies from rules imposed by specific regulatory bodies 
(e.g. Public Service Commission) and others from central Ministries and in some cases, both. 
In the case of TETFund for instance, the Federal Character Commission insists on the quota 
system for appointments, whilst the Wages and Salaries Commission determine and approve 
salaries and allowances of staff.  
Despite the rhetorical discourses and narratives, regulation of public administration cannot 
easily be entirely abolished or even slimmed down beyond a certain point, without creating 
problems of accountability, probity and ethics (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Wilson, 1994; 
Pollitt, 2003). Moreover, no matter how hard governments want to effectively abolish or 
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strongly minimise regulation, they have the habit of resurfacing in other forms (Hood, et al. 
1999). It can be the case that Agency creation leads to effectively greater regulation in some 
areas than before. A small Agency may have to conform to all sorts of regulatory 
arrangements which place a disproportionate burden on their management (Talbot, 1996; 
Alexander and Agency Peer Review Team, 2002), in much the same way as small businesses 
often complain that generic private sector regulations place a disproportionate burden on 
them. In the general context of the rising levels of audit and scrutiny of public bodies (Rener, 
1997, cited in Hood et al. 1999), the creation of many separate organisations may increase 
the audit- burden - both for the organisations and for the auditors or inspectors (Hood et al., 
1999). Policy changes need to be viewed with caution because they are not always what they 
appear to be - in some cases de-regulation is less radical or at any rate far more problematic, 
than it appears at first sight (Talbot, 1997; Pollitt et al., 1998). Finally, where there has been 
much deregulation, this has caused severe problems (Pollitt, 2004). On a lesser scale, in the 
UK, several cases of highly questionable management decisions - mostly related to ‘de-
regulated’ parts of Public Service - came in for severe criticism from Parliaments (Public 
Accounts Committee, 1994).  The issue of regulation in an Agency context is primarily to 
liberate management and allow more degree of control - to improve performance. The 
assumption is managerial freedoms will allow much greater prospects of improving 
performance, unencumbered by cumbersome rules. A more recent development is the notion 
of ‘earned autonomy’ (Behn, 2001), where agencies that demonstrate good performance are 
rewarded by greater de-regulation and increased autonomy. Some have argued that much de-
regulation has not produced ‘post-bureaucratic’ organisations, which the authors call a 
deceptive variant - ‘the cleaned bureaucracy’ (Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994). In other 
words, the organisations are re-regulated - in simpler, leaner ways - rather than ‘de-regulated’ 
in the sense of abandoned regulation altogether as some of the extreme ‘de-regulations’ seem 
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to suggest. Arguably, in terms of their internal systems, agencies are ‘cleaned bureaucracies’ 
rather than ‘post-bureaucratic’ organisations.  
Conversely, problems have been identified with issues of Agencies and autonomy. Research 
has established that formal autonomy given to Agency by laws and regulations at times differ 
from the actual autonomy that Agencies have or perceive to have (e.g. Verhoest et al. 2004; 
Yesikagit and Van Theil 2008). For example, Agencies are sometime curbed by the control 
of the parent Department, their Ministers or other Government actors. This control is about 
constraints imposed to influence the actual use of autonomy or influence Agency decisions 
by parent Ministers/Departments. Accordingly, control can be encompassing - guidance, 
control in a strict sense (monitoring) and evaluation of Agency actions.  Indeed, the control 
of Agency by parent Ministries and Departments can be exercised in the form of ex-ante or 
post-ante, as well as mainly oriented on input or on results.  
Verhoest et al. (2004) note that both controls may have their principal focus on the choice 
and use of inputs or the delivery of results but in actual practice they mostly appear in pairs 
(ex-ante on inputs and ex-post on results). Traditionally, the control of organisations tends to 
be mainly ex-ante and input-oriented with focuses explicitly on before the fact such as the 
formulation of detailed rules, regulations, standard operating procedures and approval 
requirements that give directions to actors in terms of the attainment of desire objective. In 
relation to this type of control, the Minister or Parent Departments have the right to veto or 
annul decisions by Agencies, based on risk assessment and performance oriented issues, 
(Wirth, 1986).  The crucial focus on this form of control is on issues of legality and 
compliance with rules and regulations (Verhoest et al. 2004). On the contrary, the ex-post 
control emphasises whether the intended organisational goals and targets set in the first 
instance have been achieved by the Agency, and if there is the need for further interventions 
in terms of corrective future action. Objective setting, monitoring, evaluation, audit and 
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sanctions are the elements of the ex-post control. Possibly, ex-post control increases the 
performance of public sector organisations including Agencies. 
Apart from the two forms of control mentioned previously, the government also exercises 
control through appointments, steering and evaluation of the senior management of Agencies 
and Board members (if it exists) and this is akin to a structural control. In addition, 
government can control agencies through both formal and informal contacts between the 
Agency Management and Administrative Principals. Structural control can also take the form 
of financial control, in the sense that the government can refuse to grant an agency financial 
resource or autonomy. From the above, agency autonomy is not clear cut, what exists are 
combination of a range of factors and trade-offs, principally influenced by contextual issues.  
3.1.3. Contractualisation 
 Performance contracting is one of the key features of Agencies. It is important to note that 
Government - Agency relationships are frequently governed by a contract or similar sort of 
arrangement (Thynne, 2004).  Performance contracting is about expectations, commitments, 
rewards and sanctions and these underline and influence their relationships in terms of 
accountability and control, which can affect the degree of autonomy of an agency (Greer, 
1994:13-20; Greve, 2000; Lane, 2000). According to Lidbury and Petrie (1999) performance 
contracting is a way of setting targets for organisations and reforming on the activities of an 
agency, which is at times loose - that is, it does not necessarily mean a formal contract, but 
any self-generated, agreed or imposed set of performance targets for agencies, formulated 
into a specific agreement, contract plan, or statement of some sort. According to Thyne 
(2004) an analysis of the contracts could usefully be guided by at least three sets of questions 
as they are largely directed at the agency side of the relationship. They also raise important 
questions about the existence of important commitments on the part of a government. First, 
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what is speciﬁed contractually concerning the roles to be performed and the resources to be 
utilised by an agency? What methods, tools or strategies are to be adopted? What outputs and 
outcomes are expected? Second, what explanations and justiﬁcations are required in relation 
to the strategies, outputs and outcomes of role-performance and resource utilisation? How 
often are explanations and justiﬁcations expected? In what kind of detail, and in what form, 
are they to be presented? Third, what rewards, sanctions and related matters are prescribed as 
responses to the strategies, outputs and outcomes of role-performance and resource 
utilisation? What sorts of rewards are to be allocated? What kinds of sanctions could be 
imposed and by what means? What forms of rectiﬁcation or restitution are to be sought in 
relevant situations? (Thyne, 2004).  These questions are important to unpacking the various 
tensions and controversies that surround performance contracting - in terms of agency and 
government relationships. For example, if considered from a legal and non-legal power 
arrangement, some contracts are already included in statutory provisions that established the 
agency, whilst others are fluid and contingent on a range of issues including but not limited 
to intangible features of human interaction (see, e.g. Thyne, 2004; Dan, 2014). 
This performance contract or agreement in some cases can be tightly worded and detailed 
agreements may be very close to a legal contract, at least in form if not substance. According 
to Peter Kemp with performance contracting, ' we are moving from a hierarchical system to a 
system in which the Minister and Chief Executive are in a quasi -contractual position, (cited 
in Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1990: 51). Similarly, Fortin and Van Hassel (2000) 
note that the idea of putting relationships within the public service between purchasers and 
providers, or parent Departments and Agencies as well as between Ministers and Chief 
Executives on contractual or quasi-contractual basis usually associated with performance has 
been seen to have become fashionable (Lane, 2000; OECD-PUMA, 1999).  
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Performance contracting is linked to Principal-Agent theory and the series of new 
institutional economics, which emphasise on creation of internal markets and the introduction 
of other market-type mechanisms and functionalities within the public sector (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000). In fact, there are variations in the application of performance contracting 
in both public and private sectors, particularly in terms of it being legal or ad hoc. Talbot et 
al. (2000) argued that the absence of formal legal contract in some cases have resulted in 
defects in outcomes and delivery.  Despite these observations, there are clearly no example of 
legal disputes between agencies and principal ministries when issues of poor performance 
have been identified, since legalistic agency performance contract/agreement, is a one-way 
contract - the purchaser (government) telling the provider (agencies) what they are expected 
to provide in performance terms. To Talbot (2004) Agency failure are most often subject of 
discussion, negotiation and eventual consensus rather than punitive; and where punitive 
measures are applied, it usually affects the Chief Executive or the Board.  
The performance contracting is a management tool between superiors and subordinates in a 
Government - Agency relationship. For Agencies, some form of performance contract will 
usually form one basis of judgement regarding the Agency’s performance by its parent 
Department or Minister or Stakeholders (Talbot, 2004). In previous Agency arrangement, 
performance contracts have never been crucial; it is the idea of purchaser-provider split, or 
Principal - Agency relationship. With the new Agency structure, contractual arrangements 
are linked to resources and results to be achieved; these are usually specified in terms of 
service delivery, outputs or outcomes but may also include measure of processes and even of 
resource utilization or inputs, (e.g. the analysis of UK agency targets in Talbot, 1996). There 
are variations in performance contracts, targets and those who set targets. For instance, 
Ministers or the Secretary of State usually sets UK targets. In the USA, the Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) mandates agencies to set their targets, but these are 
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then formally approved by both the Executive and Legislative branches. In Sweden, parent 
Ministries set targets, with specific measures left to the Agencies to resolve. 
With some Agencies, there are no single ‘principal’ contracts. For instance, the constitutional 
arrangement in the USA means there are at least two principals - Congress and the Executive 
Office of the President.  In countries like the UK and others that operate the Westminster – 
style government, there are usually several principals. These are only examples of the formal, 
managerial authorities usually other various bodies exist charged with regulation inside 
government, who set performance targets or performance parameters for Agencies. They do 
this, for example on matters such as equal treatment of personnel, proper handling of 
purchasing contracts, etc. In the case of Nigeria, there are bodies like the Bureau for Public 
Procurements, the Federal Character Commission, SERVICOM (Service Compact with all 
Nigerians) to mention but a few that perform similar roles. Therefore, as articulated by 
Talbot (2004) Agency target setting is a ‘zero sum’ power game between the various actors 
in the policy arena, (Ministers, parent Departments, the Agencies themselves, and Legislature 
and in some cases Inspectorates and Auditors). 
The balance of power and the idea of target setting could vary over time, even with the same 
formal institutional setting. Performance and targets can be difficult to define. Sometimes, 
performance assumes a narrow economic sense - traditionally these are the three E’s- 
Economy Efficiency and Effectiveness. Alternatively, this could represent Equality, Equity 
Evaluation, etc., (Pollitt, 2004; Talbot, 2004). In formal lineal models of public sector 
production, the sequence is often defined as inputs – processes – outputs - outcomes with 
many variations and additions. Arguably, the models of performance and production can 
focus on one or these elements (Pollitt, 2004; Talbot, 2004). 
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Based on pervasive growth of Agencies in developed and developing countries, the argument 
is that total government spending is consumed by state employees, when compared to 
traditional Ministries (Pollitt et al., 2004).  For instance, 75 per cent of the civil service in the 
United Kingdom are employees of Agencies, 30 per cent in Netherlands and almost 85 per 
cent in Sweden (OECD, 2002; Pollitt et al. 2004; Smullen, 2010). In 2003, an estimated 
proximal body in Central Government ‘accounted for between 50 per cent and 75 per cent of 
public expenditure and public employment in OECD countries,’ (OECD, 2003:5). In the last 
fifteen years, Countries such as Canada, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Tanzania, Thailand, Ghana, and the United Kingdom adopted agencification as a 
public administration model (Pollitt et al., 2004). However, in Finland and United States of 
America, Agencies have been in existence for some time as key players in the administrative 
work of Central Government (Greeve 2000; Pollitt et al., 2001; Schick, 2002; Pollitt and 
Talbot, 2004). 
Despite disagreements on the rationale for their establishment, positive and negatives themes 
can-be identified from different literature, ranging from political, economic to social (Talbot 
and Caufield, 2002; Talierco 2004). Politically, the setting-up of Agencies lessens political 
interference, enhances specialisation as opposed to bureaucracies of large Ministries, creates 
partnership/ multi-Agency working and creates island of excellence compared to backward 
public administration (Pollitt et al., 2004). Economically, Agencies create islands of income 
generation (collection of taxes and issuance of licences), help maintain public infrastructure, 
lead to downsizing of Civil Service and regulates public utilities (Pollitt et al., 2004). 
Socially, Agencies bring public services closer to the citizens to encourage and facilitate user 
responsiveness and improve performance - that is service proximity (Pollitt et al., 2004).  
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The above rationales need to be examined using ‘context’ narratives. Therefore, there are 
incoherencies, tensions, contradictions and ambiguities around the establishment of 
Agencies. Pollitt et al. (2004) note a single Agency reform may be fuelled by three, four or 
more of these motives simultaneously. For example, it can be advantageous to several groups 
(politicians, senior civil servants, professional experts, etc.), whilst at the same time, a reform 
may be triggered for ambiguous and/or contradictory purposes. Further, there are 
inconsistencies in adoption methods and processes. Pollitt et al. (2004) argue that structural 
separation is not clear cut, with contested levels of autonomy and multiple and contradictory 
aim and focus of the agency.   
Blame shifting was identified in literature as a negative dimension of Agency. Mortensen 
(2016:2) claim that with autonomy there is tendency for blaming and/ or blame avoidance. 
Mortensen (2016) further argues that the way Agencies operate creates an open avenue for 
the political principals to point accusing fingers at the Agencies when policy interventions 
fail. This has been the case in developing countries where weak institutional capacities render 
Agency interventions very ineffective (Manning, 2001).  
 
Other negative aspects identified in both the academic and official literature in relation to the 
establishment of Agencies are: (i) to pay off political allies and create an institutionalised 
power base for some party or faction (somewhat a patronage Den); (ii) to gain legitimacy by 
imitating an organizational fashion which is seen to be associated with modernization; (iii) to 
create a sense that modernisation is taking place, and (iv) to distance politicians from 
awkward or potentially unpopular activities, and enable them avoid responsibilities 
(Dunleavy, 1991; OECD, 2002: 7; Talbot and Caulfield, 2002; James 2003; Vos, 2003; 
Yamamoto, 2004).  Table 2 below summarises other problems synonymous to Agencies and 
their interactions within the public sector.   
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Table 2: Externalities and Collateral Damage  
Aspects  Challenges  
Policy Lock-In Are autonomous agencies undermining policy objectives by creating 
constituencies that will compel governments to maintain existing 
policies? 
Because Agencies are created, but rarely closed or merged, as such 
policy becomes what the agencies do, not what the government 
proposes.  Consequently, there can be situations of unhealthy rivalry 
between agency and the parent ministry which is by statutory right 
responsible for a given policy domain. In situations where there are 
dysfunctional bureaucracies, which is often time reflected in the 
ineffectiveness of traditional ministries, agencies tend to dominate 
de facto policy making at the detriment of parent ministries. This 
could then lead to poor policy synchronicity and lack of cross 
functionality. 
Policy Creep Are autonomous Agencies adopting quasi-fiscal activities that 
stretch beyond the original policy intention of government?  
It has been argued that the autonomous status given to agencies can 
encourage them to engage in quasi-fiscal activities (e.g., fee-based 
services, special concessions to certain groups) that serve the same 
role as taxes and subsidies, and exceed the original policy intention 
of government. 
Budget Balkanization Are autonomous Agencies undermining the coherence of the 
budget? 
The argument is that an unchecked Agency creation can destabilize 
the budget in three ways. First, it can create an argument for 
earmarked funding, which undermines the strategic ability of 
government to shift funds to emerging priorities, thereby leading to 
budgetary rigidities and over-stretched funding. Second, it can create 
scenarios (a.k.a. "bleeding stump" arguments) in which government 
must provide additional resources or face the unthinkable — e.g., 
teachers on strike, nurses without jobs, etc. The arms-length nature 
of agencies makes "bleeding stump" arguments more likely since the 
imminent problem is less easily identified by the central agencies. 
Finally, an unchecked agency creation can create contingent 
liabilities for government by borrowing against assets or making 
other commitments.  
 
Special privileges Are autonomous Agencies distorting public sector incentives? 
To attract qualified staff, autonomous agencies are often given 
exceptions from the government personnel regime to offer higher 
salary scales as well as other attractive benefits. The uneven 
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incentive structures within the public sector make it difficult to lure 
competent individuals to traditional ministries, while those who 
remain in the non-autonomous parts of the government become 
unmotivated or even resentful of those receiving better incentives 
and benefits in autonomous agencies. 
Source: Manning and Matsuda (2000)  
 
Spread of Agencies can be linked to the adoption of NPM reforms (James, 2003). Sometimes 
it is described as NPM-based agencification which, according to Smullen (2010), has been 
translated very differently in different political - administrative settings. Agencification and 
link to NPM is controversial with claims and counter claims.  Some schools of thought claim 
that agencification has created new governance problems, e.g.  fragmentation of the public 
sector-control and coordination (Bouckaert and Peters 2004), somewhat leading to what 
Pollitt et al. (2004) referred to as ‘hollowed out’ fragmented governments. Some argue that 
the lack of accountability creates democratic deficit (Flinders, 2001).  In 2003, the OECD 
claimed that the creation of non-commercial bodies outside the core public service on ad hoc 
basis, led to administrative 'zoo' (OECD, 2003:9). The report points out that the approach 
reduces the transparency of government for the citizen, and may compromise oversight and 
accountability within government itself. Similarly, agencies are providing lucrative job 
opportunities for the favourites of those in power and in some instances even facilitating 
corruption. In Japan, for instance, those termed, ‘decent from heaven’ headed most of the 
Agencies created, thus undermining the thrust for Agency autonomy and recruitment of 
talented citizens (Yamamoto, 2004). Out of the 57 Chief Executives of Independent 
Administrative Institutions (IAIs) in Japan, only 7 came from non-governmental background 
with 42 of them coming from the Civil Service while 8 were retired Civil Servants 
(Yamamoto, 2004). 
Further negative aspects of Agencies are that the command of technical skills and specialist 
knowledge gives them the ability that may result in ‘captures’ when they begin to run 
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Ministries - instead of the Ministries running them or Ministries becoming too strong by 
interfering in the running of the Agencies (Pollitt et al., 2004).  In Latvia, for instance, 
Ministries were found to be seriously short of the capacity to control the Agencies (Pollitt 
and Talbot, 2004). In Canada, on the other hand, it was found that the first generation of 
special operating Agencies lacked sufficient autonomy (Aucoin, 1990). The freedom of the 
Independent Administrative Corporations (IAC) in Japan was circumscribed by the insistence 
of the Ministry of Finance on annual reviews of funding and by appointing IAC Chief 
Executives from Senior Civil Servants. (Yamamoto, 2004). In Tanzania also, the theoretical 
autonomy of Agencies was affected by cash flow shortage, and high handedness of the 
Executive (President and Secretary General) (Talbot and Caulfield, 2002). To Pollitt (2000) 
agencification idea is a rather complex structure of arguments about politics, policy and 
administrative solutions to perceived problems of democratic accountability, allocation 
efficiency and technical efficiency in public organisations. Reasons for spread of Agency 
reforms across the world are diverse, with multiple theories of Agency behaviour and 
management and organisational strategies (Pollitt et al., 2004). Understanding of Agency can 
be explained form the point of context, since there are different politico-administrative 
traditions, cultures and legal systems in Countries, the stages and outcomes in state 
organisations and development are different (Verhoest et al., 2012).  Similarly, historical 
heritages such as colonialism, institutional culture and traditions, civil wars and financial 
crisis and governance structures (e.g. democratisation) influence the adoption of agency as a 
form of public governance (Verhoest, et al. 2012). 
3.2. Summary 
Agencies continue to dominate most public administration management and interventions in 
countries where traditional public administration models have failed to deliver public goods 
and services in a very efficient and effective way in line with the demands of the 21st century. 
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This assumption itself raises several fundamental questions, e.g. whether the so-called 
prescribed autonomy or even ministerial distancing is achievable or is the concept of 
administrative efficiency based on the theory of Principal Agent link. There are mixed results 
on the performance of Agencies in public sector management.  
Nonetheless, there are some interesting claims about Agencies in Nordic Countries - that is 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, which point to a high degree of performance, 
balance in autonomy and in control in their politico-administrative systems (Hansen et al., 
2012). The reasons are that these Countries have traditionally practiced agencification 
extensively and there exists a high level of mutual trust between the political and 
administrative executives (Hansen et al., 2012).  In addition, it is often claimed that the 
Agency was invented in Sweden (Pollitt et al.., 2004; Smullen 2010). Also, Nordic Countries 
are relatively homogenous, have high economic equality, large universal welfare provision 
and an egalitarian culture founded on the social democratic principles. The case of Nordic 
Countries also raises fundamental questions such as: are solid institutional capacity necessary 
for the efficiency of Agencies or that the size of a Nation’s impact on the efficiency of 
Agencies, or do Agencies function better in Countries that operate the social democratic 
economic models. Furthermore, terms such as strong institutions, state capacity, 
administrative capacity, the system of government (presidential versus parliamentary), 
legitimacy (democratic versus authoritarian regime), economic models (social democratic 
versus monetarist free market laissez-faire) and organisational ambiguity, to mention but a 
few, are often used in assessing the effectiveness of such agency. The questions raised above 
are in themselves pertinent to any scholarly work that intends to explore the operation of an 
agency.  
This chapter identified that agencification agenda is a global phenomenon, as Agencies are 
now considered important to public administration and management. According to Trondal, 
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(2014: 545) “agencification” is high on the agenda of administrative policy makers for two 
decades, partly because of the New Public Management (NPM) wave. Two decades of NPM 
reforms made agencification phenomenon highly topical and it continues to attract 
considerable scholarly attention (Trondal, 2014: 545). Whilst not totally new, the rate at 
which they have become popular in public governance is striking. As such, international and 
regional bodies as well as national governments are continuously creating agencies. Despite a 
lack of universally agreed definition of agencies, it is accepted that agencies must have three 
key elements: structural disaggregation; performance contracting, and, autonomy which in 
themselves appear simple in nature, but are indeed complex.  Questions are raised regarding 
the prescribed contextual issues (e.g. historical and legal jurisdictional differences as well as 
functions, (single or multi-functional) of agencies. This chapter is of utmost importance to 
this thesis, since one of the research questions is on the behaviour of the Tertiary Education 
Fund (TETFund) in Nigeria.  
 
TETFund is an Agency that is under the Ministry of Education, Nigeria. As discussed in 
Chapter One, since 1945, there have been more than 12 public service review committees in 
Nigeria; each with a varying focus and remit in terms the structure, conditions, composition 
and operational methods. Each sought to efficiency and service delivery. The mid- and late- 
twentieth century reforms and inquiries into the public service in Nigeria were initiated under 
the military regime to explore the responsiveness of the civil service to the demands of the 
20th century and beyond. Even since the return to democratic rule in May 29, 1999, the civil 
service continues to undergo gradual and systematic reforms and restructuring.  The Dotun 
Phillips Reform Panel of 1986 (whose recommendations were implemented in 1988), set the 
tone for the agencification agenda in Nigeria, as it recommended that all parastatals, due to 
their failures, should be converted to departments and agencies of their current supervising 
ministries, with set objectives and targets. Consequently, the Tertiary Education Trust Fund 
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(TETFund) was established by Education Tax Fund Act no. 17, (2003) and the Education 
Tax Cap. E4 laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004) -now repealed and replaced with 
Tertiary Education Trust Fund Act 2011- against a backdrop of neglect, as seen in: the 
deteriorating educational infrastructure and structures; lack of facilities and infrastructure 
required for teaching and research; inadequate funds for training and staff development; low 
morale of staff working in the sector; decline in the quality of service delivery; falling 
standard of education, poor remunerations; poor quality output; high turnover  of personnel, 
and, the general unrest in the sector as a result of strikes by both students and staff. The 
principal mandate of the agency is to use funding and project management for the 
rehabilitation, resuscitation and consolidation of public tertiary education in the country at 
both Federal and State levels.  
The next chapter discusses the methods used for this research and includes the description of 
the case (TETFund), case study research methods, methodological discussions and the data 
collection methods and strategies. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methods and Design 
4.0. Introduction 
In Chapter Three, the author discussed the concept of agencification, definitions and 
functions of agencies and explored the key elements –autonomy, structural disaggregation 
and contractualisation-identified in academic literature and policy documents as fundamental 
to the operation of agencies. It highlighted that agencies have become widespread around the 
world, adopted by nation states and international organisations, as semi-autonomous 
administrative bodies. In addition, it emphasised that agencies have been introduced 
differently Country to Country and have not followed any ‘standardised model’ or 
‘prescribed framework’, due to issues such as interpretational vagaries, definitional 
inconsistencies and contextual variations in implementation.  The success of the 
agencification agenda is equally different across the board. 
Social science research differs from research in the natural sciences and draws on various 
long-established traditions. It is concerned with people, their life context and with 
philosophical questions relating to the nature of knowledge and truth (epistemology), values 
(axiology) and being (ontology) which underpin human judgment and activities (Somekh et 
al., 2005).  Informed by the research questions, this research adopts a qualitative research 
method.  According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011), ‘qualitative research is difficult to define 
clearly. It has no theory or paradigm that is distinctively its own, nor does qualitative 
research have a distinct set of methods or practices that are entirely its own’ (cited in 
Ormston et al., 2014:2). Thus, Ormton et al. (2014), note that qualitative research is a very 
broad church and includes a wide range of approaches as well as methods found within 
different research discipline. Flick (2009) observes that, ‘at a general level, qualitative 
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research is often described as a naturalistic, interpretative approach, concerned with 
exploring phenomena ‘from the interior (cited in Ormton et al., 2014:3).  
This chapter provides an explanation of research design and approaches used in this research. 
The discussion in the chapter covers philosophical underpinnings of social research, the 
different paradigms, the choice of single case study method, and the data collection methods.  
4.1. Research Methodology  
According to Farrelly (2013), the choice of a research method is influenced by many factors 
such as the researchers’ purview of the world, the research question and the research topic. 
Whilst this might appear simple, it is far more complex as the different research approaches 
are underpinned by different theoretical frameworks and understandings. However, before 
delving into further details about this, it is important to examine what research is, to provide 
a meaningful analysis of the various research paradigms. In both popular and academic 
discourse, research is defined differently, influenced by the various ways in which the term is 
deployed in practical sense. Knowledge inquiry, defining and redefining problems, 
formulating hypotheses or suggesting solutions, scientific and systematic search for 
information, making deductions and reaching conclusions, organizing and evaluating data, 
verifying and evaluating knowledge, formulating and testing hypothesis, construction and 
deconstruction of theories, scientific investigation and discovery are examples of terms that 
have been used to capture the focus of scientific or applied research as the case may be. 
Research can be said to be a logical and systematic search for new and useful information on 
a topic, investigation of finding solutions to scientific and social problems through objective, 
rational and systematic analysis (Rejasekar et al., 2013:1). Also, Bhattacherjee (2012) note 
that research is scientific when it contributes to a body of science and deploys a scientific 
method, and argues that research contributes to existing knowledge, which in turn permits 
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and consequently results into advancement in society. Howell (2013) observes that research 
involves the relationship between the individual undertaking the investigation and the 
environment being researched, previous research and the thoughts and analyses of others. 
Therefore, research has considerable significance, e.g. influencing government policies - 
policy formulation, implementation and evaluation to the study of society itself - societal 
relations, seeking answers to a range of existing problems, new developments, dynamic 
alteration to society, etc. The various objectives of research can thus be summarised as 
follows: (1) to discover new facts, (2) to analyse an event or process or phenomenon to 
identify the cause and effect relationship, (3) to analyse an event or process or phenomenon 
to identify the cause and effect relationship, (4) to develop new scientific tools, concepts and 
theories to solve and understand scientific and non-scientific problems, (5) to find solutions 
to scientific, non-scientific and social problems, and, (6) to overcome or solve the problems 
occurring in our everyday life (Rejasekar et al., 2013: 1).   
There are different types of scientific research: exploratory, explanatory, descriptive and 
applied. Explanatory research focus on seeking explanations for observed phenomena, 
problems or behaviour, whilst exploratory research deliberates new areas of inquiry, where 
the goals of the research are to scope out the magnitude or extent of a phenomenon, problem, 
or behaviour (Bhattacherjee, 2012). It seeks to generate some initial ideas (or suppositions), 
explore conventional presuppositions about that phenomenon, and finally test the feasibility 
of an undertaking through more extensive study regarding that phenomenon (Bhattacherjee, 
2012). For descriptive research, the idea is to make careful observations and detailed 
documentation of a phenomenon of interest to the researcher.  Applied research primarily 
seek out solutions to an immediate problem facing a society, government, and industry or 
business organization. It is more practical in approach (Bhattacherjee, 2012). The ideas on 
research raised so far, demonstrates and highlights the rather broad scope and aspect as well 
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as nature of research itself. In short, research is used for different purposes depending on the 
phenomena being investigated. This research is both exploratory and explanatory; this can be 
garnered from the research question, aim, objectives and research findings and the analysis.  
Methodology is usually defined as the philosophical stance or worldview and the science of 
studying how research is done scientifically (Punch, 2005). It is an account of the various 
steps undertaken by a researcher in dealing with a research problem, as well as justifying the 
logic of research approach.  It is different to research methods, which describe those 
methods/techniques that are used for carrying out research.  Research methods or techniques 
refer to the approaches researchers use to address the research questions- that is data 
collection methods.  
Methodology is the philosophy of methods that encompasses both the epistemology and the 
ontology. According to Rejasekar et al. (2013:5), ‘research methodology is a systematic way 
to solve a problem. It is a science of studying how research is to be carried out. Essentially, 
the procedures by which researchers go about their work of describing, explaining and 
predicting phenomena are called research methodology. It is also defined as the study of 
methods by which knowledge is gained. Its aim is to give the work plan of research’. 
According to Kothari (2004:7) research methodology is a way to systematically solve the 
research problem and a science of studying how research is done scientifically. Kothari 
(2004:7) reiterate that the domain of research methodology is about the need for researchers 
to understand the assumptions underlying various techniques, and the need for them to know 
the criteria by which they can decide that certain techniques and procedures will be 
applicable to certain problems and others will not. For a researcher, the choice to select a 
method, such as qualitative, quantitative, cross sectional, longitudinal, case study, etc, is 
largely influenced by the research question, availability of data and, at times, the researcher’s 
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own skills and preferences (Gilbert, 2008). Research questions may be considered from 
different angles. From an external point of view, they should address socially relevant issues. 
Answering research questions should lead to progress- through for example, providing new 
insights or new suggestions for how to solve problem under study. A research question 
should be suitable for study through the methods of social research (Flick, 2011: 24).  A 
research question should be formulated in such a way you can apply one or more of the 
available methods for answering them- if necessary after adapting them or modifying them 
(Flick, 2011: 24). Important qualities of research questions are their specificity and their 
focus. That is, you should formulate your research questions so that they are (a) clear, and (b) 
goal directed, to facilitate the exact decisions to be made concerning who or what should be 
investigated. Research question define not only exactly what to study and how, but also 
which aspects of an issue may remain excluded (Flick, 2011: 23-24). The research question is 
the roadmap for research in that: it helps to guide literature to be examined, who the focus of 
the inquiry should be, what kinds of questions might most usefully be asked in the research 
instruments (Becker and Bryman, 2004:6). 
The research questions themselves are central to the outcome, whether they are prescribed or 
whether they unfold during the project as they help structure the project in terms of giving it 
direction and coherence, limit the project by showing its boundaries, maintain researcher 
focus, provide the framework for writing up and point to the data that will be needed (Punch, 
2005; Gilbert, 2008).  This research is qualitative in nature. Qualitative methods’ is a broad 
term that can be applied to a range of research approaches that have their theoretical origins 
in a range of disciplines including anthropology, sociology, philosophy, social psychology 
and linguistics (Murphy et al., 1998). According to Murphy et al. (1998) the field of 
qualitative research is a highly contested one in which there is extensive disagreements about 
the nature, purpose, status and practice of its methods.   
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Qualitative methods were used in this research, and the decision was influenced by the 
research question. According to Gilbert (2008) qualitative research designs, creates an 
account or description, investigates aspects of social without numerical scores or quantitative 
measurements. It is concerned with exploring the subjective meaning through which people 
interpret the world, the different ways in which reality is constructed contexts. It is often 
based upon interpretivism, constructivism and inductivism, and this is discussed in more 
detail below (Sumner, 2006; 249). Qualitative research is concerned with qualitative 
phenomenon involving quality (Rejasekar et al., 2013:5). Some of the characteristics of 
qualitative research/method are: it is non-numerical, descriptive, applies reasoning and uses 
words, its aim is to get the meaning, feeling and describe the situation, Qualitative data 
cannot be graphed, it is exploratory and It investigates the why and how of decision-making 
(Rejasekar et al., 2013:5).  Qualitative research is characterized by its aims, which relate to 
understanding some aspect of social life, and its methods which (in general) generate words, 
rather than numbers, as data for analysis (Green, 2007). Merriam (2009:13) note that 
‘qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, 
that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world’. To 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005:3) ‘qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the 
observer in the world’. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the 
world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of 
representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, 
and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic 
approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural 
settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them’.  These are more reasons why qualitative research is to be considered 
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as a form of phenomological research both in its approach and methodological philosophical 
underpinnings.  
Also, qualitative research aims to understand the experiences and attitudes and answer the 
What? How? and, Why? of a phenomenon rather than how many or how much, as answered 
by quantitative methods. As such, it is aimed at understanding some aspect of social life and 
its ways which (in general) generate terms, rather than numbers, as data for analysis. In the 
context of this research, the aim is to understand the behaviour of a New Public Management 
Agency type and qualitative methods offers the best approach to addressing the research aim 
and question.  
It is important to consider the various philosophical underpinnings and paradigms associated 
with research. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994: 107) paradigms are basic belief 
systems based on ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions. The 
qualitative paradigm is based on interpretivism (Farrelly, 2013). Tracy (2013:38) sees 
paradigms as preferred ways of understanding reality, building knowledge, and gathering 
information about the world.  Thus, it is inevitable that the, ‘researcher’s paradigm can differ 
based on ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (the nature of knowledge), axiology 
(the values associated with areas of research and theorizing), or methodology (strategies for 
gathering, collecting, and analyzing data,’ (Tracy, 2013:38, see also Howell, 2013). There is 
the positivist paradigm (also referred to as realist or functional paradigm) which according 
to Becker and Bryman (2004) is a school of thought that posits that social life can and should 
be studied according to the canons of the scientific methods with emphasis on directly 
observable entities. The positivist research believes that there is one single reality which is 
already out there in the world waiting to be discovered by researchers (Howell, 2013; Tracy, 
2013).  Farrelly (2013) notes that it is a paradigm that tilts towards quantitative research. 
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Tracy (2013) believes researchers, who use this paradigm, ‘strive for research to mirror 
reality – to represent clearly what is being examined’. Porta and Keating (2008:23) reiterate 
that within the positivist school, the world exists as an objective entity, outside of the mind of 
the observer, and in principle, it is knowable in its entirety. Therefore, the assumption within 
this school, is that the researcher can be separated from the object of his/her research and 
therefore observe it in a neutral way and without affecting the observed objects (Porta and 
Keating, 2008:23). Howell (2013) postulates that positivism is based on aspects of 
empiricism and identifies how this involves an adherence to natural science perspectives of 
reality and methodology.  
There is also the neo-positivist and post-positivist which has some similarities with positivist, 
but they emphasise that although there could be what is called the reality out there, yet it is 
partial. Therefore, within the neo-positivist and post-positivist, the assumptions on objective 
reality are more relaxed. Within this school of thought, reality is still considered to be 
objective (external to human minds), however it only imperfectly knowable (Porta and 
Keating, 2008:24). As such the positivist trust in causal knowledge is modified by the 
admission that some phenomena are not governed by causal laws, but at best, by probabilistic 
ones (Porta and Keating, 2008:24).  Tracy (2013) note that post positivist claims that human 
researcher and their methods are laden with weaknesses and bias, hence capturing the reality 
out there is an impossible project.  Post-positivist paradigm claims that the approach should 
be about limiting or eliminating errors in research processes by staying objective. According 
to Howell (2013), the methodology for the post- positivist position is about falsifying 
standing scientific laws and the ontology concerned with criticising existing reality.  
The interpretative paradigm (constructivist or constructionist) position differs both in 
methods and methodological underpinning to the positivist and they question the idea of 
objective reality (Tracy, 2013). They argue that knowledge and reality are constantly 
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negotiated, produced and constructed within the world, shaped by situations, circumstances 
or even cultural interpretations and understandings (see, e.g. Becker and Bryman, 2004; Porta 
and Keating, 2008; Farrelly, 2013). Therefore, constructivist researchers believe there is no 
one reality, but multiple realities and truths which are usually influenced by one’s on 
perception of reality (Farrelly, 2013). Events, situation etc., are socially constructed and are 
subject to constant changes. That is why in research in the social constructionist approach it 
is said that the investigator, and the object of study, are interactively linked (that is they co-
exist), so that findings are mutually created within the context of the situation, which 
consequently shapes the inquiry methods as well as outcomes. On the epistemological level, 
there is no access to reality independent of our minds they argue (Farrelly, 2013). This 
paradigm is based on interpretivism, and the aim is to go out and discover reality rather than 
if there is a reality somewhere.  Some argue that interpretivists can draw from hermeneutics, 
which aims at a holistic understanding (Tracy, 2013). A qualitative method of research is 
often associated with such epistemological stance.  
The critical paradigm is associated with the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Theodor 
Adorno, Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse (Howell, 2013). The critical paradigms 
challenge preconceived ideas about what is considered normal and natural- it is about 
questioning the status quo ante (Howell, 2013). The central idea of critical paradigm is how 
it is important to explore events from the lens of social and historical processes, and 
according to Howell (2013) that is why this paradigm is defined as historical realism. 
Postmodern/ poststructuralist perspective is also considered part of the critical paradigm 
which draws attention to issues of power relations in the society.  According to Tracy (2013) 
the post-modern paradigm to knowledge is different to that of modern scholar, in that they 
are more dispersed, unstable and plural. To Howell (2013), post-modernism is a form of 
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scepticism.  It is an approach that considered issues of domination, self-subordination as well 
as avenues for resistance and chances. The post-modern perspective questions the idea of 
totalizing truths and certainty; reject grand theories and master narratives (Tracy, 2013). 
Tracy (2013) postulates that post-modern researchers view reality and knowledge as 
fragmented, multiple, situated, and multi-faceted. On these premise, reality is thought to be 
nearly impossible to know or represent. According to Howell (2013), modernism and aspects 
of structuralism relate to positivism whereas postmodernism may correspond with aspects of 
idealist phenomenology, critical theory, constructivism and participatory paradigms of 
inquiry. Scholars associated with this school of thoughts are Levi-Strauss, Jacques Derrida, 
Micheal Foucault, Baudrillard, etc., (Howell, 2013).  
Method is associated with a variety of theoretical perspectives and paradigms; for instance, 
qualitative research uses a range of methods to focus on the meanings and interpretation of 
social phenomena and social processes contexts in which they occur (Sumner, 2006: 249). 
According to Rejasekar et al. (2013:5) ‘research methods are the various procedures, 
schemes and algorithms used in research’. All the methods used by a researcher to gather 
information during a research study are termed as research methods. They are essentially 
planned, scientific and strive to be value-neutral. They include theoretical procedures, 
experimental studies, numerical schemes, statistical approaches, etc. Research methods help 
us collect samples, data and find a solution to a problem. Particularly, scientific research 
methods call for explanations based on collected facts, measurements and observations and 
not on reasoning alone (Kothari, 2004).  They accept only those explanations, which can be 
verified by experiments’. 
Qualitative research is not a single set of theoretical principles, a single research strategy or 
single method (Silverman, 1993). According to Punch (2005: 134), qualitative research 
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methods are complex, often changing and contested field of multiple methodologies and 
research practices. This can be linked to the fact that it developed in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries across a range of disciplines, based on varied and sometimes conflicting 
philosophical and theoretical bases, including cultural anthropology, interpretative 
sociologies (such as symbolic interactionism), phenomenology and, more recently, 
hermeneutics, critical theory, feminism, post-colonial theory, cultural studies, post- 
structuralism and post-modernism (see e.g. Moriarty, 2011:2). Therefore, qualitative research 
is not a single entity, but an umbrella term, which encompasses enormous variety, (Punch, 
2005). Consequently, this diversity often leads to differences and disagreements regarding 
the nature of qualitative research, paradigms, the role of the researcher, and the use of various 
methods and the methods for analysis of data, (Punch, 2005:134; Sumner, 2006: 249). The 
core characteristics of qualitative research have been identified thus: (1) aims which are 
directed at providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the social world of 
research participants by learning about their social and material circumstances, their 
experiences, perspectives, and histories; (2) samples that are small in scale and purposively 
selected on the basis of salient criteria; (3) data collection methods which usually involve 
close contact between the researcher and the research participants, which are interactive and 
developmental and allow for emergent issues to be explored; (4) data which are very 
detailed, information rich and extensive; (5) analysis which is open to emergent concepts and 
ideas and which may produce detailed description and classification, identify patterns of 
association or develop typologies and explanations, and, ( 6) outputs which tend to focus on 
the interpretations of social meaning through mapping and ‘re-presenting’ the social world of 
participants (cited in Moriarty, 2011: 2-3). According to Flick (2011:12), ‘Qualitative 
research sets itself other priorities. Qualitative research is not modelled on measurement as 
found in the natural sciences. Qualitative research addresses issues by using one of the 
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following three: it aims (a) at grasping the subjective meaning of issues from the perspectives 
of the participants, (b) latent meanings of a situation are in focus, (c) social practices and the 
life world of the participants are described. The aim is less to test what is known (e.g. 
existing theory or hypothesis) than to discover new aspects in the situation under study and to 
develop hypotheses or a theory from these discoveries. Therefore, the research situation is 
not standardised; rather it is designed to be as open as possible’.  
On the methods used in qualitative research, at times in combination, are those which are 
open-ended (to explore participants’ interpretations) and which allow the collection of 
detailed information in a relatively close setting. A key advantage of qualitative methods in 
exploratory research is the use of open-ended questions to probe, which equally gives 
participants/ interviewees the opportunity to respond in their own words, rather than forcing 
them to choose from fixed responses, as in quantitative methods. With the open-ended 
questions, comes the opportunity to evoke responses that are: meaningful and culturally 
salient to the participant/interviewee, unanticipated by the researcher and rich and 
explanatory in nature. This provides a rich data set and context for the research. Also, 
qualitative methods allow the researcher the flexibility to further probe initial participant 
responses and raise further questions around the why or how of the phenomenon under 
investigation. It is therefore imperative for the researcher to listen carefully to what 
participants say, engage with them according to their individual personalities and styles, and 
use investigative questioning to encourage them to elaborate on their answers.  
The data collection methods and techniques in qualitative research include in-depth 
interviewing, ethnography, participant observation, case studies, life histories, discourse 
analysis, focus groups, participatory action research, and conversational analysis, to mention 
but a few. Qualitative research offers an in-depth detailed understanding and interpretation of 
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situations or events (Sumner, 2006).  However, qualitative research is accused of lacking 
rigour of quantitative research in that it produces ‘soft data’ that is subjective and difficult to 
replicate, because it is often based on small sample sets- which is difficult to generalise 
(Sumner, 2006). Despite this criticism, the selection of a qualitative research design for this 
specific research project is based on the research aims and objectives, research questions and 
the nature of this research, this is done with the knowledge that each method has its own 
shortcomings. This research complimented the qualitative data gathered with other sources 
such as documents, academic literature and data from other research projects that have been 
done on agencification – to triangulate the data.  
4.2. Case Study Method 
Case study research has become in social and scientific inquiry, used in both qualitative and 
quantitative forms of research (Casey et al., 2013). Case study research has definitional 
controversies. The problem with the term ‘case study’ is that it is not used in a standardised 
manner and the use of the term has overlapped substantially with other methods - such as 
ethnography, participant observation, fieldwork, qualitative research and life history over 
time, as well as its deployment in research inquiry which is quantitative in nature 
(Hammersley and Goom,2006:1). Problem with defining case study arise from its usage in 
various fields and disciplines (e.g. sociology, anthropology) (Moses and Knutsen, 2007; 
Simons, 2009). It is defined as an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives, of the 
complexity and uniqueness of a project, policy, institution, programme or system, in a ‘real-
life context’. It generates an in-depth understanding and knowledge and/or inform policy 
development, professional practice and civil or community actions (Simons, 2009). Also, it is 
a detailed examination of one setting or a single subject, a single depository of documents or 
one event (Bogdon and Biklen, 1992). However, Yin (2003:13-14) considers the case study 
as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (or problem) within its 
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real-life context, when boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clear. 
According to Bhattacherjee (2012), case study research is an in-depth investigation of a 
problem in one or more real-life settings, (which are sometime called case sites) over an 
extended period, and it can either be positivist in nature, (for hypothesis testing), or 
interpretative (for theory building). A case study provides the opportunity for the research to 
discover a wide variety of social, cultural, and political factors potentially related to the 
phenomenon of interest that may not be known in advance (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Indeed, 
case study be an umbrella terms for a family of research methods having in common the 
decision to focus an inquiry around an instance (Adelman et al., 1984: 94). It is an enquiry 
which uses multiple sources of evidence to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evidence (Johnson, 1994: 20). 
According to Keddie (2006), a case study is an approach that uses the in-depth investigation 
of one or more examples of a current social phenomenon, by utilizing a variety of sources of 
data. In addition, a ‘case’ can be an individual person, an event, or that of a social activity 
group, organisation or institution.  It can either be a single case, (for example, a community 
study or a ‘socio-biography’ of a member of a deviant sub-culture), or multiple, (possibly 
quite large) of cases, (for example, in the analysis of the conflict behaviour of different types 
of work groups or different organisations) (Keddie, 2006). The main thrust of a case study 
can be descriptive, exploratory or explanatory (Yin, 2003) and the data are usually more 
detailed, varied and extensive (Neuman, 2006). Indeed, case studies play a key part in policy 
research because they are frequently undertaken to provide examples of good practice in the 
delivery of a specific policy or programme; they may also be undertaken as part of an 
evaluation project, providing examples of the impact of a policy (Keddie, 2006). A case 
study uses the logic of analytics, instead of enumerative induction (Neuman, 2006).  
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According to Vaughan (1992), case studies help researchers connect the micro-level, or the 
actions of individual people, to the macro-level or large-scale social structure and processes. 
Nisbet and Watt (1984:73) note that case study is not simply an example or an anecdote but 
involves systematic collection of evidence.  
Bhattacherjee (2012) noted that the decision to use a case study by a researcher is contingent 
upon four key questions: (1) is this the right method to use?; (2) what is the appropriate unit 
of analysis for a case study?; (3) should the researcher use a single case study or multiple 
case design?; and, (4) what sort of data collection method should be used in case study? 
These questions are pertinent, as they provide the scope for the research and give the 
researcher the opportunity to identify different variables necessary for the investigation the 
unit of analysis. In the context of this research, the case study method is considered 
appropriate for several reasons. Firstly, this research is exploratory in nature and as such it 
provides the opportunity to answer the why and how questions, in relation to TETFund; these 
are relevant to addressing the research question. To Bhattacherjee (2012) the case study 
method is appropriate for exploratory studies where the experiences of participants and the 
context of actions are critical, as well as for studies aimed at understanding complex, 
temporal processes (why? and how? of a phenomenon) rather than factors or causes (what?).  
As a method, it is well-suited for studying complex organizational processes that involve 
multiple participants and interacting sequences of events, such as organizational change and 
large-scale technology implementation projects (Bhattacherjee, 2012). Secondly, it offers the 
opportunity to acquire meaningful, robust and rich data on issues and problems of agency. 
Therefore, as a method, it provides a rich and deeper understanding of a phenomenon - in this 
case the concept of agencification. Thirdly, it offers an opportunity for triangulation. 
Bhattacherjee (2012) note that the use of case study provides an opportunity for the 
researcher to use a range of data collection methods and techniques, which offer greater 
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opportunity to the researcher to triangulate or validate observed data by comparing responses 
of the interviewees.  
Basey (2002: 115-120) set out seven stages in case study research: (1) identifying the 
research as an issue, problem or hypothesis; (2) asking research questions (3) drawing up 
ethical guidelines, (4) collecting and storing data (5) generating and testing analytical 
statements, (6) interpreting or explaining the analytical statements, and (7) deciding on the 
outcome and writing the case study report. This thesis has followed the seven stages 
suggested by Basey (2002).  
In academic research, it has been identified that there are two types of case study: single and 
multiple case studies. The use of single case studies may be appropriate under the following 
circumstance: (1) the case is unique and as such there is no need conducting additional cases; 
(2) the scale of the research is such that undertaking additional cases would mean sacrificing 
depth to achieve breadth; and (3) there are few examples relevant to the enquiry and other 
potential cases are inaccessible. The choice of using a single case study for this thesis is 
based on the fact the research questions aims to examine the behaviour of an NPM agency- in 
this case TETFund, as well as the impact of NPM on a developing nation and on its public 
sector, in this case, Nigeria. The researcher believes using a multiple case studies would 
impact on the outcome- as the different agencies within Nigeria operate under separate 
mandates and were set up for different reasons.    
Case study research has often been criticised because its findings are not generalisable, in 
particular single case studies (Goom et al., 2006). It is argued that case study is about 
developing knowledge on a topic area or event, and that generalisation does not necessarily 
apply (Stake, 2006). As Lincoln and Guba (2006) argue that the only generalisation is that 
there is no generalisation. This argument says that there is no need to call for generalisation 
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in all cases of research, and that this is usually informed by the scope of the research in the 
first instance. It is also argued that the scope of qualitative research is not about 
generalisation but rather a method of inquiry that seeks to understand in detail what is being 
studied by the research. Therefore, generalizability can usually be established through 
additional studies (Bhattacherjee, 2012). In addition, as Silverman (2000) adds that purposive 
sampling (as used for this research) helps to provide potential for generalisation. The 
researcher believes that this research, although specific to TETFund can be generalised 
because the nature of it public sector reforms in Nigeria.  The strength of single case study 
research on in-depth understanding of phenomenon, impressed on the researcher to adopt this 
method, based on the research aim and objectives. The need to understand the organisational 
behaviour (in this case- agency behaviour) offers a more plausible reason for using a single 
case study.  This case study will focus on understanding the dynamics present within a single 
setting which for this research is TETFund. Through data analysis, the researcher aims to 
develop theoretical positions on agencification particularly in a developing country setting. 
As such the main aim is not to generalise, but to provide knowledge that is transferable to the 
study of agencies in developing countries. Case study research is a valuable approach to 
management research and it provided the potential for rich data and in-depth analysis of real 
situations, phenomenon and events.  
4.3 Data Collection  
Since case studies are empirically omnivorous, data collection is typically multi-method and 
multi-source. This research used semi-structured interviews and documents. Interviewing is a 
method of data collection, information or opinion gathering that specifically involves asking 
a series of questions. According to Gary (2006) an interview is a conversation between 
people in which one person has the role of researcher. The choice of interview in a research 
will depend on the focus of that research. Interviews are associated with both quantitative 
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and qualitative social research and are often used alongside other methods. Although 
interviews can be generally defined and have some commonality of meaning, they can vary 
enormously in terms of the context, or setting, in which they are carried out, the purpose they 
serve, as well as how they are structured and conducted, and this gives rise to many different 
types of interviews (Davies, 2006), ranging from structured to unstructured, (Patton, 1990, 
Neuman, 2006). Also, interviews are described in different ways as a meeting or a dialogue 
between people where personal and social interaction occur, (Davies, 2006), ‘guided 
conversations,’ Rubin and Rubin (1995) and conversations ‘with a purpose,’ (Burgess 1982). 
Similarly, research interviews are based on the conversations of everyday life - with structure 
and purpose that are defined and controlled by the researcher. According to Kvale (1996), 
interviews allow people to convey to others a situation from their own perspective and in 
their own words. There is no common procedure for research interviews, but an interview 
investigation can be outlined in seven method stages: thematising, designing the study so that 
it addresses the research questions, the interview itself, transcribing, analysing, verification, 
and reporting. The research interview is characterized by a methodological awareness of 
question forms, a focus on the dynamics of interaction between interviewer and interviewee, 
and also a critical attention to what is said, (Kvale, 1996). Interviews provide an avenue to 
access people’s perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations, and constructions of reality 
(Punch, 2005). In case study research, interview is one of the most important sources of 
information (Yin, 2003). According to Cohen and Manion (1997), the interview can serve a 
number of distinct purposes. First, it can be used as the means of gathering information about 
a person’s knowledge, values, preferences and attitudes. Secondly, it can be used to test out a 
hypothesis or to identify variables and their relationships. Thirdly, it can be used in 
conjunction with other research techniques such as surveys, to follow up issues. Arguably, 
interviews are also preferable to questionnaires where questions are either open-ended or 
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more complex, or where the logical order of questions is difficult to predetermine. Whether 
an interview is successful in eliciting the range and depth of answers required will depend to 
a large extent on the skills of the interviewer. Essentially, semi-structured interview is the 
favoured approach, where there is a need to attain highly personalised data and there are 
opportunities for probing further issues that come up during an interview. The research uses 
the semi-structured interview as it allowed for both follow-up and also probing of the 
responses to which enriched or clarify the qualitative aspects of the data gathered. Semi-
structured interviews are non-standardised and are often used in qualitative analysis. The 
order of questions may also change, depending on which direction the interview takes. 
Indeed, additional questions may be asked, including some which were not anticipated at the 
start of the interview as new issues arise, (Gary, 2006).  
The semi-structured interview allows for probing of views and opinions where it is desirable 
for respondents to expand on their answers. This is vital when a phenomenological approach 
is being taken. That is, where the objective is to explore subjective meanings that respondents 
ascribe to concepts or events. Such probing may also allow for the diversion of the interview 
into new pathways, which were not originally considered as part of the interview, help 
towards meeting the research objectives (Gary, 2006; 216). Accordingly, data obtained from 
semi-structured interviews is generally rich and in depth, giving the researcher a fuller 
understanding of the informants’ perspective on the topic under investigation, and the 
reasons behind the views and opinions expressed (Simons, 2009).  
The use of semi-structured interview in case study research allows the researcher to explore 
the ‘why’ questions which will in turn enrich the data. Yin (2003) noted that in most 
situations, case study interviews must be open-ended in nature, so that the researcher can ask 
respondents about the facts of the matter as well as their opinions about events.  The 
researcher believes that the use of probes, prompts and a flexible questioning style that semi-
 111 
 
structure interviews provide, (both in terms of the ways in which questions are asked and the 
order in which they are delivered), will give the researcher a great opportunity to explore and 
encourage respondents to give their detailed views on the issues raised or mentioned in the 
process of interviewing. According to Henn et al., (2006), the use of probes and prompts in 
qualitative interviews enable the researcher and the respondent to enter into a dialogue about 
the topic in question, and this can be helpful in that the researcher and the respondent are 
given the opportunity to query questions and answers, and to verify that they have a shared 
understanding of meaning. In this sense Yin (2003) argued that this will turn the respondents 
into ‘informants’, thus making them crucial to the success of the case study. By using semi-
structured interviews, respondents are also encouraged to provide examples in order to 
ground their narrative.  
The interviewees included stakeholders, beneficiaries, official and staffs of the Fund. The 
interviewees were contacted by phone and the details of the research forwarded to them 
afterwards. The interviewees were asked to pick the time convenient for the interviews. 
Initially, it was anticipated that the number of interviewees will be 30, however 33 people 
were interviewed. For some of the interviewees, the interviews took place in their own 
offices, and for others it was done via the telephone. All interviews were recorded with the 
participants’ permission and transcribed verbatim. The interviews ranged from 1 hour to 1 
hour 30 minutes. This was to ensure accuracy of reportage of the interviews, add to the 
veracity of the reporting. The recording provided an opportunity for the researcher also to 
take notes.   This provided the researcher with an avenue to concentrate on the interviewees’ 
answers and prompt effectively (Bryman, 2008; Simons, 2009). Recordings are essential for 
accurate transcription as they provide the researcher the opportunity to re-listen to the 
interview in order to review and highlight points missed during the first time of listening. 
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The interviews were conducted in line with the requirements of the Northumbria University 
ethical guidelines. The interviewees were advised in advance of the issues to be addressed in 
the interview and the ethics form and consent form was sent to them in advance. The 
researcher provided the interviewees with an information sheet detailing the aims of the 
research and the structure the interview will take, before actually conducting the interview. 
Before the interview, the interviewees were asked whether they were still willing to take part 
in the interview and informed that they had right to withdraw their participation. In addition, 
to been provided with a consent form they were supplied with a summary of the research 
aims and objectives and an introductory letter from the researcher’s university. In addition, 
the privacy right of the interviewees was explained to each of them as they are also of 
paramount importance to the researcher. Most importantly, the interviewees were assured 
that the information gleaned from the interviews will be anonymised and confidentiality will 
be maintained in terms of disclosure, autonomy; respect the rights of individual, beneficence; 
doing good, non-maleficence; not doing harm, and justice; particularly equity are key 
principles of ethics in research (Munn and Drever, 1991; Gillham, 2000). Everyone who 
participates in a research study should have freely consented to participation, without being 
coerced or unfairly pressurized. This means they should be well- informed about what 
participation entails and reassured that declining will not affect any services they receive. 
While written consent may in some situations frighten the individuals you are talking to, you 
should at the very least obtain verbal consent. Confidentiality allows for the protection of the 
identity of the person from whom a researcher gathers information. If collected, the identity 
of the participants must be protected at all times and not be left lying around in notebooks or 
un-protected computer files (Gillham, 2000). 
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4.3.1. Sampling 
Sampling refers to strategies for assuring that you have the ‘right’ cases in your study (Flick, 
2011:77). All research including qualitative research involves sampling (Punch, 2005). 
Sampling is a technique used to select groups from a wider population and this is done 
because it is not usually possible to include the whole populations in the research, (Davidson, 
2006). It is important to note that qualitative and quantitative researchers approach sampling 
differently (Neuman, 2006). However, it has been noted that qualitative researchers focus 
less on a representativeness of the sample than on how the sample or small collection of 
cases, units, or activities, illuminate social issues.  As such, the primary purpose of sampling 
is to collect specific cases, events, or actions that can clarify and deepen understanding.    
Turning now to probability and non- probability sampling, probability sampling is one in 
which every unit in the population has a chance (greater than zero) of being selected in the 
sample, and this probability can be accurately determined. With non-probability sampling, 
qualitative researchers rarely draw a representative sample from a huge number of cases to 
intensely study the sampled cases. For this research, non- probability quota sampling was 
used to identify the interviewees. Non-probability sampling is often used where it is not 
feasible, practical or theoretically sensible, to otherwise undertake random sampling. Quota 
sampling is a non- probability method of selection that aims to make the sample 
representative of the target population by setting controls on sample composition to make it 
match known population characteristics, (Sturgis, 2006). In the case of Nigeria, there are 36 
states and the Federal Capital Territory, which are then grouped into 6 geo-political zones.  
Due to the size of the country and the number of beneficiaries it will be difficult to use the 
probability sampling technique.  
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A major drawback of quota sampling is that, since it is not a probability sample, it is not 
possible to estimate the standard error and so the researcher cannot calculate confidence 
intervals or use inferential statistics. A further limitation of quota sampling is that the 
researcher must know the proportion of people with each characteristic in the population in 
order to specify the quota controls, (Sturgis, 2006). Nevertheless, non-probability sampling is 
adequate for case studies because the aim is not to use the results as a basis for wider 
generalizations, nor to infer from the sample to the general population. The aim is, rather, to 
learn something from the behaviour of the case being studied (Flyvberg, 2006).  
Based on the research question, purpose sampling was used to identify the interviewees. 
Purposive sampling is defined as the selection of participants who have knowledge or 
experience of the area being investigated. Purposive sampling is virtually synonymous with 
qualitative research (Palys, 2008). According to Punch (2005: 187), purposive sampling 
means sampling in a deliberate way, with purpose or focus in mind. It is about identifying 
and selecting individuals or groups of individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or 
experienced with a phenomenon of interest (Cresswell and Plano Clark 2011 cited in 
Palnikas et al., 2013). However, it is sometimes argued that non-probability methods such as 
purposive sampling are not free from bias as informants or interviewees may be chosen out 
of convenience, or from recommendations, from knowledgeable people. However, despite its 
inherent bias, purposeful sampling can provide reliable and robust data (Tongco, 2007). The 
strength of the method actually lies in its intentional bias, (Bernard 2002; Lewis & Sheppard 
2006). This research uses the stakeholder purposeful sampling, which is particularly useful in 
the context of evaluation research and policy analysis. As an approach, it involves the 
identifying of the major stakeholders who are involved in designing, administering 
programme or service being evaluated (Palys, 2008). 
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4.3.2. Documents 
According to Punch (2005), printed and archival documents are both a rich source of data in 
social science research. For this research, documentary data will be used for (triangulation. 
Documents are important in triangulation, where an intersecting set of different methods and 
data types is used in a single project, (Denzin1989).  Also, documents can help verify the 
correct spellings and titles or names of organisations that might have been mentioned in the 
interview and can provide specific details to corroborate information from other sources (Yin 
(2003).  
Documents are important tools for social researchers as they can provide context to what is 
been researched in a number of ways, including but not limited to timelines and historical 
perspectives. This of course, can help the researcher understand how things have progressed 
over the years and how questions for fieldwork can be framed. Sometimes documents 
provide somewhat an insight into a range of issues- both in terms of scope and reach of the 
topic under investigation. The more reasons why Yin (2003) argued that documents provide 
enormous ideas about questions or other areas to explore in data analysis. That been the case, 
it is important for a researcher using document pays particular attention to that selection of 
documents in order to avoid bias. Some scholars have been very critical of the use of 
documents in qualitative research, because it is assumed that documents contain unmitigated 
truth, however, Yin (2003) argued that the case study researcher is less likely to be misled by 
documents because they are intended to provide supplementary details to other information 
that has been gathered through other data collection techniques, and in this case, it is semi-
structured interview. Documents used were Ministry of Education Reports, TETFund 
publications, public sector reforms and reports and other government reports in the area of 
public sector management, etc. The use of these documents has helped significantly in 
providing contextual data gathered through the semi-structured interviews with key 
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stakeholders and employees of the TETFund. The researcher also did archival research to 
locate documents of historical importance, especially the military decrees and the evolution 
and growth of the Nigerian Civil service.  
4.4. Ethics 
Ethical issues are very important in all types of research. Ethical issues are about access, 
consent, ownership of data, confidentiality and anonymity. It is about careful negotiation of 
access to the case study (the organisation- people), seeking informed consent from 
participants, agreeing a protocol for the ownership of data (e.g. asking participants to confirm 
the content of interview records before using them in the research), ensuring confidentiality 
of data collected during the research, and ensuring anonymity for all participants and key 
stakeholders.  
According to Northumbria University Research Ethics and Governance Handbook (2014-15) 
informed consent is one of the core ethical principles of conducting research with human 
participants and named data.  Informed consent is important in research because it respects 
the autonomy of the participants and protects their welfare. The three main elements of 
ensuring consent: are (1) adequate appropriate information to make an informed decision; (2) 
Voluntariness (with no coercion or undue influence); and (3) competence and/ or autonomy 
(Northumbria University, 2014). The author provided the interviewees with content form 
(Sample of this is in Appendix 11). In addition, author provided the interviewees with 
information on what the research is all about and mentioned to them the importance of 
confidentiality.   According to the Northumbria University Research Ethnic and Governance 
Handbook (2014-15, p14) information about the study should be presented to the participants 
and it must include: the study title and an invitation to participate; the purpose of the study; 
why the participant has been chosen, the voluntary nature of participation, including the right 
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to withdraw from the research at any time etc.  This procedure was adhered to in the process 
of carrying out the semi-structured interviews.  
In addition, the issue of confidentiality was mentioned to the participants/ interviewees in 
relation to the presentation of the findings. In the process of interpreting the data from the 
findings, the interviewees were anonymised.  According to the Northumbria University 
Research Ethnic and Governance Handbook (2014-15, p24) the publication of personal data 
must be done in accordance with method described when consent was provided by the 
individuals.  In relation to the recording of interviews with both the beneficiaries and staff of 
the Fund as well as other government officials (as mentioned above) the author asked their 
permission for the interviews to be recorded. Whilst some of the interviewees acceded to the 
request, others declined and preferred notes to be taken.   
4.5. Data Analysis 
According to Attride Stirling (2001), if qualitative research is to yield meaningful and useful 
results, it is imperative that the material under scrutiny is analysed in a methodical manner. 
In analysing the data, this research uses thematic approach - in particular, on the themes 
relating to the concept of agencification. Thematic analysis seeks to unearth the salient 
themes in a text, though at different levels. There are six steps to thematic analysis and this is 
the approach that has been used in this thesis: (1) coding of material - this has involved the 
dissecting of the text from the interview into different segments; (2) identifying the themes - 
for this there are different themes that are important to the understanding of agencification, 
apart from the three core elements that have been identified above which link to both theories 
and practice, such as corruption, governance, etc.; (3) constructing of the themes - identifying 
both internal and exterior histories as they apply to the research questions, aims and 
objectives; (4) describing the networks and connections between the various themes and 
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issues relevant to the research question; (5) summarise the main themes, and, (6) interpret 
patterns (Attride Stirling, 2001).  
According to Cope (2014, p89), common criticisms are that qualitative research is subjective, 
anecdotal, subject to researcher bias, and lacking generalizability by producing large 
quantities of detailed information about a single, unique phenomenon or setting.  The criteria 
that are used to develop trustworthiness in qualitative research are credibility, dependability, 
confirmability and transferability (Lincoln and Guba, 1994). Credibility is defined as the 
truth associated with the data or participant’s views and the interpretation and representation 
of them by the researcher (Polit and Beck, 2012).  According to Cope (2014), credibility is 
enhanced by the researcher describing his or her experiences as a researcher and verifying 
with participants. In addition, to support credibility when reporting a qualitative study, the 
researcher should demonstrate engagement, methods of observation, and audit trails (Cope, 
2014, 89). For this research credibility was established through the process of asking the 
participants to examine the transcripts of the interview in order to ensure that it captured their 
views. In addition, the researcher performed two roles: first as a researcher and second as a 
participant observer, being an employee of the Fund.  
Dependability is about the data, that is, the extent at which there are constancy over similar 
conditions and this can be achieve when another researcher concurs with the decision trails at 
each state of the research process (Cope, 2014, p89).  According to Koch (2006), through the 
researcher’s process and descriptions, a study would be deemed dependable if the study 
findings were replicated with similar participant in similar conditions (cited in Cope, 2014, 
p89). The researcher is of the opinion that the research process and findings have strong 
elements of dependability. However, the issue of dependability may be questioned further as 
participants used in research process can either retire or move on to do something else and 
the setting may change as well. For instance, as TETfund was established through an Act and 
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a change in government can alter the operations of the Fund. More profoundly, my position 
as both a research a participant cannot be easily replicated, as external researchers wouldn’t 
be participant and other participant will probably not be trained as social science researchers.  
Conformability refers to the researcher’s ability to demonstrate that the data represent the 
participants’ responses, not the researcher’s biases or view points, and this can be displayed 
by the researcher describing how conclusions and interpretations were established and 
exemplifying that the findings were derived directly from the data (Cope, 2014). In the 
presentation of the data and findings for this research, the researcher presented the accurate 
information supported by the anonymised source. Transferability refers to finding that can be 
applied to other settings or group (Lincoln and Guba, 1994). However, the position on this 
issue aligns with that of Sandelowski (1986) which states that the criterion of transferability 
is dependent on the aims of the qualitative study and may only be relevant if the intent of the 
research is to make generalizations about the subject or phenomenon (cited in Cope, 2014, 
p89). As stated in section 4.2.2, the researcher did not set out to generate a data that will be 
generalizable; the purpose of this research is to provide a rich data and findings on a single 
case, which can serve as a point of research for other researchers to explore, and for 
generating potentially transferrable knowledge.  
4.6. Summary 
This Chapter has discussed the data collection techniques and the philosophical 
underpinnings that guided this research work. Positivism, constructivism and postmodernism 
have been discussed. Although these paradigms differ, they have been able to add to 
discussions on research methods and methodology in social sciences.  Issues around validity 
and reliability of data, as well as limitations of the research, are explored in Chapter Six as 
part of the conclusion to the work.  Despite controversies regarding the use of single case 
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study, the author considers this method as the most appropriate given the research question. 
Methodological discussions on the richness and density of data, which are essentially of good 
value in qualitative research, were also discussed. The field questions (attached) focused on 
the behaviour of the Fund, drawing on issues raised in Chapter Three in terms of autonomy, 
performance contracting and structural disaggregation, identified by scholars as the three 
core elements of agencification. Pollitt and Talbot (2004) note that depending on the reform 
the three may not be present at all, or may not occur at the same time, or may be in pairs. 
However, they observed that when this three come together that the full force of the ‘agency’ 
concept becomes most apparent. In addition, the concept of strategic management is explored 
in relation to the operations and behaviour of the Fund, as well as how it connects to the 
contextual issues addressed in Chapter Five. This brings to light the argument made by Ferlie 
and Ongaro (2015) on the importance of strategic management in understanding 
contemporary public services organisations in any given context.  
On reflection, the researcher is of the opinion that his position falls within the social 
constructionist paradigm. Being staff of the Fund, my colleagues and I by interacting daily 
build an interpretation of TETFund as an NPM Agency, at least partly irrespective of 
whether such claims may be ‘objectively’ appraised. The fact that I work for the agency 
TETFund (the case study for this research), which is discursively created as an NPM Agency, 
impacts on my very stance: indeed, I would mentally want it to be an NPM Agency – I am 
acting to make it be (come) such an organisation – and knowledge generated about it to be 
potentially transferred for making other Agencies develop in similar ways. This position was 
negotiated by ensuring that there is validity and reliability in the collection as well as the 
interpretation of the research data (as described in section 4.4.).  Chapter Five presents that 
findings and the analysis of the field work. 
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Chapter Five 
Research Findings and Analysis 
5.0. Introduction 
In Chapter Four, the research methodology and data collection techniques and methods used 
for this research were discussed. It was stressed that the use of qualitative research method 
was triggered by the research questions: what is the behaviour of an NPM Agency in a non-
NPM context? What influence does NPM have on public management in a developing 
country, with Nigeria as case study? Is the TETFund an NPM Agency?  Therefore, the 
objectives focused on the concept of agencification and whether the operations and behaviour 
of the Fund reflects what is mentioned in academic literature on concepts of agency practices 
and NPM infusions, as well as NPM reforms and its impacts on public sector management in 
Nigeria.  Accordingly, the researcher utilised semi-structured interview as the principal data 
collection method and the protocol (in terms of the questions) was organised and structured 
in such a way to address the research question and bring out the pertinent issues on 
Agencification, Agencies and the central focus of the research, that is the behaviour of the 
Fund, alongside perceived impact of NPM in public sector management.  As such interviews 
were conducted with key government officials, stakeholders, beneficiaries and personnels of 
the Fund. The data from the interviews are presented and analysed in this chapter, 
comparatively to concept of agencification and the operations and behaviour of the Fund. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, Agencification is a concept that has gained currency across the 
world, used in both developed and developing countries as a panacea to a range of public 
administration problems created by global changes in the twenty first century.  As underlined 
in Chapter Three, Agency is used in different contexts and forms, thereby making 
interpretations of successes and failures respectively difficult. Indeed, whilst there are no 
universally accepted definitions of Agencification and Agencies; there seem to be 
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congruence in both policy and academic circles of the existence of three key Agency 
components: autonomy, structural disaggregation and performance contracting. In Verhoest 
et al.’s (2012) Government Agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 countries, it was 
discussed how the implementation of agencification varies from country to country, shaped 
by governance philosophies and structures, socio-economic conditions and cultural settings, 
and the modus operandi of public sector in these respective countries. The outcome of these 
has covered extensively in this book. However, what is particularly striking is how this book 
reflects only on one African Country, which is Tanzania, thus opening up a number of 
questions, one of which how Agencification and Agencies in Africa and developing countries 
are receiving less attention in research and scholarly activities (as also in ‘C. Pollitt and C. 
Talbot (eds.) (2004) Unbundled Government: A Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to 
Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisation’). That being the case, worthy of mention, of 
course is how New Public Management has received considerable attention and research in 
developing countries, in the 20th and early 21st centuries, as opposed to the concept of 
Agencification and Agencies. In cases where Agency was assessed in literature, the dominant 
arguments tend to oscillate between NPM tools and Agencies, and the post-NPM narratives 
which tend to focus on the 21st century forms of public management.  In addition, most 
literature on Agencificiation tends to focus on OECD Countries. Therefore, in order to 
address the second research question, the semi-structured interview also deliberated the 
impact of NPM, the drivers, the public-sector management, and some of the doctrines of 
NPM that have been adopted not only by the Fund, but by the Civil Service in Nigeria. It is 
interesting to note at this stage that, although this is explored further below, NPM doctrines 
and methodologies are now prominent in different forms and guises in the Public Sector in 
Nigeria. These ideas and doctrines are apparent in the various privatisation agenda, private-
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public sector partnership, citizen participation and target setting, and downsizing of 
organisations (see, e.g., the principles of NPM distilled in Chapter Two).  
In this chapter, using thematic analysis the author explores the operations and behaviour of 
the Tertiary Education Trust Fund, in order to ascertain whether it conforms to the three key 
elements of agencification, that is autonomy, structural disaggregation and performance 
contracting identified by Pollitt et al. (2004) and other academic and policy literature on 
agencies and agencification. Also, the chapter explores the strategic management policies of 
the Fund that is the operations and behaviour. As Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) note, strategic 
management in public services organizations is both contingent (models of strategic 
management have nowadays enhanced applicability to many contemporary public sector 
organizations compared to what they had in the past) and perennial (strategic management is 
part and parcel of managing public services organizations, or at least managing them where 
improving performance is one goal). Also, the chapter presents findings on contextual issues 
and NPM mainstreaming agenda in Nigeria. There are two main focuses for this chapter, 
which of course is central to this thesis: first, it would demonstrate how and why TETFund is 
an NPM Agency and second, demonstrate the actual behaviour of TETFund. 
To answer the first part, the author used the three key elements identified in the literature on 
agency, which are structural aggregation, autonomy and performance contracting as the 
framework work of analysis.  In the second part, on behaviour, the author presented the 
findings in relation to how the fund operates, ranging from issues of budget to recruitment 
etc.  
5.1. Structural Disaggregation and TETFund 
It has been discussed in Chapter Three that structural disaggregation is about the splitting up 
of large bodies into a ‘parent’ body and various subordinate ‘Agencies’- mostly applied to 
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splitting up ‘Ministries’ into a core central body and several Agencies carrying out specific 
tasks (Talbot 2004). Indeed, structural disaggregation is one of the key management 
strategies of New Public Management Principles. For an Agency to be structurally 
disaggregated, it means that it is at arm’s length (or further) from the main hierarchal ‘spine’ 
of Central Ministries/ Departments of State (Pollitt, 2004; Talbot, 2004; Noordegraff, 2015). 
To Fedele et al. (2007), institutional distancing between agency and parent Ministry is 
defined through statutory provision furnished by a Corporate Board; nonetheless this is not 
always the case as evident in the work of Verhoest et al. (2012). It is also about performing 
specific task in policy formulation or implementation with some degree of autonomy from 
the parent Ministries (see Fedele et al., 2007).  Another element of structural disaggregation 
is the presence of a Chief Executive who is responsible for management and reporting and 
the person is usually appointed through an open process, separate from what obtains in the 
Civil Service recruitment policy. Also, there is the idea of drawing up formal reporting 
arrangements and putting in place separate accounts for the new body as well as the existence 
of staff separate from the mainstream Civil Service, most often by changing their formal 
employment status (Talbot et al., 2000). The following subsections will explore the ideas of 
agencification in relation to whether TETFund is structurally disaggregated. The data here 
are drawn from both semi-structured interviews and documents and this offers more the 
opportunity for the triangulation of the data.  
Administrative Structure of TETFund 
According to Ferlie and Ongaro (2015: 54), the Board formally sits at the apex of many 
organizations, especially private limited companies, and increasingly has (at least formally) a 
governance role in many public services organizations. There are variations in the basic 
structure and composition of a Board and is dependent on the nature of the organisation (e.g. 
private organisations, executive agencies and regulatory bodies). The Board takes 
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responsibility for the overall governance of the organization, reporting to shareholders/ 
constituents at an AGM (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). Chambers (2012 cited in Ferlie and 
Ongaro, 2015:54) categorizes the role of a Board into three: (1) To determine strategy 
(direction), (2) Assess performance (control), and (3) shape organizational culture (values, 
rules, tone etc.). Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) also added that the Board should have a leading 
role in: (1) The handling of any mergers or acquisitions; (2) Ensuring overall financial 
control and probity; and (3) Deciding dividend policy (in private limited companies). 
According to McGauran et al. (2005) the Board functions in terms of strategy development 
and this is done in conjunction with the Senior Management team of an Agency. In addition, 
they also ensure direction and accountability of an Agency. It also plays a key role in setting 
targets for the Agency. Other responsibilities of Agency Board that have been identified in 
the literature are that of advisory, representation of a sector or of the social partners and they 
provide a layer of political accountability between a CEO and the Minister.  
In the case of TETFund, the Board of Trustees (BOT) which is the highest administrative 
organ in the administrative structure of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund, has vested in it, 
the management of the Fund and is headed by a Chairman, who as stipulated in the Fund’s 
enabling Act, apart from having a good knowledge in finance and administrative matters, 
must also have the qualifications and experiences required to perform the functions of that 
office as contained in the Act. Other members of the Board of Trustees are made up of 6 
persons each representing one of the six geo-political zones in the Country, a representative 
each from the Federal Ministries of Education and Finance respectively who are not below 
the rank of a Director and a representative each from the Universities, Polytechnics and 
Colleges of Education (these are represented by the Executive Heads of their respective 
Regulatory Bodies) and the Executive Secretary of the Fund, who is the Secretary to the 
Board and the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of the Fund.  However, the Act 
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establishing the Fund allows for the Board of Trustees where it desires to obtain the advice of 
any person on a particular matter to co-opt him to the Board of Trustees for such a period as 
it thinks fit. Such a person who is in attendance by this provision however, will not be 
entitled to vote at any meeting of the Board and will not count towards a quorum. On the 
strength of this provision, the Board of Trustees of the Fund co-opted the Federal Inland 
Revenue Service which by law is charged with the responsibility of collecting the Education 
Tax on behalf of the Fund. 
The Membership of Board of Trustees aside from the Chairman, must at any given time, 
reflect the six geo-political zones of the country (North Central, North East, North West, 
South West, due South and South East) and are supposed to be persons with considerable 
experience from both the public and private sectors to represent the business, financial and 
education sectors of the country. The Chairman and other Members of the Board, apart from 
the ex-officio Members are appointed for a period of 4 years, at the first instance, by the 
President on the recommendation of the Minister of Education and renewable for a further 
final period of 4 years but at the discretion of the President. The President may from time to 
time determine the remuneration paid to the Board of Trustees and it must meet at least four 
times in a given calendar year for the conduct of its ordinary meetings. However, the Act also 
allows that the Board of Trustees meets to conduct such other business as exigency demands. 
This it does through its various committees such as, Finance and General Purpose 
Committee, Projects Committee, Project Monitoring Committee, Tenders Board, 
Appointments, Promotion and Disciplinary Committee, Audit Committee, Strategic Planning 
Committee, National Research Fund Committee, Book Development Committee, Legal 
Matters Committee, Fund Generation Committee, Project Evaluation and Impact Assessment 
Committee, Academic Staff Training and Education Development Committee, Research 
Committee, Special Projects Committee, Committee on Needs Assessment of Nigerian 
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Tertiary Institutions (CNAONTI) and Committee on Information, Communication 
Technologies ( ICT) and Corporate Affairs Committee. 
Indeed, these committees evolved as the programme, structure and activities of the Fund 
were reviewed or expanded in line with the provisions of its enabling Act which gives the 
BOT the powers to appoint one or more committees to carry out on its behalf any of its 
functions. Such committees could have members (not necessarily members of the Board of 
Trustees) as may be determined by the BOT and such person other than a member of the 
BOT may hold office on the committee in accordance with the terms of his appointment. The 
decision of a committee of the Board of Trustees will be of no effect until it is confirmed by 
the BOT. 
While the Act allows that a member of the Board of Trustees other than, the ex-officio 
members, may resign from his/her appointment by a notice to the President in writing under 
his/her hand, it also has a proviso that a member, including the Chairman, can cease to hold 
office if it is established that the person is of unsound mind, bankrupt or makes a 
compromise with creditors, convicted of a felony or any offence involving dishonesty, is 
guilty of serious misconduct in relation to his/her duties. The President effects the removal of 
such a member after being satisfied that it is not in the interest of the Fund or Public that the 
member should continue to be in office.  In a situation where a vacancy occurs in the 
membership of the Board, the President appoints another person to hold the remainder of the 
term of office of his/her predecessor so that the successor will represent the same interest. 
The functions of the Board of Trustees as spelt out in the Act include monitoring and 
ensuring collection of the tax and ensuring that the collections are transferred to the Fund, 
managing and disbursing the tax imposed by the Act, liaising with the appropriate Ministries 
or Bodies responsible for collection or safe keeping of the tax, receiving requests and 
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approving admittable projects after due consideration and ensuring the disbursement of funds 
to various public tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, the Board of Trustees is saddled with the responsibility of monitoring and 
evaluating the execution of projects and investing funds in appropriate and safe securities. It 
is mandatory by the enabling Act that the Board updates Federal Government on its activities 
and progress through annual and audited reports respectively and review the progress and 
suggests improvement areas within the provisions of this Act as well as do such things as are 
necessary or incidental to the objects of the Fund under the Act or as may be assigned by the 
Federal Government. Similarly, the Board of Trustees is expected to make issue guidelines, 
from time to time, to all its beneficiaries on the disbursement of monies from the Fund, on 
the use of monies received from the Fund and generally regulate the administration, 
application and disbursement of monies from the Fund as spelt out by its enabling Act.  
Also, the Board is required to administer the tax imposed by the Act and disburse the amount 
in the Fund to Federal and State tertiary educational institutions specifically for the provision 
or maintenance of the following: essential physical infrastructure for teaching and learning; 
instructional material and equipment; research and publication; academic staff training and 
development; and for any other need which, in the opinion of the Board of Trustees is critical 
and essential for the improvement of quality and maintenance of standards in the higher 
educational institutions. 
The allocation of funds to all public tertiary educational institutions by the Board of Trustees 
is done on the basis of equality among the 6 geopolitical Zones of the Country in the case of 
special interventions and equality among the States of the Federation in the case of normal 
interventions.  The distribution of the funds to the beneficiaries is to be done in the ratio of 
2:1:1 as between Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education. Similarly, the Act 
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confers on the Board of Trustees the power to consider the peculiarities of each of the geo-
political zones when disbursing the funds between the 3 tertiary levels of education 
mentioned above. On the recommendation of the Board of Trustees, the Minister of 
Education who supervises the Fund can make guidelines for the disbursement of the funds 
but with the approval of the President.  
The Board of Trustees in addition to the responsibilities stated above also has the powers to 
employ either directly or on transfer or secondment from any civil or public service in the 
Country as many people as in its opinion feels will be required to assist it and the Executive 
Secretary in the discharge of their various functions as specified by the Act. It also has the 
powers to determine the remuneration, including allowances, of persons so employed but 
with the approval of the National Salaries, Income and Wages Commission of the Federation.  
The day-to-day Administration of the Fund is overseen by the Executive Secretary who is the 
Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of the Fund and whose appointment the President 
makes based on the recommendation of the Minister of Education. He must possess a good 
knowledge and cognate academic and administrative experience in tertiary education as 
specified by the enabling Act and will hold office for a period of 5 years in the first instance 
and may be eligible for reappointment for another period of 4years only with the terms and 
conditions for emoluments and service may be specified in the letter of appointment of the 
person. In addition to such person being responsible for the day-to-day administration of the 
Fund subject to the general direction of the Board of Trustees, he is expected to keep the 
books and proper records and proceedings of the meetings of the Board of Trustees, the 
administration of the secretariat of the Board and the general direction and control of all the 
employees of the Fund.  
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The Executive Secretary of the Fund is assisted in the day to day administration of the Fund 
by a management team made up of All Head of Departments, Head of Directorate and heads 
of some specialized Units under the office of the Executive Secretary. The Fund has 11 
departments and 4 specialized units under the office of the Executive Secretary with their 
various duties and functions clearly established. The departments are: Academic Staff 
Training and Development, Corporate Planning and Development, Public Relations, 
Executive Secretary’s office, Education Support Services, Finance and investment, Human 
Resource Management, Information and Communication Technologies, Monitoring and 
Evaluation, Research and Development/ Centre for Excellence, and Project Management. 
The specialized Units are: Audit, Servicom (Service Compact with citizens), Legal and 
Board Matters and Anti-Corruption. The Fund also has Zonal Offices in each of the six 
geographical zones of the Country (North East, North West, North Central; South East, South 
West and due South- as mentioned above). Zonal offices did not exist at the inception of the 
Fund, but it was introduced by the Second Board of Trustee (1999- 2007). When it was 
introduced, the objectives then were that the zonal offices should be able to operate from the 
zone making the activities of ETF to be closer to the beneficiaries. This was to make the 
beneficiaries at the various sub sectors like the primary, secondary and tertiary institutions 
closer to the Fund in terms of monitoring of projects, submission of project proposals to be 
executed, in terms of bid of qualities etc. It was also considered expedient that with the Fund 
being closer to the beneficiaries through the zonal offices, there was no need for the 
beneficiaries to travel to Abuja (head office). However, the Zonal Offices were phased out in 
2003 for reasons of internal tensions amongst some departments in terms of roles and 
functions. Interviewee G, who is part of the management team provides the administrative 
rationale for the phasing out of Zonal Offices. The reasons provided was that:  
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‘The Board and Management realised that the objectives of setting it up the 
Zonal Offices were not attained. In addition to monitoring of education tax 
collections taking place at the zonal level by the officers of the Fund, the 
Revenue Officers visit the integrated tax offices (LTO) of the Federal Inland 
Revenue Service regularly. Over time it was realised that all these objectives 
were not attainable because most of the beneficiaries still preferred to leave 
their zones to come down to the Head Quarters for every of their activities.’  
Interviewee G also mentioned contingency reasons and lack of effective delegation of some 
roles meant for the Zonal Office by the headquarters.  The interviewee was of the opinion 
that this poor delegation could be seen as a way of ensuring beneficiaries reported to the 
headquarters, an unspoken or unwritten form of management strategy to monitor the 
beneficiaries.  
The interview quotation above identifies some of the management strategies, as underlined in 
the literature on the governance and administrative strategies of Agencies. Possibly, it has 
been observed that administratively, an Agency can take independent decisions as it affects 
its operations without consultation with the Principal Ministries. Also, the above quotations 
points to some of the NPM doctrines of efficiency and effective management strategies.  
The Zonal offices were re-introduced in 2014, following approval from the Board of Trustees 
and it is contemplated as one step to fully support the Fund’s mandate of ensuring increased 
revenue growth and an effective monitoring and evaluation of intervention projects. 
According to TETFund (2014) the establishment of Zonal Offices is seen as a way of 
decentralizing the Funds monitoring activities and bringing its other activities closer to its 
target beneficiaries. Each Zonal office is headed by a Zonal Coordinator and supported by 
physical projects monitoring officers, revenue monitoring officer, education project 
monitoring officers, I.C.T. monitoring Officers, R & D/CE monitoring officers, Zonal Admin 
Officers, Confidential Secretary, Office Assistant and Drivers. In terms of administration the 
Zonal Coordinator reports directly to the Director, Executive Secretary’s Office (DESO). The 
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Zonal office has the following mandate: increased revenue growth, timely/ quality delivery 
of TETFund physical intervention projects through effective monitoring and evaluation 
duties/ activities, and timely/quarterly delivery of TETFund education intervention projects 
through effective monitoring and evaluation duties/ activities. The Zonal Coordinator roles 
are: Funds monitoring/ mobilization, Physical Project Monitoring, and education project 
monitoring.   
The Service in the Fund is an approved service for the purposes of pension and the 
employees of the Fund are entitled to pension, gratuity and other retirement benefits as 
approved for persons holding equivalent grades in the Civil service of the Federation. On 
pension, any power exercisable by a Minister or other authority of the Federal Government 
other than to make regulations under the Pension Reform Act is vested and exercisable by the 
BOT. 
Recruitments of staff are done through interviews conducted either by independent 
recruitment consultants or in-house after vacancies are advertised.  Even though merit is the 
criteria for appointments to the service of the Fund due consideration is given to the Principle 
of Federal Character which stipulates that staff recruitment must reflect equality in the 
representation of each State of the Federation without compromising merit. Currently the 
Fund has 402 employees. 
5.1.2. Findings on Structural Disaggregation 
As discussed in Chapter Three, according to Fedele et al. (2007), there are three core aspects 
to structural disaggregation: first, there is institutional distancing between agency and parent 
administration, which is often based on legal imperatives and features. It is about creating an 
identifiable, separate, organizational structure with its own name (see, e.g. Talbot et al., 
2000). Relating to the legal aspect, the focus is on the workings of Agencies, particularly its 
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power to determine the content of its own statue, furnished by the presence of a Corporate 
Board representative, which highlights the plurality of stakeholders (Fedele et al. 2007); 
Second, the complexity of the task transferred to the Agency in terms of heterogeneity of its 
activities and outputs. As Talbot et al. (2000) note the body is usually given a single or small 
set of functions. Third, the Agency specialisation on operational tasks is an indicator of the 
existence of clear-cut distinctions between the responsibility of policy formulation and the 
responsibility of policy delivery. All Agencies have legal status, unsurprising given the fact 
that in legalistic systems it is almost a pre-condition for disaggregation (Fedele et al., 2007).  
As stated in Chapter Three, other elements of structural disaggregation that have been 
identified in literature are: functions usually are primarily about delivery, execution or 
provision and not about policy-making; the body is given a clear ‘constitution’- in the form 
of some sort of legislation or at least a formal ( if not statutory) ‘framework document’- 
which sets out its purpose, powers, and governance arrangement; it has a single, named 
individual - usually a Chief Executive (CE) responsible for managing and reporting on the 
new body. Such a person is, or can be, appointed usually- actually or potentially- through an 
open process, separate from the normal civil service recruitment; the staff of the new body 
are usually different in some ways from mainstream civil servants, most often by changing 
their formal employment status, and there is a drawing up of formal reporting arrangements 
and putting in place separate accounts for the new body (Talbot et al., 2000). 
Based on these definitions and elements identified above (as well as the key details of 
agencification and NPM discussed in Chapter Two and Three), the author will explore how 
TETFund Act disaggregated the Fund structurally from the parent Ministry (the Federal 
Ministry of Education) by a provision contained therein.  
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The TETFund by its enabling law of 2011 is already structurally disaggregated from its 
supervisory ministry- the Federal Ministry of Education, Nigeria. The Tertiary Education 
Trust Fund Act 2011, Section 3 subsection 1 states that the Fund is established for the 
rehabilitation, restoration and consolidation of tertiary education in Nigeria, to be managed 
by the Board of Trustees established under section 4 of the Act. Also, the Act established the 
Fund as a corporate body with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be 
sued in it’s a corporate name.  To determine the extent at which structural disaggregation 
exist in the relationship between TETFund and the Federal Ministry of Education, questions 
were directed at the key stakeholders in order to unravel and to challenge what already exists 
in both the literature and statutory Act that established the Fund. Talbot et al. (2000:9) note 
that the separation of Agencies is usually one of degrees rather than absolutes, with some 
being clearly far more separate but with none being entirely independent. Also, most Agency 
‘separations’ are more often movements along a spectrum (or multiple spectra) rather than 
‘quantum leaps’ (Talbot et al., 2000:9). Going by the Act establishing it, the Fund is 
supposed to have a degree of distancing from the Federal Ministry of Education in its 
operations. In an attempt to seek clarity on the relationship between the Fund and the 
Ministry, questions were raised in relation to this. Interviewee B, who is part of the 
Management team note that:  
First, the Fund is under the Federal Ministry of Education. Secondly, we were 
expected to render a report and audited account to the Ministry so that they play 
their role as a supervisory body’. 
 
Interviewees B’s comment corresponds with what is in the literature - that Agencies are 
accountable to a Ministry but have some elements of administrative distancing. That is why 
Talbot (2004) argues that the separation of Agencies is usually that of degrees rather than 
absolutes.  The Federal Ministry of Education is the parent Ministry and, as stipulated in the 
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enabling Act, corroborated by the interviewee B, the Fund has a high degree of Ministerial 
distancing. The extent at which this is reflected in the literature in terms of supervisory roles 
is clear, for example in De Jong et al, 2002, Talbot, 2004. That TETFund is a Parastatal under 
the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Education, which exercises supervisory 
responsibility, was also reinforced by Interviewee C.  
 
Although the formation of Agencies across the World differs, whether you look at it from the 
viewpoint of nation states or international bodies, Agencies report to a Principal 
Organisation or Departments within an organisation, or Ministries, as in the case of a nation 
state.  For instance, in the European Union, there are varieties of Agencies serving different 
purposes for EU institutions and member Countries, which are set up to achieve a specific 
purpose either on a long term or short-term basis. The remits of these Agencies are usually 
defined by the principal, in this case the European Unit.  The key point is that structurally 
disaggregation is important to the effective functions and operations of agencies.  
In addition, the existence of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer is also indication of 
structural disaggregation, as their roles and functions highlights. Interviewee B describes the 
role of the Executive Secretary of the Fund and this corresponds with what is acknowledged 
in the literature on Agencies and Agencification in terms of structural disaggregation.  The 
position of interviewee B is also captured in the enabling Act which states that the Executive 
Secretary, who is appointed by the President with the recommendation of the Minister, is the 
Chief Executive and the Accounting Officer of the Fund. The Chief Executive heads the 
administration of the Fund and takes charge of the day to day administration of the Fund 
under the supervision and control of the Board of Trustees. According to the Act, the 
Executive Secretary reports to the Board of Trustees, that superintends on the entire activities 
of the Fund.  
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In most literature (e.g. De Jong et al.,2002, Christensen and laegreid, 2006), the presence of 
an Executive Secretary is seen as imperative to understanding structural disaggregation. The 
Chief Executive superintends an Agency. According to McGuaran et al. (2005) CEOs of 
Agencies play an important function of determining the direction of an Agency, and the 
extent to which it delivers on its functions. This indeed is a crucial and important feature of 
an Agency.  
However, it is the President’s prerogative to appoint and renew or otherwise the tenure of the 
Executive Secretary and this is corroborated by interviewee W: 
where the appointment was done by the President I did not know that I was going to 
the Fund. I was called once to Abuja and told that I will be going to TETFund for 
President xxxxxxx and after the first three months in the Fund, I had the opportunity 
to brief him. 
 
Whilst this is the case, of paramount importance is the structure of political administration in 
each Country where the Agencies are used as part of governance structure. In the case of the 
United Kingdom, where the form of government is Parliamentary, the appointment is made 
by the supervising Ministry (e.g. the Department of Education). However, whereas they are 
appointed by the Ministry or the President, the running of the organisation is principally 
done by the CEO and the Board.  According to Talbot (2004), the Chief Executive should be 
such a person that is, or can be, appointed usually- actually or potentially- through an open 
process, separate from the normal Civil Service recruitment, nonetheless it is worth 
identifying that the appointment and renewal of tenure of such an officer in the case of 
TETFund is the prerogative of the President, without any advertised formal competition or 
application processes. McGuaran et al. (2005, p5) note that in addition to structural 
separation from Ministers and Government Departments, they are also accountable in some 
way to a Minister/Government. 
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Talbot et al. (2000) note that an element of structural disaggregation is for the Agency to have 
in place a separate account. In the case of TETFund, a separate account exists in the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, where the Education Tax is deposited by the Inland Revenue after collection 
as mandated by the enabling laws of the Fund. Initially, the Fund was drawing budgetary 
allocation from government for payment of salaries and other recurring expenditure, but with 
the 2011 amendment to its Act, a provision is made for the Fund to utilise not more than five 
percent of the collection in a given year for the management and administration of the Fund, 
which includes payment of salaries and allowances and monitoring of diverse projects. As an 
example, prior to the amendment of the act, some of the income generated were used to fund 
monitoring but following the amendment of the Act we do not do that, a special fund not 
exceeding 5% of collection is set aside for the funds expenses including payment of salaries 
and allowances (comment attributed to Interviewee F).  
Reflecting on the comments of the interviewees above and literature review, it is claimed 
TETFund to some extent exhibits a certain degree structurally disaggregated from the parent 
Ministry (Federal Ministry of Education) and other bodies that regulate its activities (which 
have been mentioned earlier). Structural disaggregation is about creating an identifiable, 
separate organisational structure with its own name, which is clearly grafted into the structure 
and operations of the TETFund. According to the principle of agencification, a public 
organisation is given name as well as single or small sets of functions and usually these 
functions are about delivery, execution or provision and not about policy making (Pollitt and 
Talbot, 2004; Christensen and laegreid, 2006). Evidently, TETFund shows this character of 
performing the function of interventions in areas such as restoration, rehabilitation and 
consolidation of tertiary education in Nigeria, as stipulated in its enabling law. Likewise, an 
Agency is based on some form of legislation, or at least a formal document- which sets out its 
purpose, power and governance arrangements (see also, Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; Christensen, 
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and laegreid, 2006). For an Agency, the Members of Staff are different in some way from 
mainstream Civil Servants, and this occurs usually by changing their formal employment 
(Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). TETFund has its own Staff Conditions of Service and its Staff 
Members are Public Servants recruited from the Public and Private Sectors. However, 
Members of Staff are bound by the General Civil Service Rules and some aspects of its 
Conditions of Service or Employment, e.g. pension, health insurance, promotion processes 
and tenure of service.  
To further Justify that the Fund is structurally disaggregated, the Tertiary Education Trust 
Fund Act, Section 3 (2) a and b states: The Fund (a) shall be a body Corporate with perpetual 
succession and a common seal; and (b) may sue and be sued in its corporate name (TETFund 
Act, 2011). This provision shows that the Fund is formally structurally disaggregated from 
the parent Ministry (The Federal Ministry of Education).  
5.2. Autonomy and TETFund: Findings 
Recognised in the literature on autonomy and Agency (as discussed in Chapter three) are 
issues such as discretion that organisations or individuals have in taking decisions as well as 
how much they can be circumscribed by specific rules or even just standard operating 
procedures which are the norm (McGauran, et al., 2005). According to Verhoest et al. 
(2004), autonomy is the level of decision-making competency (discretion) of an organisation. 
Equally, they argued that there are two types of autonomy, which can be located at strategic 
or operational level, that is managerial autonomy and policy autonomy. Managerial 
autonomy entails the right of an agency to take decisions on managerial issues, e.g. things 
that relates to personnel and financial management independently without recourse to the 
parent Departments or Ministries at the level of individual transactions or employees 
(operational) or at the level of general rules and criteria that apply regarding the use of these 
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resources (strategic). Policy (implementation) autonomy implies the discretionary authority 
of agencies to decide on certain aspects of the initiation and implementation of policies 
without particularly needing the approval of parent Departments or Ministries, e.g. 
prioritization of activities to be performed (operational), the delineation of the target group of 
the policy implementation, the quality and quantity of outputs and the policy instruments to 
be used or deployed (strategic). Reflecting on the previous explanations, the subsection 
below will scrutinise the activities and behaviour of TETFund with the principal purpose of 
unpacking the concept of autonomy.  
Financial autonomy: Collections, Sharing Formula and Scope of Operations of the Fund  
The two key types of autonomy are managerial and policy autonomy. The provision of the 
Act has already given the Fund both managerial and policy autonomy in the operations, 
sharing and disbursements of collections to beneficiaries. Interviewee B notes that:  
In addition, the Act that established the Fund’s specified roles for all of the 
stakeholders and the Federal Ministry of Education is one of the stakeholders and 
it cannot do beyond what the law says really. 
What the above quotation show is how the principal Ministry cannot interfere with the 
sharing, allocation and disbursement of Funds to beneficiaries as the Funds enabling law has 
already stipulated the parameters for doing such.  As the Fund has within its mandate, the 
generated funds, these are used principally for the various interventions, and the supervising 
Ministry has no control over how the Fund manages its financial activities. This, to a large 
degree, is what is called financial autonomy, and this is one of the key elements of an agency.  
The 2 per cent annual Education Tax paid by all registered companies in Nigeria is collected 
on behalf of the Fund by the Federal Inland Revenue Service which is responsible for Federal 
Tax Administration. The tax collected is deposited in a dedicated account set aside for that 
purpose in the Central Bank of Nigeria, from where it is disbursed directly to the beneficiaries 
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on the advice of the Fund. The sharing formula for the disbursements in the ratio of 2:1:1 as 
between Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education. The TETFund Act 2001 
stipulates that fairness and equality must be the guiding principle in the distribution of funds 
to the beneficiary institutions (TETFund, 2014:2). However, it should be noted that prior to 
enactment of the TETFund Act 2011, the tax was disbursed between all Public Tertiary, 
Secondary and Primary institutions in Nigeria as well as to Monotechnics, Colleges and Inter 
University Centers. The scope of operations of the Fund before the amendment of its enabling 
Act covered 57 Universities, 3 Inter University Centers, 50 Polytechnics, 64 Monotechnics, 
61 Colleges of Education, 102 Unity Schools and 36 State Primary Education Boards. With 
the amendment to the Act the beneficiaries of the Fund now are as follows: 
Table 3: Benefiting Institutions  
Institutions  Number  
Universities 68 
Polytechnics 50 
Colleges of Education 62   
   
The sharing Formula for disbursements of the Fund before the 2011 amendment was as thus: 
Table 4: Sharing Formula  
Institutions  Percentage  
Higher Education     50 % 
Universities      25% 
Polytechnics      12.5% 
Colleges of Education     12.5% 
Secondary Education         20% 
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Primary Education         30% 
 
The new sharing formula with the enactment of Act 2011 is as thus: 
Table 5: Sharing Formula Based on TETFund Act 2011 
Institutions Percentage 
Universities    50% 
Polytechnics 25% 
Colleges of Education  25% 
 
Unlike previous years, the Fund changed its policies on sharing, allocation and 
disbursements when it discovered that some state governments were setting up tertiary 
institutions more than others in order to draw more funding from education tax which 
contravened the provisions in the Funds enabling Act that emphasized equality amongst 
states in terms of sharing, allocation and disbursements to state owned beneficiaries. 
Therefore, the Fund decided to intervene only in one category of tertiary institution owned 
by State Governments e.g. if a state has a University, a Polytechnic and a College of 
Education the Fund will only intervene in one category of such institutions in a given year as 
decided by the benefiting State Government. This is in line with the provision in the Fund’s 
enabling Act, on furthering equality and fairness amongst States in its allocations/ 
interventions. Also, it is imperative to state that all public institutions benefiting from the 
TETFund interventions have their proprietors and the Fund only complements their sources 
of funding. In the case of Federal Tertiary Institutions, they are owned by the Federal 
Government, while the institutions in States have their various State Governments as their 
proprietors. This point is reiterated by interviewee K: 
 142 
 
For instance, after the collection it is equally the responsibility of the BOT to 
allocate the funds to the three levels of the tertiary education sector in Nigeria. 
That is to say Universities, Polytechnics, and Colleges of Education, both Federal 
and States; and in doing so the Board of Trustees is guided by the sharing formula, 
which is imbedded in the law on the ratio of 2:1:1. which is 50 per cent of what is 
collected is allocated to the Universities and 25 per cent to the Colleges of 
Education while the other 25 per cent is allocated to the Polytechnics 
 
Furthermore, the Board of Trustees is equally mandated by law to invest the tax collected in 
appropriate and safe securities. The objective of this is to earn an additional income for the 
Fund which is ploughed back into the project account for further interventions to the three 
tiers as mentioned earlier. This point also highlights some of the functions of the BOT 
identified in section 5.1.1., which is to provide direction and advisory role.  It is part of the 
organisation’s mandatory functions to monitor the activities of beneficiaries in the 
management of funds provided. After the disbursement of the fund, the Board of Trustees is 
equally mandated by the law to monitor the funds allocated to the institutions to ensure 
judicious use and much more importantly to ensure that no diversion under whatever guise is 
made without recourse to the BOT for appropriate decisions. In a nutshell that is what the 
BOT does and the functions of the BOT revolve round the three key areas which the BOT is 
mandated by law to intervene that is, in the areas of restoration, rehabilitation and 
consolidation of the educational infrastructure in Nigeria (comments above by interviewee 
K). 
 
Responding to the question whether the allocation, sharing and disbursements of funds to 
beneficiaries by the Fund have ever been politicized, interviewee M noted that:  
 to an extent I will say ‘no’, because there are laws regulating our operations so 
whether a politician or not they cannot change the sharing formula, they cannot 
change the equality and fairness enshrined in the law.  
This point by interviewee M, further reiterates the extent of autonomy of the Fund.  
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In the literature on developing countries, particularly in Africa (as discussed in Chapter 
Two), the arguments oscillate around the notion of ethnic divisions and its impact on public 
management. This is particularly so in the case of Nigeria, where there are issues of ethnic 
group affiliation and favouritism in public sector management.  Though this point was raised 
by the interviewer, however, evidence show that TETFund, has been able to manage its 
affairs without much political interference. This is interesting as it offers more light on issues 
of corruption and accountability in the management of public sector. In addition, this raises 
fundamental questions: Is Agency approach the best way forward to addressing the problems 
of corruption? Is this level of accountability peculiar to TETFund? These questions are 
explored more in detail in the section on context and strategic management in this chapter, 
where ideas of corruption and accountability in relation to agencification and strategic 
management issues are covered in more details located in the notion of context. 
Utilization and Management of Allocations 
The Fund has established a clear guideline for enlisting an institution as a beneficiary. An 
Institution must be enlisted by approval of the Board of Trustees of TETFund to qualify as a 
beneficiary of TETFund intervention funds. To be enlisted as a beneficiary of the Fund, 
prospective Institutions must fulfill the following: (1) it must be a public tertiary Institution; 
(2) Recognized by the relevant regulatory body: NUC, NBTE or NCCE; (3) Established by 
law via an Act of Parliament or Edict of the State House of Assembly and signed into law by 
the president or state governor; (4) Academic activities, that is, student admission, teaching 
and learning , must have commenced at the institution; (5) Institution shall formally apply to 
the Fund to be enlisted as a beneficiary of the Fund; (6) TETFund shall visit to verify that 
academic activities have commenced and thereafter recommend to the Board of Trustee for 
enlistment as a beneficiary; and (7) Following approval by the BOT, the Institution shall be 
enlisted and formally notified (TETFund, 2014: p3-4). 
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The funds disbursed to beneficiaries are used for provision of physical infrastructure e.g. 
students hostels, lecture halls and auditorium, class rooms, transportation, buses and boats for 
students library development, academic staff training and development, research funding, 
journals, student’s desks, electricity (generators and solar panels), computer centers and IT 
development, water tankers, teacher training and capacity building, staff training and 
development, bore holes and book publication and conference attendance. The Fund does not 
allow its beneficiaries to use funds disbursed to them for building of Municipals like Road 
networks on campuses, as the proprietors of the Institutions are expected to do that. 
The interventions of the Fund are categorized as normal (regular), special and special high 
impact interventions.  Normal Interventions as specified in the enabling act providing Funds 
for the relevant government institution for revision of curriculum for schools, library 
development, book development, national research grants, training and development, 
conference attendance, teaching practice, academic manuscripts development, academic/ 
research journal development, institution-based research, curriculum and programme 
contents development. In the area of Academic staff training and development programme, 
TETFund provides a wide range of support in staff academic improvement by funding post-
graduate studies in Masters, PhD and research and development (TETFund, 2012). The 
above are examples of academic interventions. For example, the library intervention is 
carried out in different forms in the institutions and can be grouped into: procurement of 
books, supply of library infrastructure, shelves and reading carousels and procurement of 
library equipment. Infrastructure interventions include for instance construction of classroom 
blocks and offices, laboratory and multi-purpose halls, boreholes, water treatment tanks, 
rehabilitation of hostel block buildings, renovation of lecture halls and auditorium, as well as 
equipment and supplies (TETFund, 2012: 19).  
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Special interventions are usually at the discretion of the Board of Trustees, but allocations are 
zonal based and are done equitably by decision of the Board of Trustees as contained in the 
enabling Act (TETFund, 2014). Special High Impact projects are embarked upon to cover 
areas of critical educational needs such as building of Central Zonal Teaching/ Research 
Laboratories (which are facilities that are jointly used by Institutions), programme upgrade 
and improvement in the Teaching and Learning Environment. Beneficiaries are selected by 
the BOT, based on the age of the institution per geo-political zone, amongst other criteria. 
The conventional Universities were first beneficiaries of the Special High Impact 
Intervention Programmes, which started in 2009 (TETFund, 2014). The Fund is specific 
about deploying resources to core areas of academic needs and selection of projects to be 
executed by each beneficiary are need driven as long as they fall within its mandate and are 
in line with the guidelines stipulated by the Fund. 
Worthy of mention is how the Fund does not award contracts for the execution of these 
projects as this is done by the beneficiaries through their internal mechanisms and the 
selection of such projects to be executed are done by the beneficiaries based on their needs. 
The Fund only scrutinizes project proposals submitted to it by the beneficiaries and once they 
met the stipulated guidelines and due process, approval is given in principle for 
commencement of tendering processes, which must be advertised in three National 
Newspapers one of which must be a publication of the Federal Government ‘The Tenders 
Journal’. This is meant to ensure transparency and competitiveness in the bidding process. 
The costing of all projects is however vetted by the Fund to ensure that they are not inflated. 
Similarly, the Fund does not in any way accept variation of costing once it has given an 
approval for a project. 
The disbursements of funds to benefiting institutions from the Central Bank are done in 
tranches at different stages of a project so as to avoid project abandoning by contractors and 
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are transferred into a dedicated account in a commercial bank opened for that purpose by 
each beneficiary. From time to time the statement of accounts of the beneficiaries are 
scrutinized and matched with the stage of work on a project.  If any beneficiary institution 
defaults in the execution of its projects, it will not receive additional funding until it meets 
the required expectations from its previous disbursement. The Fund, as specified by its 
enabling act, invests by placing funds in commercial banks which have strong financial 
standing, these are on a short-term basis and for the purposes of generating interest which are 
ploughed back into its account with the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
The above are elements of autonomy on how the agency manages and ensures transparency 
with its dealings with beneficiaries.  
In addition, there is direct intervention based on general needs of all beneficiary institutions, 
such as information technology and this is done through outsourcing. This supports 
significantly some of the doctrines of New Public Management. Government outsourcing can 
be defined as the delivery of public services by agents other than government employees 
(Minicucci and Donahue, 2004). Governments can outsource the provision of public services 
in two main ways: they can either purchase goods and services from the private sector, or 
non-governmental organizations in order to include them in their own production chain, or, 
they can hire a company to directly provide public goods and services to the final consumer 
or citizen (OECD, 2011). Interviewee G provides some insight into how the Fund outsources 
some of its interventions.  
With the beneficiaries we started in 2001 when the ICT deployment was very 
low. Even schools did not have enough computers because their operations 
were based on typewriters. So we introduced to them concepts of e-library, e-
solutions and other ICT activities to help them get their operations automated. 
In addition, we worked with the technical partners to develop the internal 
infrastructure and set programs to achieve the activities outlined in the road 
map and at the same time we used the same partners to enhance the capacity 
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of our beneficiaries. But for the past 4 to 5 years we have not had internal 
consultants to help us not because we are 100% sufficiently advanced but we 
have developed our internal capacity to work with or without external help. 
 
However, direct and indirect interventions are interlinked. For instance, some initiatives 
come from beneficiary institutions that come up with a proposal. In this case, the Department 
in charge of projects reviews the submission to gauge the feasibility of implementing such 
project.  The projects Department will then forward this to other Departments for their input. 
Following this, recommendations could be made to the BOT to seek its approval to 
implement such a programme in phases as a pilot in some selected institutions. During 
implementation monitoring process is set up and impact assessments done.  When the agency 
is sure of its sustenance and workability then it can be deployed to other Institutions.  
For example, a couple of projects have been done using this method, like the electronic 
document management system, which was deployed to about six Institutions across the six 
geo-political zones in the Country. Through this method the Fund introduced the net library 
that contains journals and many books as well as the computer-based testing solutions, which 
were all deployed to some Institutions.  The Fund conducted a series of capacity building 
programmes for lecturers in Nigerian Universities on auto card on security, project 
management, Microsoft Office amongst others (comment by Interviewee H)  
Indeed, the Fund has some degree of financial autonomy, as its enabling Act allows it to 
invest in appropriate and safe securities. The Department in the Fund in charge of all 
financial transactions is called Finance and Investments. The interests generated from these 
investments are ploughed back into the intervention account in the Central Bank. It is 
important to note that the Board decides on issues of investment. The above is confirmed by 
interviewee H: 
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The money is coming from the private sector we need to grow the money so 
that we can fund more projects. So the law says that the Fund should be 
invested in an appropriate and safe security and this has been done before 
but the problem with this investment is that it is always short termed you 
cannot invest for a long term because if an institution has collected maybe 
50% of its own annual allocation for physical infrastructure, it will be unfair 
to turn around and say wait till the end of the year until the investment would 
have matured, for the next tranche. The tenure for the investments is not more 
than ninety days in the bank because each time the beneficiaries ask for their 
money; the money must be made available to them.  
 
The management process of the investment of the Fund is coordinated by the BOT, Executive 
Secretary and Director of Finance and Investments. This is done through selection of the 
banks for investment. One of the aims of this is to grow the funds for profit and plough same 
back into the accounts at the Central Bank. The rates of investment are monitored by the BOT 
and are reflective of what is going on in the market. For example, the Fund has rates fixed by 
the BOT and these are based on the goings on in the market and the rates for all the banks are 
the same.  The Fund does not allow multiple rates so that no bank can cut corners, and this is 
done by giving letters to banks to inform them upfront what the incomes are and ask them to 
pay to a separate account.  As interviewee C notes ‘We monitor that they make the payment 
by checking every month to ensure that the figures agreed on have come to the bank’. 
 
The above comment from interviewee C is in line with some of the arguments in the 
literature on agency autonomy on financial matters. For example, McGauran et al. (2015) 
observe that the issue of financial autonomy is crucial. The extent to which an agency relies 
mainly on income from its Parent Department, from other government sources, or from 
commercial activities, will clearly influence its autonomy to decide and act, (McGauran et 
al., 2015, p15). By its enabling Act, the TETFund has financial autonomy, which is, of 
course, important to the management of the operations of the Fund as well as effective 
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Ministerial distancing. Therefore, through the enabling Act and the operations of the Fund, it 
can be said that the agency has financial autonomy, e.g. generates, disburses and manages, its 
funds.  
Human Resources and Recruitment 
Autonomy of Agencies is linked to human resources management. The question on 
recruitment was part of the questions in the interview protocol and the process of recruitment 
was discussed by some interviewees.  According to Interviewee K, Certainly, the enabling 
Act determines the processes of recruitment. There is a Federal Character Commission 
whose Act determines how recruitment is to be done and makes it compulsory for 
advertisements to be made in respect of vacancies available. They also follow up to ensure 
that federal character is reflected in the appointments in all government Ministries, 
Parastatals and Agencies. 
In the Fund, the recruitment of the staff is done independently of the parent Ministry (the 
Federal Ministry of Education). By its enabling Act, this power is vested in the Board of 
Trustees. As such, TETFund does not recruit through the Federal Civil Service Commission, 
but rather through its own recruitment procedures. In spite of this, the Conditions of Service 
does not differ completely from that of the Public Service; it is very similar to that of the 
Federal Civil Service of Nigeria. According to Interviewee F 
 The Human Resources Department is entrusted with this responsibility. It identifies 
the vacancies and seeks approval through the Executive Secretary from the Federal 
Character Commission to fill in those vacancies. Once they receive approval, they 
advertise and receive applications from applicants and invite them for interview 
and also select those that are competent to fill in those vacancies. In the last 
recruitment drive, most of the Departments were asked to identify their vacant 
positions and the required number of staff to fill them. 
The level of autonomy from the Ministry is reflected in the appointment panel. For instance, 
the panel for the recruitment is usually as outlined in the Conditions of service of the Fund. For 
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junior staff, there is the Junior Staff Committee on Appointments, Promotion and Discipline 
and for Senior Staff there is a Committee on Senior Staff on Appointments, Promotion and 
Discipline which is chaired by the Executive Secretary. After selection interviews, the report of 
the exercise is usually submitted to the Board Committee on Appointments, Promotion and 
Discipline. If the committee is satisfied with the processes carried out, it will present it to the 
BOT for approval. As to the process involved, it is the act of compiling the applications, short-
listing the candidates and presenting the list to the Committees to conduct interviews and 
selections. As regards advertisements of positions the Conditions of Service for the 
organisation, gives guidelines on which positions can be advertised and also those areas that 
selections can be done, based on available applications on ground for that particular position 
that is to be filled (above comment by Interviewee N). 
Literature on the Agency, its Autonomy and Human Resources say the Members of Staff of 
the Fund are different from Civil Servants, in some employment conditions, although they are 
also bound by Civil Service Rules and Regulations. However, the Fund has separate 
Conditions of Service for its Members of Staff where these special employment conditions are 
outlined. This point was raised with one of the interviewees from the Human Resources 
Department. The interviewee noted that there are financial packages that are readily available 
to the Members of Staff which are not offered to Members of the Civil Service. According to 
interviewee N;  
‘There are lots of special allowances enjoyed by members of staff such as overtime 
allowance, and what is called Fund management allowance. The Federal 
Government because of the volume of funds this organisation is saddled with to 
manage, approved this and we do not want people to start developing the culture of 
theft or corruption. The fund management allowance is paid quarterly to each and 
every staff.  Besides that, we also pay education allowance to enable officers pay the 
school fees of their own children’. 
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Interviewee N also noted that the employees are not Federal Civil Servants and their grading 
is different to that of Federal Civil Service, and this is in line with the various academic 
literatures on Agency and Autonomy: The officers employed here are considered as staff of 
the Tertiary Education Trust Fund but, by extension,  are employees of the Federal 
Government of Nigeria, because the Fund is an Agency of the Federal Government 
established by an Act of Parliament of 2011, ( Interviewee N). As such, the grading system 
is not based on levels 17 to 1, which is, of course, the Civil Service Grading Structure. For 
TETFund, the grading system is based on what is called the Consolidated Salary Structure of 
the Research and Allied institutions (COSRI) and this is obtainable in other regulatory 
Agencies under the Federal Ministry of Education and it is graded from level 1 to 15. So 
COSRI 15 is the position of the Director (Interviewee N) 
 
Remarkably, formal autonomy given to the Fund in its enabling Act is evident in the 
activities and operations of the Fund. Such formal autonomy granted by the Act in Sections 6 
and 7(1e & 4) to the Fund that has been identified by this research can be summarised as 
follows: (a) Monitoring and ensuring collection of Education tax by the Federal Inland 
Revenue Service and ensuring transfer of the same to the Fund; (b) Managing and disbursing 
the tax imposed by this Act; (c) Liaising with the appropriate Ministries or Bodies 
responsible for collection or safe keeping of the tax; (d) Receiving requests and approving 
admittable projects after due consideration; (e) Ensuring disbursement of funds to various 
public tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria; (f) Monitoring and Evaluating execution of 
the projects as well as collection of Education tax; (g) Investing funds in appropriate and safe 
securities; (h) Reviewing progress and suggesting improvement within the provisions of this 
Act; (i) Doing other things as are necessary or incidental to the objects of the Fund under the 
Act or as may be assigned by the Federal Government; (j) Making and issuing guidelines, 
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from time to time, to all beneficiaries on disbursement from the Fund on the use of monies 
received from the Fund; and Regulating the administration, application and disbursement of 
monies from the Fund under this Act; and (k) giving due consideration to the peculiarities of 
each geo-political Zone in the disbursement and managing of the tax imposed by this Act 
between the various levels of tertiary education.  
In this section, the dimensions of Agency autonomy have been vetted. We now turn to the 
third dimension of analysis of an Agency: the relationship with the supervising authorities 
and with the other stakeholders. The author will first discuss whether, and the question of 
how, influential performance contracting works for TETFund, and then examine the 
interactions with key stakeholders more broadly.  
5.3. Performance Contracting 
Performance contracting is a predominant of NPM inspired Agencies. Government- Agency 
relationships are frequently governed by a contract or the like, (Thynne, 2004). It is about 
expectations, commitments, rewards and sanctions and these underline and influence their 
relationships in terms of accountability and control, and this can also impact on degree of 
autonomy of an agency (Greer, 1994. pp.13-20; Greve, 2000; Lane, 2000).  According to 
Lidbury and Petrie (1999), performance contracting is a way of setting targets for 
organisations and reforming on the activities of an Agency, which is, at times, loose. That is, 
it does not necessarily mean a formal contract, but any self-generated, agreed or imposed set 
of performance targets for Agencies, formulated into a specific agreement, contract plan, or 
statement of some sort. It is a system of setting targets for, and reporting on, even though not 
necessarily publicly, the activities of an Agency (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). It is used more as 
a management tool between superiors and subordinates, rather than as a contract between 
independent bodies, (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). For Agencies, to some degree, performance 
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contract usually forms the basis of judgement about the Agency’s performance by its parent’s 
Department, Minister and other stakeholders. Nonetheless, it is an idea that has been said not 
to be crucial, but rather a new way of management (Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). 
According to Cheche and Muathe (2014), performance contracting is a complex concept with 
many variables that interact. Notwithstanding their assertion, they were able to identify six 
key variables from existing literature that can help illuminate the scope and understanding of 
performance contracting: performance management, performance measurement, stakeholder 
and employee involvement, commitment, and, performance targets (Cheche and Muathe, 
2014:67). ‘Performance management is concerned with encouraging behaviour that leads to 
attainment of the organisational objectives, also a management tool that aims to align goals 
of the Principal and the Agent in a manner that creates a shared vision,’ (Cheche and Muathe, 
2014:67). On the other hand, performance management is focused on the process of 
establishing achievements and gaps in order to provide feedback (Armstrong, 2006 cited in 
(Cheche and Muathe, 2014: 67). Commitment within performance contracting context occurs 
at two levels: top management and the level of employees. Targets is about the organisation 
meeting the Vision, Goals and Objectives set to measure standards of service delivery 
(Cheche and Muathe, 2014: 67). Cheche and Muathe (2014:69) note that there is 
considerable evidence that shows that performance contracting has had a positive impact on 
service delivery in public service across the world.   
Nzioki (2011) see performance contract as an agreement between the Government and a 
Public Agency that requires the Agency to establish goals based on its mandate, set target to 
achieve the goals and measure performance and provide incentives for achieving the targets. 
Usually, the contract is signed by the Chief Executive of the Agency and the Secretary to the 
cabinet for the Government. The contract is countersigned by the Minister or the Chairperson 
of the Board. It is also endorsed by the Prime Minister as the supervisor and coordinator of 
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government business. Nzioki (2011) is of the view that Performance Contract would contain 
the Agency’s Vision and Mission, Mandate and Core Functions, Strategic Objectives, Core 
Values, Policy Priorities, Focus for Action, Commitments and Responsibilities of the Chief 
Executive, Commitments and Obligations of the Government, Monitoring and Evaluation, 
and Performance Evaluation Targets (matrix) (Nzioki,2011). 
Performance Contracting was introduced to the Nigerian Public Service for the first time by 
President Jonathan on August 22, 2012 and this was signed by his Ministers. It was 
introduced against a backdrop of disagreement between the Presidency and the National 
Assembly over the perceived poor implementation of past budgets (especially the 2012 
budget) and it was developed by the Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the National 
Planning Commission in conjunction with Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) 
(Bello, 2012). The contracts prepared by the National Planning Commission (NPC) was to 
serve as a benchmark performance indicator upon which each Minister will be monitored, 
evaluated and assessed in relation to the implementation of the President’s Transformational 
Agenda (Ojameruage, 2012).  
In addition, all Heads of Department and Agencies under each Ministry were mandated to 
sign portions of the Performance Contract with their Ministers. Upon signing it, President 
Jonathan noted that, ‘these contracts would improve performance and deliver quality and 
timely services to the citizens, improve productivity and instil a greater sense of 
accountability for effective service delivery,’ (Ojameruage, 2012). The President also 
reiterated that he would expect the process to serve as an instrument for the realization of the 
objectives of Government, as enumerated in the Vision 2020 Document and the 
Administration’s Transformation Agenda by the year 2015, (Ojameruage, 2012). 
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The introduction of Performance Contracting system in Nigeria is informed by two main 
reasons: (1) enabling the Federal Government of Nigeria measure performance of MDAs in a 
fair, objective and comprehensive manner, and, (2) creating results- oriented public service 
delivery mechanism (Darma, 2013). In the context of Nigeria, performance contract 
concerns: promoting transparency and accountability in governance through public display of 
performance results measured against performance commitments of the agency (Darma, 
2013). It promotes responsiveness of Agencies through the design of its Service Delivery 
Charter and thus holding the Agency accountable for implementing its charter.  Performance 
Contract focuses on transforming administration with the development of an Agency Specific 
Strategic Plan to specify the correct direction to be followed within a defined time-frame; 
increasing efficiency and focusing resources on key national policy priorities as well as 
institutionalizing performance- oriented culture in the Public Service through introduction of 
an objective Performance Appraisal System for staff (Darma, 2013).   
According to Bello (2012) contracting will serve as a new evaluation tool for measuring the 
performance of key Public Officials such as Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Directors and 
Heads of other Government Departments and Agencies beyond the traditional method of how 
they utilise their budgetary provisions.  
Prior to the introduction of Performance Contracting, the National Planning Commission 
developed in 2011, the Half Year MDA scorecard as a data collection and analysis tools for 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). This was implemented to track the performance and 
contributions of Sectors and Federal/ State MDAs towards achieving the Nigerian Vision 20: 
2020 during President Yar’adua’s administration (National Planning Commission, 2011:2). 
The administration reinforced the Performance Management System with the inauguration of 
an integrated Performance Management System comprising institutional and individuals’ 
framework by the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation (OHCSF) and the 
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establishment of a National Monitoring and Evaluation Department in the National Planning 
Commission in 2010 (National Planning Commission, 2011). It was envisaged that it would 
serve as a consistent format that can be applied to all MDAs, to capture the Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) for outcomes and outputs in their Strategic Sectors, and thereby ascertain 
their progress against annual targets (National Planning Commission, 2011:2).    
The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) provided a set of suggested KPIs for Monitoring and 
Evaluation (M&E) purposes, covering each of the Federal Ministry and it was the natural 
starting point for MDAs wishing to understand what kinds of data were expected in MDA 
scorecard submissions (National Planning Commission, 2011:2). The criteria for 
measurement were set against the standard in Nigerian Vision 20: 2020. After the   
introduction of the PMS, the public service recorded improvement and clarity in the 
alignment of institutional and individual performance. Activities implemented for the 
institutionalization of the system were development of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
that were used to track the delivery of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), the 
development of Performance Agreements with Mr President cascading down to the 
Permanent Secretaries, Head of Parastatals and Agencies, and, the development of a 
reporting template for the MDAs, (Usman 2013:24). The 2012 Performance Contract 
agreement between the President and Honourable Ministers of the Federal Republic led to 
regular Ministerial Performance Reporting at the Federal Executive Council (Usman 
2013:24).  
On 22nd November 2012, the acting Executive Secretary of Tertiary Education Trust Fund 
(TETFund) signed a Performance Agreement with the Minister of the Federal Ministry of 
Education. Following this, the Executive Secretary then set up Performance Agreement for 
Heads of Department of the Fund. The Fund, as of then, was structured as- Education 
Support Services, Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, Corporate Planning and 
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Development, Finance and Investments, Information and Communications Technology, and 
Human Resource Management. Each Director by this Performance Contract was expected to 
draw up clearly defined duties and responsibilities as well as targets for each staff under his 
supervision against which he or she will be appraised for performance. This appraisal forms 
part of the criteria for biannual staff evaluation, promotion, demotion or termination of 
appointment as the case may be. 
Before the introduction of Performance Contracting in Public Service in Nigeria, the 
National Planning Commission was charged with the responsibility of the physical 
Monitoring and Evaluation of MDAs programmes and activities based on key performance 
Indicators outside any form of contracting as mentioned above. In one of such Reports on 
TETFund published in July 2012, the Commission stated that: This Report is intended to be a 
resource to enable Government Executives and Leaders to track the effectiveness of 
TETFund in defining and improving programmes and projects required to accomplish their 
Mandate. It is designed to identify whether projects carried out have yielded the desired 
outcome to the beneficiaries. This will further assist Government and the Management of the 
Fund, strategize appropriately on projects to be funded and the efficient use of funds 
available to the institutions. In essence, this will lead to a better means of learning from past 
experiences and demonstrating results, as part of improving service delivery and 
accountability to stakeholders. The objective of the Monitoring Exercise is to support the 
TETFund and beneficiary organisations, institutionalise and reinforce Results Based 
Management across all levels of their operations. Although, several internal processes for 
assessing projects may exist in TETFund and its partner organisations, the use of “external 
and independent” assessors enhance decision making and accountability. 
The report is aimed at determining the outcome of projects funded by TETFund in the 
respective institutions. It determines the success factors of the intended projects, the 
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constraining factors and reasons for such, which will, in turn, help in future policy design 
and implementation. In the same vein, the report’s objective also aims at finding out the 
levels of commitment, transparency and effectiveness on the part of the various institutions 
administration in the judicious use of the intervention funds in implementation of proposed 
protects in their institutions within the agreed timeline. Hence, the report comes in hand as a 
testimony to the findings of the inspection team on these projects in order to ascertain their 
level of completion or otherwise, the constraining factors as the case may be and what efforts 
that need to be made to ensure achievement of targets. 
This subsection has been able to establish that performance contracting is in operation in 
TETFund. The next subsection will examine the agency behaviour. 
 
5.4. Agency Behaviour 
 
The TETFund Act 2011 states that the Board of Trustees shall be responsible for monitoring 
and ensuring collection of education tax by service and ensure transfer of same level of Fund, 
manage and disburse the tax imposed by the Act, liaise with the appropriate Ministers or 
Bodies responsible for collection or safe keeping of the tax, receive requests and approve 
admittable projects after due consideration, ensure disbursement of funds to various public 
tertiary educational institutions in Nigeria, monitor and evaluate execution of the projects, 
invest funds in appropriate and safe securities, update the Federal Government on its 
activities and progress through annual and audited reports, review progress and suggest 
improvement areas within the provisions of the Act, make, and issue, guidelines, from time 
to time, to all beneficiaries on disbursement from the Fund, on the use of monies received 
from the Fund.  It is illustrative to point out that from the foregone paragraph the Fund has 
some degree of autonomy and contractualism. These points to the fact that it is controlled and 
steered by submission of annual and audited reports to the Federal Government, through the 
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Federal Ministry of Education in addition to the previous practice of submitting the Funds 
annual working budget to the National Assembly for approval.  The current directive, that the 
Fund submits its budget to the President through the Federal Minister of Education for 
approval, is another form of steering and control.  Although, this change, which took effect 
from 2013, was considered another effective approach to expedite disbursement to 
beneficiary institutions by removing the Funds budget approval from the usually rigorous and 
overly bureaucratic processes of the National Assembly, nonetheless it could be viewed as 
another form of steering and control by the Government. Interviewee E noted that the Board 
of Trustees never took any budget approval to the Federal Ministry of Education or to Mr. 
President, but of recent, the 3rd BOT before its tenure came to an end did start seeking the 
approval of the Fund’s budget from the Mr. President through the Honourable Federal 
Minister of Education. However, whilst, this can be seen as some form of involvement, there 
is still the administrative autonomy. This approval being sought is consistent with the 
provisions of the Funds enabling Act. 
In addition to the detailed description of the Fund’s role and responsibilities in terms of how 
it is being steered and controlled through provisions of its Act of 2011, there is also the 
Service Charter which was introduced to the public sector under the 2007 Obasanjo’s 
Reforms as part of the instruments for Measuring and Evaluating Performance of Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies of Government by the National Servicom Office. In compliance 
with this directive, TETFund drew up its Service Charter, which encapsulates its Vision, 
Mission, Services and its Customers against which its performance, responsiveness to its 
customers and service delivery are measured. According to interviewee U 
The Servicom Unit entails an all in all service delivery. The main goal is that, if 
there is any grievance from outside or inside the Fund, people come to us to seek 
redress, the Unit will take up the matter and see that justice prevails. We also go 
around to see what members of staff are doing, what they are supposed to do and in 
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good time. The members of staff of Servicom go around to see that members of staff 
of other Departments are doing their work appropriately. The Unit is to ensure that 
files and other related matters are dealt with timeously, in order to meet targets 
and that organisations are meeting the demands and expectations of both the 
Government and the Public in terms of service delivery (Interviewee U).  
 
Particularly, the Directors of the Fund are also required to key their staff into the Performance 
Contracting Action Plan. In trying to know how this was achieved, questions were raised about 
the evaluation and supervision of staff performances, for instance, Interviewee J noted that; 
all the members of staff working with me are given schedules of duty, so I hold a 
particular staff responsible for a failure in the core functions of the division. That 
way I am able to appraise them. By giving them specific responsibilities, I am able to 
measure their performance and rate them. I also discuss performance indicators with 
my staff. Similarly, each Monday every member of staff submits a report of what they 
did in the past one week so that we could appraise them. Initially we use to give 
schedule of duties to staff without time line. But with time, this was introduced 
because we wanted to measure how effective and efficient they had been. 
 
Responding to a question from the interviewer on whether the Fund has a mechanism in 
place for Staff Appraisal, interviewee J stated that;  
  there is the annual performance appraisal which is done twice in a year 
covering periods from January to June and July to December. However, 
more through management approval, we have introduced what is called 
weekly performance reporting system. This involves the officers below a Unit 
Head or Department reporting on weekly basis on their schedule of duties. 
The decision was taken in order to improve performance and also to see that 
officers really justify the various incentive packages given to them.  
The interviewer also inquired whether the appraisal system has been the practice overtime, 
interviewee J maintained that:  
Before we joined the organisation the appraisal we met on ground was the 
common appraisal of the mainstream Civil Service of Nigeria which is once a 
year.  Apart from modifying the annual appraisal mechanisms we have put in 
place the corporate appraisal which involves receiving a monthly report from 
each Department in respect of duties performed, what is anticipated to be done 
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for the next month, their challenges and expectations and what relationship they 
expect to forge in the discharge of their responsibilities. 
 
Relationship with the Presidency, the Federal Ministry of Education, the National 
Assembly and other Government Regulatory Bodies 
Although as stated above the Funds enabling Act gives it some degree of autonomy, the 
provision of the same Act also gives the President the powers to intervene in the operations 
of the Fund, in the event of a national need. Under Section 6 (j) of TETFund Act 2011, 
which spells out the functions of the Board, it is stated that the Board could, ‘do such other 
things as are necessary or incidental to the objects of the Fund under this Act or as may be 
assigned by the Federal government, (TETFund Act 2011). For instance in 2010, the Fund 
was given a Presidential directive for the sponsorship for higher Degrees of 8 NYSC 
Members (National Youth Service Corps) who were awardees of a Special Presidential 
Scholarship and this was implemented by the Fund in collaboration with the Federal 
Ministry of Education. Though this intervention is outside the Fund’s Mandate there is a 
Provision in its Act which allows for the Federal Government to give the Fund directives as 
it concerns the educational policies of government when the government felt that it needs to 
intervene. A further example is, while setting up the National Open University of Nigeria. 
There was no budgetary appropriation by the National Assembly for its establishment. The 
Federal Government of Nigeria had to direct that the Fund provide funding for the initiation 
of the University. It is clear that the President can, by the Act direct the Board of Trustees of 
the Fund; develop a project in a University in any part of the Country, as long as it is done in 
the interest of the Country.  The power of the President to give directives to the Fund in areas 
of intervention in the aspect of national needs is contingent on a range of issues.  For 
instance, the President might decide to build a lecture theatre in a University or College of 
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Education or build a Central Research Laboratory anywhere in the Country. This the 
President can do by directing the Management or Board of Trustees to go ahead and allocate 
a sum of money to that project and ensure its delivery.  
 
Questions were raised on whether the Federal Ministry has tried to interfere in the operations 
of the Fund, which generated tensions in their relationship.  Empirical evidence shows that in 
some instances, there have been attempts by the Federal Ministry to intervene or instruct on 
areas of interventions. However, the Board of Trustees has been able to resist the pressures, 
thus making the funding to operate independently in line with the provisions in its enabling 
Act (Interviewee A).  
As described above, the Federal Ministry of Education is the supervisory Ministry of the 
Fund and as such the Fund reports to the President through it. It means that the Ministry does 
not have the discretionary power to challenge how the Fund should be managed. It only 
provides directions and national policy guidelines on education to the Fund, similar to the 
Ministry’s relationship with other agencies it supervises.  Referring to situation where the 
ministry wanted to interfere in the operations of the Fund, Interviewee A noted: 
 that the Ministry wanted a situation where they could control how the Fund 
undertook its intervention policy, in areas where we should invest money in the 
sector. In line with the mandate of the Fund, this was resisted by the Board. To 
counter or minimise these interference, the Fund annually set up certain 
percentages (approximately 10%) for the Federal Ministry of Education, to cater 
for pressures and unexpected request from the Ministry. 
 
Consequently, one could argue that the Fund has a degree of autonomy based on its structure 
and operations. There are situations where cultural factors have influenced its operations, 
though not particularly challenging its independence. Such challenges are handled at the 
discretion of the Board of Trustees. For instance, as mentioned earlier there are six 
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geopolitical zones in the country and they are all represented on the Board of Trustees. The 
author raised this point with Interviewee A as to whether there were overbearing pressures 
that arise from issues of federal character and cultural/ ethnic affiliation as well as political 
manoeuvring that challenge the independence of the Fund. Interviewee A retorted that it is 
not an issue of overbearance, but that of ethnic sentiments, whereby members want certain 
projects probably sited in their constituencies and thus to some, yes, they would insist, and 
they would put pressure that we site projects in their constituencies  
The researcher explored the relationship between one of the Funds Departments, the Federal 
Ministry of Education and other government supervisory bodies. Interviewee J noted: 
Our relationship was through TETFund Management. The TETFund has had 
cordial relationship with all Federal Ministry of Education although it did all it 
could to make us look like a department in the Ministry. The attitude of the 
Ministry in the past was like the Minister had a say because the Minister’s 
nominee was on the Board of Trustees. The Federal Ministry of Education saw 
the ETF as a department of the Ministry of Education. Whereas the Act 
established the TETFund as an agency of government and if possible on the 
same pedestal if not higher than the ministry because what we do is beyond 
what the Ministry of Education does. The Federal Ministry of Education’s 
impact is in the area of formulation of the National Policy on Education and to 
mid-wife it. But we are involved in direct interventions. 
 
Based on the above comment by interviewee J, the interviewer asked how the Ministry was 
showing its superiority over the Fund. The response from interviewee J indicates that in some 
cases there have been situations whereby the Fund’s intervention procedures have been 
disregard.  Interviewee J also mentioned that the Federal ministry does not maintain a line of 
communication that would establish a proper documentation of interventions, as such a 
considerable number of its projects have been inconclusive.  The interviewer however is of 
the opinion that since the Fund exited from funding Primary and Secondary education, there 
has not been any project opening up a relationship with the Ministry. Currently, there is no 
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direct project relationship with the Federal Ministry of Education except where the President 
so directs or gives instructions. 
A follow-up question to ascertain whether the Federal Ministry ever made the Fund change 
its internal or external processes was posed to the interviewer. Interviewee J retorted that this 
has not happened and any attempt to do so would comprise the work of the Fund as well as 
go against the law that established the Fund. Further probing questions were asked in relation 
to whether the Federal Ministry of Education was not successful in super- imposing decisions 
on the Fund as it affects day to day administration and implementation of programs.  
Interviewee J retorted that although there have been various attempts, but this has 
not worked.  
Further, reference was made to the enabling Act by the Interviewee in relation to the 
relationship between the Board of Trustees and the Federal Inland Revenue as well the 
Federal Ministry of Education, in relation to the representation on the Board of Trustees 
and how they are all equal stakeholders. Thus, the Federal Ministry cannot impose its 
own decision on the operations of the Fund as well as the implementation of programmes.  
Interviewee J was asked whether the Fund is more powerful than the Ministry. This was to 
ascertain if there was some level of autonomy and its behaviour. It is clear from the 
interviewee that the Fund is not more powerful than the Federal Ministry of Education, as the 
TETFund is an interventionist agency and a service delivery agency.  
 The Fund operates in line with the policy of the Federal government in terms of 
intervention, as such; it takes directions not solely from the Federal Ministry of 
Education, but from the Federal Government of Nigeria.  For example, the enabling 
Act gives the Board of Trustees absolute authority over the management of the Fund 
and not the Ministry of Education; this gives the Board of Trustees and management 
committee to draw up the policies not the Federal Ministry of Education 
(Interviewee, J). 
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Administratively, the Fund has a collaborative relationship with  the National Assembly and 
some regulatory bodies such as  the Central Bank of Nigeria, Office of the Account General 
of the Federation, Federal Inland Revenue Service, Office of the Auditor General of the 
Federation, Economic Finance and Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt and 
Other Related Practices Commission (ICPC), Federal Character Commission, National 
Salaries and Wages Commission, the National Planning Commission and the National Civil 
Service Commission. The accounts and books of the Fund are regularly checked by the 
Office of the Accountant General of the Federation and the Office of the Auditor General 
respectively, to ensure that all Federal Government financial guidelines and regulations are 
adhered to.  Similarly, the Committees on Education for the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, which are the legislative arms of Government, undertake oversight functions 
over the Fund with the view to knowing the various programs and activities of the Fund and 
also to have information on collections, allocations and disbursements made by the Fund. 
Other agencies that check the books of the Fund are the Federal Character Commission and 
the National Income Salaries and Wages Commission. They ensure compliance with 
recruitments as it affects the Principle of Federal Character and issues affecting Wages and 
Salaries respectively. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission as well as the 
National State Security Services also scrutinize the books and accounts of the Fund whenever 
the need arose. The Accounts Committees of both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives respectively, also check financial activities of the Fund to ensure compliance 
with budgetary provisions. The National Planning Commission monitors and evaluates the 
impact of the interventions of the Fund across the Country annually and submits report to the 
Federal Government in this regard.  
The Fund organizes annual workshops with the regulatory agencies of its beneficiaries, that 
is, the National Universities Commission, National Board for Technical Education and the 
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National Commission for Colleges of Education with a view to strategically planning and 
reviewing areas of intervention to beneficiary. The Fund also collaborates with International 
Organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, such as UNESCO, Carnegie, Intel 
Corporation, Foundation and MacArthur Foundation with the view to drawing up synergies 
with them to avoid duplication of interventions to its beneficiaries. It also exchanges ideas 
with other similar Funding agencies in Africa like Tanzania, Sierra Leon and Ghana. 
It is pertinent to mention here that all these oversight functions do not have direct bearing on 
the operations of TETFund; as such, the independence of the Fund is not compromised. This 
point was emphasised by Interviewee A, who noted that,  
‘the National Assembly played an oversight function on the Fund just like 
any other government agencies…They will come and make sure that we 
are operating in accordance with the rules and regulations, we are 
following due process, we have laid down procedures and guidelines that 
we must adhere to and that is their role; that is their constitutional 
responsibilities’. 
In order to capture the degree of independence of the Fund from other agencies and 
committees, questions were asked on whether there were attempts to checkmate the 
independence of the Fund. Response from Interviewee B indicates that it is difficult to 
checkmate the independence of the Fund because of the law that established it.  According to 
Interviewee B: 
Nobody checkmates you because the Fund was established by law and also the 
other agencies were also established by law. No agency has the statutory right 
to check mate as such, but you have collaborative relationship with the 
regulatory agencies to enhance not only the allocation of resources but also 
the management of what you have disbursed and the impact that you have 
achieved. For instance, to qualify to be enlisted as a beneficiary, a university 
has to submit a request to the Fund but part of the requirement for enlisting a 
new university is that NUC has to give an attestation that it is recognised as a 
University in the Country the same thing with the NBT for polytechnics and 
NCC for the Colleges of Education because the Fund is not responsible for 
recognition of institutions and conferring legitimacy on them. But each time 
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they request that they are now established as a University or Polytechnic and 
or College of Education and therefore should benefit from the intervention 
funds, we now request the necessary agency for instance, to, confirm. But 
secondly, as a government agency and under the executive branch we are also 
subject to the oversight responsibility of the National Assembly which is 
another arm of government. So, we have the House Committee on Education 
and the Senate Committee on Education. They could invite us at any point in 
response to a request from the general public or from members of the National 
Assembly for clarification on certain matters. But as a matter of course they 
also visit the agency at least once in a year for what they call oversight so that 
they look at our books, how we have done, what we have done and what we 
have achieved and then we tell them also areas where we think we need 
improvement that may require legal provision. 
Interviewee B further added that:  
There are the House and Senate Committees on Public Accounts. Because we 
disburse public funds they also perform their oversight responsibility in terms 
of checking the books and checking the annual audited accounts. If there are 
issues or questions, they will raise the question we respond, and we proceed 
from there.  Then again, the National Assembly also has a special relationship 
with the Fund in the sense that not only were the laws made by the National 
Assembly and also amended by the National Assembly they also provide 
resources for payment of personnel salaries and overhead because the Fund 
from the education tax will go straight into the intervention project of the 
university. We do not use the fund to pay salaries and we do not use the funds 
to pay for overhead. We draw these as an agency of government from the 
regular budget. So, the National Assembly performs that role. Then of course 
the usual agencies of government like the Office of the Auditor General of the 
Federation and the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation come at 
the end of the year to look at our books and also, we have the External 
Auditors taken from the list provided by the Auditor General of the Federation 
and retained for a period, who examine our books and submit the accounts. By 
law we are supposed to submit our account to the Minister and then an annual 
report on the activities of the intervention fund to the President. 
 
The relationship with other agencies are based on collaborative approaches ranging from the 
resources generation (in the case of the Federal Inland Revenue Service) and the impact the 
various programmes and projects are having (in the case of the Federal Ministry of 
Education).  For instance, in the case of the Federal Inland Revenue and its relationship with 
the Fund, Interviewee A noted that the through the Federal Inland Revenue, the Board 
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ensures that the Education Tax is collected, assessed, and remitted to the Fund through the 
Central Bank. Interviewee A also added that:  
The one that will readily come to mind is the Federal Inland Revenue Service. It was 
the function of the Board to make sure that Education Tax was collected; in fact, 
assessed, collected and remitted to the Fund through the Central Bank. So, it had a 
very crucial role to play.  We didn’t just sit down and wait for them to do whatever 
they wanted or tell us at the end of the day this is how much they had collected. We 
tried to play a role in monitoring the assessment, collection and remittance of these 
funds at the end of each financial year 
On the relationship with the National Assembly and the Fund, interviewee M is of the 
opinion that the relationship is based on the Law, therefore the way the Fund collects its fund 
is not subject to the National Assembly. In addition, the interviewee noted that the 
disbursement of fund by the agency is based on equitable distribution in relation to the geo-
political zones. Although, the interviewee noted that on several occasions the National 
Assembly has tried to appropriate some of the agency’s funds, (Interviewee M). 
As mentioned earlier, the Federal Ministry of Education is the parent Ministry of the Fund; as 
such this could impact on the operations and independence of the Fund in terms of setting 
policies and agenda. However, findings from the field research demonstrate that the 
independence of the Fund was not compromised by this relationship. According to 
interviewee A, who was a member of the BOT; 
Throughout my stay my Board kept complaining that the Ministry is not 
providing that roadmap because don’t forget ETF is supposed to be an 
interventionist agency that is the Ministry will pave the policy and then we 
come in, support them, compliment their efforts towards achieving 
Government goals.  But we had problems with that. What the Ministry used 
to do was to say they were going to- areas that cannot be said to be directly 
relevant to our mandate – you transfer teachers of Federal Colleges or 
Unity Schools and you say the Fund should pay for their allowances, for 
their movements and all that. My Board wanted a clearer direction. This is 
where we are focusing on. For instance, when the Ministry said look 
Government wanted French to be adopted as a second National language 
so to say we said fine, what do you want us to do?  How do we intervene 
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and I remember there was a proposal about establishing French Language 
laboratories in Schools and my Board was ready and willing to provide 
funding so that, that policy is implemented successfully but it vanished from 
the table. 
In addition, Interviewee B also noted that the Fund had a degree of independence from the 
supervising ministry: 
The Fund has a Board, so much is done within the Fund and not all that 
matters are referred to the Ministry each time you want to say call a 
meeting, to allocate available resources ever year or in terms of 
implementation, we do not need approval of the ministry, but the ministry is 
also represented on the Board of the Fund. Issues that require clarification 
by the Fund will now be channelled to the Ministry through the 
representative and each time the Board meets the representatives of the 
Ministry submits a report to the Ministry itself. In other words, the Ministry 
is playing the supervisory role, but it does not intervene in the day to day 
administration of the Fund and to a very large extent the Fund has no 
reason to be referring to the ministry on a daily basis. But as the need 
arises of course because it is a parastatal under the ministry it can seek 
clarifications. 
 
Interviewee B reiterated that following the transition from ETF to TETFund, there was never 
a time that the ministry interfered in any major way apart from areas where there is a cross 
over in terms of policy making at the ministerial level or at the level of Federal Executive 
Council of the Government. Where interventions are made at these levels they are considered 
incidental and do not compromise the mandate of the Fund.  Interviewee B also observed that 
there were no overbearing issues on the part of the ministry:  
There was no overbearing influence as such because we streamlined a lot. At 
least for the period that I served we streamlined from the ETF to TETFund 
and the Ministry never interfered in terms telling you what to do which is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the enabling law. But as the supervising 
Ministry of course there were issues that may arise in the cause of making 
policies at the ministerial level or even higher at the level of Federal 
Executive Council of the Government where you will be requested to 
discharge specific responsibilities which is again consistent with the law 
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because the law also says that the Fund can do other things as may be 
assigned by the Federal Government, but these other things are only 
necessary or incidental. They are not really key or they do not dilute the core 
mandate of the Fund, but they are just incidental to the objectives of running 
or providing education system. 
Similarly, Interview K, mentioned that there is a good working relationship between the 
agency and the Ministry, with very limited amount of meddling. The interviewee K likened 
the relationship between the BOT and the Federal Ministry of Education as that of a child and 
a father. The responsibility for regulating education in Nigeria as enshrined, by law, in the 
Federal Constitution of Nigeria is domiciled in the Ministry of Education and the Fund is 
under the Ministry of Education. On administrative relationship, functionally, the law places 
the responsibility of doing everything that I had mention under the Act with the BOT, but we 
relate administratively. Because the Minister is the supervising Minister of all agencies under 
the ministry and being an agency under the Federal Ministry of Education, the Fund submits 
to the authority of the Minister on all administrative matters and all matters that have to go 
through to the level of the political leadership of the country for discipline, orderliness and in 
conformity with the structure the BOT does not relate with the Federal Executive Council. It 
goes through the Minister to the Federal Council. It goes through the Minister to the 
President. 
As the Fund reports to the President through the Federal Ministry of Education, question was 
raised in the interview whether this impact on the operations and independence of the Fund 
and whether in the first instance the Presidency and or Ministry gets meddlesome in the 
Funds activities, Interviewee A, noted that interventions or meddling only happens in the case 
of projects, where approved projects from International Organisations such as the UNESCO 
is referred to the Fund for execution. However, the Board of Trustees would have to decide in 
 171 
 
this case whether to implement in line with the context of its mandate. According to 
Interviewee A:  
I don’t know whether it is meddling but one thing I know is that 
Government maybe sometimes for lack of Funds will say oh this is a 
UNESCO approved project and we are asking ETF to provide the Funds. 
Now it is left for my Board, yes, it is from Federal government no doubt, 
to look at it viz a viz our mandate and sometimes in fairness to the Board 
they cannot not say no to the Presidency, so they will look at it and see 
how it can be fixed or considered within the context of our mandate and 
justify it otherwise it will be like going out of our mandate. 
 
To determine whether or not issues of steering and control have been features in appointments 
of managers and operations of the Fund from inception, a former Executive Secretary was 
asked whether there was any checklist or contract provided verbally or in writing by the 
Federal Ministry of Education or the President when he was appointed, and he responded as 
thus: 
No there was none in terms of check list. I think it is implied in the kind of 
people appointed that you have the capacity and the knowledge to think and 
transform the agency. But remember I said earlier the appointment was done 
by the President so, I did not know that I was going to the Fund. I was called 
once to Abuja and told that I will be going to TETFund for President 
Yar’adua’s seven-point agenda and after the first three months in the Fund, I 
had the opportunity to brief him. I told him about what I saw and the 
direction in which I believe the Fund should go. He later invited me alongside 
the Minister of Education and we had a lengthy discussion in his office and so 
he had his own ideas, but in all it was not written. So, in other words yes, I 
had a check list of things to do but it was not contained in my letter of 
appointment but of course government said as principal I want you to do this 
and brief me regularly. So, we are doing so through the Minister. 
 
From the narratives above, though the Fund enjoys some degree of autonomy, it is regulated 
by other agencies of government through various overseeing functions and it is controlled and 
steered by the executive through rules and regulations in respect of Salaries and wages, 
budget, employment criteria (Federal Character principle). Furthermore, Presidential 
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directives on interventions operate through a clause in the Act which says that the Fund’s 
interventions can cover anything incidental and any other matter as directed by the 
government. Other forms of control, steering and regulation of the Fund by Government is 
through  Civil Service Rules and Regulations, appointments of BOT and Executive Secretary, 
representation of Federal Ministries of Education and Finance respectively on the Board,  
annual budget approval of the Fund by the President rather than through the National 
Assembly appropriation, overseeing by the Accountant General and Auditor General of the 
Federation, respectively, and representation of regulatory bodies of beneficiaries on the Board 
and submission of annual and audited reports to the Federal Government.  
 
The Agency in Action: 
In this section, we start to examine the behaviour of the TETFund […] – Indeed, in part, this 
has already been done in the previous sections, addressed in the level of autonomy the agency 
enjoys as well as the relationships it establishes with the parent administration as well as the 
other stakeholders who are themselves co-determined by the agency behaviour, and not just 
by the institutional design of the agency, (however influential it is).  
Monitoring and Evaluation of Projects    
All projects being executed by the beneficiaries are monitored, inspected and evaluated from 
time to time by the Members of the Board of Trustees, Staff of the relevant Departments of 
the Fund and in exceptional or rare occasions outsourced Consultants who are members of 
their relevant professional bodies. Any consultant so engaged but found to have misled the 
Fund in respect of the status of a project is reported to his professional body for sanctions. 
Similarly, members of staff of the Fund form the relevant Departments and Units as well as 
outsourced professionals on a quarterly basis, audit the financial accounts of the beneficiary 
to ensure compliance with financial regulations. It should be noted that all projects being 
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executed by beneficiaries have their completion periods or project circles. Reports of all 
monitoring and evaluation activities are submitted to the Fund through the Executive 
secretary who forwards same to the Board of Trustees. 
Both direct and indirect monitoring and evaluation involve different approaches. For direct 
interventions, interview G retorted that the Fund monitors and documents the effect of 
interventions and this is done through a process of internal evaluation. The monitoring 
process has helped the Fund make substantial changes to interventions in particular in the 
area of providing solution.  Describing the process of ICT project evaluation, Interviewee H 
noted that after the project has been executed, the ICT Department in conjunction with all the 
Departments evaluate the impact. Some members of staff are selected from different 
Departments as part of the evaluation team. After, the evaluation, a report will be sent to the 
Management with recommendations and where there are grey areas identified during the 
evaluation the management intervenes, (Interviewee H). 
Aside funding projects, the Fund also provides funding for library interventions, academic 
staff training development, conference attendance, teaching practice, research grants, book 
development and others, through the Departments of Academic Staff Training and 
Development and Education Support Services respectively. According to Interviewee I,  
‘the evaluation and monitoring of these areas is done through institutions 
(beneficiaries) and visits to the Universities where the scholars are registered 
and studying. This is to ensure that the institutions are utilising the money for 
the purpose for which it was released’.  
 
 He further contended that the Fund has an approval process that establishes credibility and 
accountability in the monitoring of projects. For instance, approval is granted as soon as the 
vetting process confirms that a project had adhered to the intervention guidelines of the Fund 
and it is within the budget and it is realisable. The beneficiaries according to interviewee I, 
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are granted approval in principle to go ahead and seek for qualified and competent 
Companies that can to deliver the projects in line with the provisions of the Public 
Procurement Act. Once this is done with evidence provided, the funds are released to them to 
begin direct execution of the project.   
 Interviewee I further stated that  
‘the Institutions execute the projects themselves. What we do is to ensure 
compliance of the set rules of public procurement at that level and following to 
that, we do monitoring. Also, there is another department which also evolved 
called Monitoring and Evaluation Department. This department’s central role is to 
follow the money. This is just to ensure that the money the beneficiaries have 
collected delivers the project they proposed and got approved. 
 
In situations where there are problems of non- compliance or low capacity utilization by 
beneficiaries, the Fund organizes what is called Sensitization Workshop or Strategic Planning 
Workshop, whereby the Agency interacts with its beneficiaries to Plan and review its activities 
and those of the beneficiaries in terms of their executing projects and utilization of funds 
released to them in line with the Fund’s guidelines.  According to Interviewee J,   
‘Equally, the agency also does what is called micro- managing of some 
projects, where we know that they have critical challenges by jointly visiting 
and addressing the issues and see how we could navigate the challenges 
faced by the institutions concerned’. 
 
In addition, to the above comment, interviewee J noted that 
‘Where issues are made, you communicate the issues to beneficiaries 
for remedy and where issues are not raised we demand our staff to 
raise the necessary certificate then we await audit certificate 
clearance that they are in healthy conditions for the release of 
subsequent fund’. 
 In response to questions on monitoring to ensure accountability interviewee O,  
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‘stated that the Fund monitors how beneficiaries spend the money 
allocated to them. This is done through auditors, who consult the 
accounts books of beneficiaries to check if the money disbursed to 
them have been utilized judiciously. In addition, the office of the 
Accountant General monitors disbursed funds to beneficiaries every 
year on behalf of the Fund, and where there are issues of disparities, 
a query is raised to challenge the problem. In relation to the Fund, 
external auditors equally monitor the accounts on a yearly basis’.  
 
Relationship with Beneficiaries 
As it has been mentioned, the beneficiaries of the Fund are Universities, Polytechnics and 
Colleges of Education. The author explored the relationship between the beneficiaries and the 
Fund. Interviewee C, a former Bursar at a college of Education, one of the beneficiary 
institutions, had this to say: 
‘The relationship was very nice and one thing I knew was that the Fund’s 
procedure was wonderful. Funds were released to you as a beneficiary based on 
the level of execution of projects you were given money for. After you get 
approval for your project to be executed from the Fund it would not release any 
money to you unless it was satisfied with the work done with the previous 
allocations to you’. 
 
Unlike other interventionist agencies in the country in the past, where monies were provided 
or made available without adequate monitoring and accountability, the Fund has in place a 
proper procedure and processes for monitoring and evaluating all its allocation to 
beneficiaries. Unlike in the past where interventionist agencies decide for their beneficiaries 
on areas of intervention, the intervention of TETFund is need driven. Based on the allocation 
to them in any given year, beneficiaries send proposals to the Fund for indicating areas of 
need. Once the fund is satisfied that such proposals are within its core mandate, it gives 
approval to the beneficiaries for execution. Based on the above, Interviewee C was asked 
whether the process of allocation is cumbersome. The interviewee proposed that the Fund 
provides strict supervision of various projects executed. In addition, the Interviewee C noted 
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that, once proposals were submitted to TETFund it will go through it, check the bidding 
documents, and once it was satisfied with the submission it would approve the project. 
However, it has been noticed in some of the comments of the beneficiaries, on the issue of 
cumbersomeness of the Funds process is related to the issue of accountability and 
transparency by the beneficiaries. They have now been made to understand that it is, ‘no 
more business as usual,’ to utilise public funds without being accounted for. In addition, 
Interviewee D described the process of fund utilization which supports the above points on 
allocation. 
After a proposal had been approved if it is a capital project 50 per cent of the 
project cost will be released to you at the 1st instance. Then you need to work 
to a certain level that will be supervised by TETFund experts and once they 
are satisfied with whatever you have done they now release another 35 per 
cent and if the job is done to a required level, you will inform them again, they 
will look at it and another 15 per cent will be given after the project is 
completed. 
 
Furthermore, Interviewee D was asked whether the process is cumbersome: 
It depends on your relationship and your knowledge of project execution. If 
you don’t have serious knowledge of how to package your project you would 
have a problem. But once you knew how to package your projects and execute 
them to the Fund’s satisfaction the process was not cumbersome. But the 
moment you made a weak submission from the start your proposal would be 
returned back to you. 
 
On whether the Fund has made a difference to the beneficiary institutions, the beneficiaries 
are of the opinion that the public tertiary institutions in Nigeria had been helped tremendously 
by the Fund. The beneficiaries note that the Fund has contributed to improvement of 
infrastructures, especially those for teaching, learning and research. ‘It has also helped in 
areas of academic training and development in the institution as it has been sponsoring our 
academic and non- academic members of Staff to attend conferences. They have also 
benefitted from the Fund as far as teaching practice is concerned. Most of the buildings on 
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campuses such as ICT building, lecture theatres, major students’ halls of residence were those 
that were constructed by TETFund’ (Interviewee E).  
 
The relationship of the Fund with beneficiaries was also explored from the perspective of the 
staff of the Fund; both senior and middle level management. The finding corroborates what 
the beneficiaries highlighted. According to Interviewee F, who was at some point the 
Executive secretary of the Fund, the relationship was that both the Fund and the beneficiaries 
are stakeholders who are concerned about improving the quality of education in Nigeria. The 
situation is that of correcting the decay that was evident in most institutions prior to the 
establishment of the Fund. Thus, the relationship was considered imperative to providing a 
solution to a range of problems confronting higher education institutions in the country from 
issues of staff training to development and lack of adequate facilities for teaching and 
learning (Interviewee F). Although at the inception of the Fund, there are issues of 
implementation of projects by beneficiaries, this however, as noted by Interviewee F, was 
resolved through close monitoring of the implementation of projects and as such there were 
no major cases of abandoned projects, other than some delays in the implementation. This 
was such that benefiting institutions that had delays in the execution of projects are precluded 
from accessing their allocation in a given year until those pending projects are completed. 
This has actually helped the Fund to ensure the success of its interventions, (Interviewee F). 
The research also explored the relationship between the Board of Trustees and stakeholders. 
As Interviewee K said, the relationship can be defined into two broad categories. The First, 
category is the beneficiaries of our allocations, which are the Universities, the Polytechnics 
and the Colleges of Education, whilst the Second category is the Institutional Stakeholders; 
the National Assembly and the Executive Arm of Government. 
General Administration within the Fund 
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From inception till 2011, when the Fund’s enabling Act was amended, it received yearly 
budgetary allocations from the Federal Government for personnel and recurrent expenditure. 
No budgetary allocations were made to the Fund for any Capital expenditure. But, with the 
2011 Amendment of the Act, the Fund does not draw anymore budgetary allocations for 
personnel, recurrent and capital expenditure. The new amendment empowers the Fund to set 
aside an amount not more than 5 per cent of its yearly collections to meet up with these 
expenditures, which are approved by the Board of Trustees.  Although the salaries of Staff of 
Fund are comparable to those paid in other agencies in the Federal public education sector, 
there are allowances, which the Fund pays them, which are outside the approved allowances 
for Federal Civil Servants in view of the nature of work, they undertake. However, the 
relevant regulatory bodies of the Federal Government approved such allowances for 
implementation. For its annual intervention budgets, the Board of Trustees is mandated to 
submit guidelines to the President through the Minister of Education for approval.  
The approval limits of the Chairman of the Board and the Executive Secretary for any 
financial transaction (procurements and expenditure) are specified in the financial guidelines 
of the Federal Government and any amount exceeding that has to be approved by the 
Minister of Education. If the amount involved is beyond the approval limit of the Minister of 
Education approval must be sought and obtained from the Federal Executive Council after it 
has been vetted and approved by the relevant Committees of the Board and the Federal 
Bureau for Public Procurements (if it involves procurement) on the recommendation of the 
Minister of Education.  
All procurements and external services required by the Fund must be advertised to the 
general public if they exceeded the specified limits and tenders received are opened in the 
presence of the general public including members of the civil liberties organizations who 
must be invited. 
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The Executive Management Committee of the Fund meets weekly to consider issues relating 
to the day to day administration of the Fund, proposals from Departments and Units, as well 
as for evaluation of targets set for each department and Unit of the Fund. The Fund also holds 
quarterly General Meetings with all staff where they are expected to discuss issues relating to 
their welfare, duties and the general directions of the Fund in line with its goals, mission and 
objectives and strategic plans. Each Department and Unit of the Fund is expected to meet 
weekly to brief Staff on the activities of the Fund, assess Staff performance of their 
scheduled responsibilities, plan targets in line with the goals and objectives of the Fund and 
to consider issues to be tabled to the Management. The sanctions, behavior and conduct of 
the Staff of the Fund are guarded by its Staff Conditions of Service and core values, with 
time limits for meeting day to day duties and responsibilities by staff clearly specified. The 
Fund conducts staff appraisal twice a year to review the performance of each staff, which 
usually forms part of the basis for their promotion or otherwise apart from other conditions 
for promotion like time in rank and written and oral examinations. The Fund engages the 
services of external auditors on a yearly basis to look into its financial records and some   
relevant professionals to evaluate its performance as it affects its interventions and day-to-
day activities. 
The Staff of the Fund are continuously trained within and outside the Country with back to 
office reports on such trainings submitted by each benefiting staff through his/her head of 
department /unit to Management on return. 
All approvals for the day-to-day expenses must be sought, and obtained, from the Executive 
Secretary based on the advice of the Internal Audit and the Department of Finance and 
Investment of the Fund. Similarly, all correspondences coming in or out of the Fund go 
through the Executive Secretary’s Office who gives directives on what to do or requests the 
relevant head of department/unit for advice.   
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The researcher also explored the management of the finances of the Fund, of which three 
stages were identified. Interviewee O, contended that, the first stage is how the agency keeps 
the fund and manages it, the main aspects of the funding agency is the issue of providing and 
managing funds. The agency keeps the fund and manages it in such a manner that funds are 
available as at when necessary and are put in the appropriate instruments. Second, the agency 
is into the processing of payment to the beneficiaries, because they are the major issue.  It is 
all about how the beneficiaries collect their money and we are also in the value chain of 
reaching the beneficiaries to get their money. The agency is a primary and important 
contributor in getting the money across to them, and third, after the agency keep the money, 
and disburse them to the beneficiaries we also maintain books of account which will show 
the stewardship of the Fund. The purposes of this approach are to ensure that the agency need 
to show how the funds have been used and how they are recorded properly to enable the 
BOT and Management take informed decisions. The essence of these approaches is to 
provide information to the Board and provide statistics. This somewhat is a show of 
stewardship to government on how the funds are being used and we need to show to other 
agencies of government either the Accountant General of the Federation that the fund is 
being used for its purpose, (Interviewee O). 
To determine further the level independence and autonomy of the Fund, Interviewee K 
responded that because the Fund is managed by a BOT, it has a high level of autonomy and 
this is reflected in its activities. For instance, Interviewee K highlighted that the highest 
policy making body in the Fund is the BOT.  They make policies for the day to day 
management and guidance of the Fund’s operations and the Executive Secretary and 
Management are directed by the powers of the BOT to implement those policies on a day to 
day basis. So, the relationship is not different from that of an agent and its principal and that 
is basically what it is. The Executive Secretary and Management do nothing that is not 
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delegated by the BOT. They derive their powers from the BOT because what we are 
managing is a trust and that is what makes the BOT distinct in both character and form with 
other conventional Government Boards because while others are performing normal Boards 
or Council management functions as per the practise everywhere in the world, the BOT is 
fulfilling its mandate through the collection, management and disbursements of funds as well 
as for the monitoring of collection of education tax which have been placed by law under it. 
But the BOT functions through the management which is the technical team that helps the 
BOT to actualise its major policy decisions by breaking them down to the nitty-gritty, 
(Interviewee K). 
Furthermore, in articulating the relationship between the BOT and the Federal Ministry, as 
well as separating national broad policy making by the Federal Ministry of Education and 
implementation by the Fund, the interviewee contended that: The executive arm of 
government for us here is represented by the Federal Ministry of Education on the Board of 
Trustees. In addition, the agency also develops policies and pursue actions and all strategies 
that will further the cause of government in terms of keying in to the transformational 
initiatives of the President at all times. As such the agency in a way we are more like the foot 
soldiers of the government always working in tandem with what the broad policies of 
government are (Interviewee K). 
Central to the notion of agency, and agency behaviour, is the idea of policy formulation and 
implementation. The interviewer also explored policy processes within the Fund from the 
activities of the Board to that of the Executive sectary and executive management committee. 
Findings from the field work show that policy making takes on different processes within the 
agency. For instance, it was uncovered that the Board makes its own policy sometimes and 
also provides guidelines on how the funds are to be utilized by beneficiaries and also 
monitors the implementation of same. In addition, findings from the fieldwork identified that 
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the Executive Secretary is involved in all sorts of policy initiatives before they are tabled in 
front of the Executive Management Committee, which after seeing the usefulness of such 
proposals or policy ideas forwarded same to the Board of Trustees for consideration and 
possible approval, (Interviewee B). 
The interviewer also explored the operations of the Fund under both the military and 
democratic regime, taking into consideration changes in the name from Education Tax Fund 
to Education Trust Fund in 1999 shortly after the democratisation process. This was to 
ascertain whether this was done independent of the Fund or was there any sort of 
consultation. Findings show that there was a mix up in terms of how the Fund was referred to 
and what the actual name was, and this is due to transition and changes in forms of 
governance. For instance, at inception, the correct name of the Fund should have been 
Education Trust Fund but somehow people kept referring to it as Education Tax Fund, so we 
had to do a letter to government to correct the anomaly. So, the Fund’s name was then 
changed from Education Tax Fund to Education Trust Fund and then recently to Tertiary 
Education Trust Fund, (Interviewee C) 
Legal Issues 
It is imperative to note that the operations of agencies are based on statutory recognition. In 
terms of autonomy, agencies have the mandate for legal matters, especially that which applies 
directly to the functions and operations of the Fund. The Legal Board Matters Unit is a 
service unit in the Fund and it provides legal services to the Board of Trustees and 
Management of the Fund. It provides legal opinions, draft contracts agreements, prepare all 
the instruments that are required to give legal effects to the operations of the Fund and also 
supervise the staff working in the unit. The legal officer provides legal advice to those aspects 
of the operations of the Fund that had legal implications and ensures that we adhered to all the 
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laws affecting the operations of the Fund. In 2007 the Unit was renamed Legal and Board 
Matters Unit. The Board secretarial aspect was assigned to the Legal unit and as such the Unit 
is involved in managing the affairs of the Board of Trustees (Interviewee L). 
One of the key points highlighted in the literature on agency is the idea of autonomy in terms 
policy implementation and initiation. This issue came up in the interview in terms of 
exploring the behaviour of the agency in relation to legal matters. It is clear from 
Interviewee K that there is limited intervention from the government and principal in terms 
of policy implementation and initiation and that the legal boundaries are well established and 
enshrined in the enabling Act. Interviewee K notes that the Board makes its own policies 
sometimes and also provides guidelines to beneficiaries on how the funds are to be utilised 
and how the Agency will monitor its implementation. However, the interviewee observed 
that there has been situation where the parent Ministry has tried to control how the Fund 
channels the various intervention policy and the areas to invest. The interviewee noted that 
the Board was able to resist this meddlesomeness. In addition, to this the Agency decided to 
set aside certain percentage of Funds for the Federal Ministry of Education, to cater for any 
request outside the remit of the coverage of the agency. This is to also cater from unexpected 
requests from the Ministry (Interviewee A). 
5.5. Summary of the Findings on Agency Behaviour  
In this first section, a description of the functions and behaviour, as well as the operational 
strategies of TETFund, was provided, through a narrative supported by findings and data 
from the interviews conducted with key stakeholders and beneficiaries. The research 
question focuses on understanding the behaviour of an NPM agency within the context of a 
developing country, thus, some of the interview protocols focused on the three key 
principles of agencification- that is structural disaggregation, autonomy and performance 
contracting. It has been established that these three key elements are present in the behaviour 
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of TETFund at varying degrees. It has been established from the research findings presented 
above that the separation of an agency from a parent ministry is not absolute, but rather a 
question of degrees, considering the fact that the enabling law of the Fund clearly delineates 
the functions, reporting parameters, and responsibilities of the Board of Trustees, 
Management of the Fund, vis-a-vis those of the Federal Ministry of Education and other 
central government agencies. Also revealed is the fact that the agency earned increased 
autonomy based on the provisions in the Amendment Act of 2011 which gives the Fund the 
leverage to set aside any amount not more than 5 per cent of its collection in a given year for 
its capital, recurrent and overhead expenditures as against such been provided for by national 
budgetary allocations, which was the practice before the amendment. Indeed, in various 
literatures, the issue of re-regulation has been understood as another way of cutting increased 
autonomy of agencies. In the case of TETFund, with earned autonomy following the 
amendment of the Act as mentioned above, the agency is now mandated to send to the 
President its intervention budget guidelines/ templates for approval since it does not draw 
any budgetary allocation that will require approval from the National Assembly. From the 
research data, there is less interference in the recruitment of staff, policy making, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation, from the parent ministry and other central 
regulatory agencies. Also, the findings unveil that the Fund is not over burdened with much 
regulatory activities and regulations that would impede its operations.  
With performance contracting, in as much as there is an oscillation between written and 
unwritten rules in academic literature, in the case of TETFund- its activities and operations 
are reported and monitored through its annual and audited reports to the President through 
the Minister of Education as stipulated in the enabling Act? Similarly, the evaluation and 
monitoring of its activities and interventions by the National Planning Commission, the 
overseeing functions of the National Assembly, supervision and policy direction from the 
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Federal Ministry of Education, adhering to rules and regulations of the National 
SERVICOM Office as well as some regulatory agencies of government like the Offices of 
the Auditor General and Accountant General of the Federation respectively and the Bureau 
for Public Procurements are some of the ways of monitoring the performance of the Fund 
which also have elements of steering and control. Furthermore, a report on the activities of 
the Fund is usually submitted to the Federal Minister of Education by the member 
representing the Ministry on the Board of the Fund.  
The implementation of agencification, through the establishment of Agencies does not 
operate in a vacuum, as it is subject to a range of contextual issues which have often led to a 
range of controversies both in academic and policy circles. According to Pollitt (2013a), 
context is crucial- as contextual features such as constitutions, cultures or political systems 
have major effects on stability and change- and even what is considered as good governance.  
As mentioned in Chapter One and Chapter Two there have been various public-sector 
reforms in Nigeria and these reforms were undertaken under different forms of 
administrations. This raises fundamental questions in relation to NPM guided reforms. The 
following section will explore the various contextual issues on the New Public Management 
and Agency in Nigeria, reflecting on the findings from the research.  
5.6. Contextual Issues and Agencification in Nigeria  
5.6.1. State and Political Context 
“Power is the lifeblood of administration,” Norton Long (1949; 1952) 
O’Toole and Meier (2013) say political context is always the starting place for a theory of 
context in relation to public management, due to the fact that public organisations are 
expected to be responsive to the demands of political sovereigns. Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2011) observe that within the political context, the question should be about understanding 
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the vertical and horizontal dispersions of authority and power. With vertical dispersion, the 
focus is on how authority is shared between different levels of government. Horizontal 
dispersion entails how far central executives are able to ‘get their acts together,’ by ensuring 
that all ministers act collectively and this dimension ranges from highly coordinated to highly 
fragmented (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 51). O’Toole and Meier (2013) reiterate that 
political power can be fragmented, either in formal structures or via rule-governed processes. 
Formal structures of fragmentation include the separation of powers and federalism, and this 
allows power to be dispersed amongst political institutions, autonomous or semi-
autonomous, regional or local government, (e.g. United States, Nigeria).  A unitary political 
system, on the other hand, concentrates power in a single political institution (e.g., the United 
Kingdom). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011:54-55) argue the state structure and nature of 
government combine to exercise significant influence on the speed and scope of public 
management reforms and interventions. 
While some political systems have consensual, or concentrated, political power structures, 
others operate as an adversarial and fragmented political power. In the case of adversarial 
political systems, the onus is on the public managers to find a political consensus regarding 
the bureaucracy and its programmes, whereas in the fragmented political system, public 
managers rather have to become political actors by seeking to forge a coalition that supports 
agency actions, (Long, 1949; see also O’Toole and Meier, 2013). Importantly, the variations 
in political context, or in the concentration of political power, can have two influences on 
management and organizational performance. First, it can change the mix of managerial 
activities that are likely to pay off, that is, it enhances some management skills but devalues 
others. Second, it can increase or decrease how much management itself matters in affecting 
performance, (O’Toole and Meier, 2013). With TETFund, its enabling Act (2011) gives the 
BOT and Management a clear mandate to operate. In addition, the Act gives room for both 
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BOT and Management to be creative and innovative in their management of the Fund, 
through the creation of programmes of intervention, the creation of Departments in line with 
the changing needs and demands of beneficiaries. 
Associated with political context analysis are the roles, functions and influence of ministers 
and mandarins. In some countries, executive politicians and senior public servants are 
involved in the public management reforms and implementations; however, the relationship 
between the two varies from country to country (jurisdictional interpretations) (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011:54-55). To Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011:54-55), the top civil servants 
constitute that main part of the elite that makes crucial decisions about reforms. This also 
raises some fundamental questions: What kind of relationships, bargain or deals are agreed 
between top politicians and top civil servants?; Are there consensual agreement on the 
behavior amongst them?; Are political careers separate from, or integrated with, the careers 
of the  mandarins?; Are senior civil service positions themselves politicized in the sense that 
most of their occupants are known to have, and have been, chosen partly because they have 
specific party political sympathies or affiliations?, and finally,  How secure are senior civil 
service jobs? These questions are particularly important when exploring the success or failure 
of public sector reforms. However, in the case of TETFund, the Executive Secretary must 
have a professional background in education.  So far, no politician has been appointed as the 
Executive Secretary of the Fund since its inception. Section 8 (c- e) of the Fund’s enabling 
Act states that the Executive Secretary should be a person with a good knowledge of, and 
with cognate academic and administrative experience in, tertiary education, having the 
qualifications and experience appropriate to performing the functions of that office under this 
Act. In addition, they should hold office for a period of 5 years, in the first instance. They 
may be eligible for re-appointment for a further term of 4 years only, and on such terms and 
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conditions as to emoluments, and conditions of service as may be specified in his letter of 
appointment. 
The structure and functions of political institutions are shaped by the philosophy and culture 
of the administration and governance in any particular country. Rechtsstaat’s model and the 
Anglo-Saxon models have been identified as two models within public administration. Pollitt 
and Bouckaert (2011) note that very few systems fall between these two models which 
appear to be inherently inconsistent and irreconcilable. However, Ongaro, 2009: 252-63) 
argues that the ‘Napoleonic’ states, (including France and Italy), constitute an important sub-
family in the Rechtsstaat model (Ongaro, 2009: 252-63). From the Rechtsstaat perspective, it 
is said that the state is a central integrating force within society, and its main concerns are 
with the preparation, promulgation and enforcement of laws, (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 
62). As such, most senior civil servants will be trained in the law and, indeed, a large and 
separate body of specifically administrative law will have been created. In such a culture, the 
instinctive bureaucratic stance will tend to be one of rule-following and precedent, and the 
actions of both individual public servant and individual citizen will be set in the context of 
correctness and legal control, (Pollitt and Bouchaert, 2011: 62). By contrast, the ‘public 
interest model’ – the Anglo- Saxon model - accords the state a less extensive or dominant 
role within society, as the term government is preferred above the state. Government (rather 
than the state) is regarded as something of a necessary evil, whose powers are to be no more 
than are absolutely necessary, and whose ministers and officials must constantly be held to 
public account by elected parliaments and through other means. Arguably, whilst the law is 
an essential component of governance within the Anglo-Saxon model, it is not dominant in 
comparison to the Rechtsstaat model, (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 62). 
In Nigeria, the structure and functions of political institutions are stated in the Constitution. 
As such, the model of Federalism that the Country follows provides a format for execution of 
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roles and duties of the three tiers of government- namely executive, legislative and judicial. 
The appointment of ministers is done by both the executive and legislative arms of 
government, whilst the appointment of the Boards and Chief Executives of agencies is the 
exclusive prerogative of the executive arm of the government. The political context in which 
the Fund operates is in accordance with the guidelines set by the Federal Government and the 
laws establishing it as passed by the National Assembly.  
In comparative public management literature - political context is viewed as important 
foundation to understanding contextual issues. As mentioned in the Chapter Two, according 
to the 1999 constitution, Nigeria is a Federal Republic with three tiers of government: 
Federal, State and Local. There are 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja, 
which has an autonomous status and is the seat of government, (Otobo, 1999). According to 
ECA (2010), the form of government is a Federal Presidential System of Government. The 
President exercises executive powers, combining the roles of Head of State, Head of 
Government and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Within this Federal republican 
framework, there is the distribution/separation of powers between the federal, state and local 
governments - what Pollitt and Bouchaert (2011) call the vertical dispersion of power.  The 
Nigerian Public Service is made up of government ministries, extra ministerial departments, 
statutory agencies and corporations.   
To Ekaete (2007:13) the structure of the government of any nation is a result of the complex 
interplay of its socio-economic aspiration and development objectives, cultural influences 
and political considerations on the one hand, and the state of evolution of the country’s 
public service administration on the other. Chapter Two addresses section 13 to 23 of the 
1999 Constitution of Nigerian which prescribes the objectives and directive principles of 
policy of the state covering political objectives, economic objectives, social objectives, 
educational objectives, foreign policy objectives, and environmental objectives, obligations 
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of the mass media, national ethics and directives on Nigerian cultures. Nigeria comprises 
diverse ethnic groups and this has led to controversial debates on the structure of the civil 
service. In order to address this, the 1979 and 1999 constitutions enshrined the concept of 
federal character. This is a principle that aims to promote and ensure that appointments to 
public service institutions fairly reflect the linguistic, ethnic, religious and geographical 
diversity of the country. According to Section 11, No 3 of the 1999 constitution, the 
composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies, and the conduct of 
its affairs, shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria 
and the need to promote national unity. It also commands national loyalty, thereby ensuring 
that there will be no predominance of persons from a few states or ethnic or sectional groups 
in that Government or in any of its agencies. Section 11, No 4 focuses on the recognition of 
diversity, the composition of the government of a state, a local government council, or any of 
the agencies of such government or council, and the conduct of the affairs of the government 
or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise the diversity 
of the people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and 
loyalty among all the people of the Federation. According to the ECA (2010), the practice 
has resulted in a confused balancing of the merit principle and the quota systems with a 
heavy dose of arbitrariness.  
The principle of Federal Character which states that selection for appointment must be based 
on equality without sacrificing merit, however its application has generated a lot of tension as 
in most cases limited attention was given to merit in filling vacancies in the public service. In 
respect of TETFund, there was strict compliance to the principle of Federal Character 
without subjugating merit to selection based on quota system. Due to this, TETFund has 
qualified staff employed on merit and the staff composition reflects the Federal Character in 
terms of geographical spread of the country. This has had positive impact on the performance 
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of the Fund.  This point was mentioned by interviewee L, who noted that recruitment into the 
Fund has been guided by the provisions for the law and appointments to the Fund, is 
regulated by the Federal Character Commission. The process is such that the Agency has to 
submit list of those to be interviewed for jobs to the Federal Character Commission in order 
to obtain what is classed the Certificate of Compliance. Thus, appointment has been such that 
the Agency creates a balance between the professional cadre and technical staff (Interviewee 
L). Further it is noted that the recruitment process has been dynamic and based on very 
innovative ways of advertising and this can be further gleaned from the current work force.  
The Nigerian Federal Civil Service Commission is a constitutional body, established under 
Section 153 (1d) of the 1999 Constitution. It is empowered to (i) appoint qualified candidates 
to staff the different Ministries/Extra Ministerial Departments in the federal civil service, (ii) 
make recommendations to government on personnel policies aimed at improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the civil service and ensure that personnel decisions reflect 
the stated policies and interests of the government (Nigeria, Federal Republic of 1999; cited 
in ECA, 2010). Moreover, the powers, objectives and composition of the Commission are to 
firmly establish Nigeria as a “united, strong and self-reliant nation, a great and dynamic 
economy, a just and egalitarian society, a land of bright and full of opportunity for all citizens 
and a free and democratic society,” (Nigeria, Federal Republic of 1995:10) through non-
partisanship, adherence to rules and regulations and best practices (ECA, 2010). 
 
In the data collection process, some contextual issues were raised in the interviews. The 
interviewer raised the question of what led to the establishment of the Fund in order to 
ascertain whether it was based on political issues. Interviewee C noted that the Fund was 
established as a matter of policy expediency against the backdrop of unrest amongst the 
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), mainly against the military rule in the 1990s. 
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The Military Government headed by General Babangida, came up with the suggestion of 
additional funds for higher institutions in the country. Thus, what followed was a negotiation 
between ASUU and Federal Government which resulted in the idea of taxing all registered 
Companies doing business in Nigeria, 2% of their accessible profit as Education Tax for the 
purpose of funding higher educational institutions. As such the Federal Inland Review was 
mandated to collect the 2% Education Tax and transfer at the beginning of each year to 
TETFund account with the Central Bank of Nigeria (Interviewee C). 
Some of the public sector reforms literature in Nigeria, in particular, and Africa, in general, 
had mentioned these external pressures largely responsible for the various reforms. However, 
in order to confirm this, the interviewer raised the question of whether the creation of the 
agency - the TETFund - could be seen as a result of other factors and not only the pressure 
from the Academic Staff Unions of Universities. Interviewee C notes that in the case of 
Nigeria, the creation of the Fund was basically influenced by internal pressures following 
negotiations between the government and ASUU.  Indeed, the Fund was seen as a solution to 
a range of issues that led to the strike actions by ASUU, such as poor facilities and 
infrastructure and poor remuneration of the academic and technical staff of the universities 
(Interviewee N). The Fund also was seen as a way of addressing the challenges of learning 
and teaching as well as research (Interviewee, N). The above points from interviewee C and 
N, was further corroborated by interviewee F:  
I am not too sure if international agencies were involved in the setting up of 
Education Tax Fund. As I said before, it was basically ASUU that clamoured for 
it. The union felt that since government revenue cannot meet all the demands from 
all the sectors of the economy particularly the education sector which was grossly 
underfunded, it was necessary to rely on another source outside government for 
regular funding of the educational sector and that was how the private sector was 
brought in to support government in funding the educational sector. However, 
that is not to say that the sector is not receiving regular grant from government. 
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Attempt was made to unravel some of the other issues associated with the emergence of the 
Fund. Interviewee K noted that the creation of the Agency could be linked to a protest against 
the Structural Adjustment Programme, as this was part of the reasons for the strike by the 
members of ASUU. The structural adjustment programme was questioned in terms of how it 
was impacting on the economy negatively in general and the education sector in particular, 
(Interviewee K). 
The quotation above raises a fundamental question in terms of what has been stated in 
academic literature - that the reforms did not take into consideration contextual issues and 
actually worsened the already precarious situations in most Countries.  
The interviewer also explored the role of the Executive Secretary in order to understand the 
extent of distribution and dispersion of authority and power, although enshrined in the Fund’s 
Enabling Act, to see whether it actually operates in reality. Interviewee C noted, the Fund was 
established by law and the law clearly stated in the mandate under section 7 sub-section 1 as 
to what to do with the resources and that the Executive Secretary is the Chief Executive and 
Accounting Officer of the Fund, and works with the Board of Trustees on the basis of 
delegated powers of the BOT. In other words, there is a Board of Trustees that manages the 
Fund, but the day to day management of the institution rests on the Executive Secretary and 
the Management (Interviewee C). 
After establishing the role of the Executive Secretary, the researcher sought to identify how 
Executive Secretaries were appointed in order to ascertain whether there were issues of 
political patrimonialism in the appointment of Executive Secretary. From the comment from 
Interviewee C, the appointment of the Executive Secretary is enshrined in the enabling law of 
the Fund and the law stipulates that the appointment of the Executive Secretary as the Chief 
Executive and Accounting Officer is done by the President on the recommendation of the 
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Minister of Education. The Executive Secretary is appointed for a term of 5 years in the first 
instance and renewable under the TETFund Act for another term of 4 years which sums it to 
9 years. Interviewee C retorted that reappointment is always at the discretion of the president.  
The activities of the Fund are overseen by Board of Trustees, which is made up of the Board 
of Trustees from the six geo-political zones of the country, representatives of the Federal 
Ministry of Education, Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Inland Revenue and 
representatives of Regulatory Agencies of benefiting Institutions, namely the National 
Universities Commission, the National Board for Technical Education, and the National 
Commission for Colleges of Education. It was imperative to explore how the BOT has 
changed over the years, in order to identify any form of political issues or context. 
Interviewee B noted that following the Amendment of the enabling Act in 2011, the previous 
composition of the Board of Trustees which comprised the chairman and representative from 
the six geo-political zones of the country and representatives of Federal Inland Revenue 
Services, was expanded to include representatives of, the National Universities Commission, 
the National Board for Technical Education and the National Board for Colleges of 
Education. 
How the composition of the Board affected decision-making in the Fund was also examined 
in attempt to identify whether there are political interferences. In particular regarding 
whether there have been attempts to enforce decisions of their various ministries on the 
Board of Trustees at its meetings, given the inclusion of representatives of the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Federal Ministry of Finance. Interviewee B observed that the 
essence of having representatives of the Federal Ministry of Education and Finance on the 
Board of Trustees is to ensure that the Fund is aware of various government policies, comply 
with the laws and regulations in relation to its interventions and activities. It is clear, that 
these representatives did not interfere in decision making processes, but only assisted in 
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terms of providing quick and relevant information that could allow the Agency take precise 
decisions on its interventions.  
It was considered imperative to explore whether tension existed between the Board of 
Trustees and Executive Secretary who are all appointees of the President. Comments from 
Interviewee H captured the rather complex relationship between the Board and the 
Executive Secretary;   
Well, I worked under two Chairmen. One xxxxxx and for a considerable 
period I had no Board as provided for by law. But government said in the 
absence of the Board, the Ministers will perform oversight responsibilities or 
perform the functions of the Board in their absence. So in all, I think I have 
worked with 5 Boards. xxxxx regular Board, 3 Ministers of Education and 
then xxxxx Board... I think my experience in the last four years is generally 
speaking you have no frictions or conflicts as such.  What I did was to 
confine myself to the provisions of the TETFund Act. We were all there to 
serve the public interest and the public interest was defined in the enabling 
law. So, I had no encroachment of role. Nobody tried to play the kind of role 
that he or she was not supposed to play. I don’t think the Board was 
overbearing because it was also a democratic process in the sense that the 
Board also had committees. So, I worked with not only the Chairman but all 
other Board members not only at the level of the Board but also at the level 
of Board committees. 
 
Since there have been three Board of Trustees, questions were asked about the qualities of 
the appointees, in order to ascertain whether they were politicians. Interviewee G noted, the 
1st Board was in office for a short period of time and not a lot was achieved in terms of 
staffing. However, while Members of the 2nd Board of Trustees were all technocrats, the 3rd 
Board of Trustees were mainly politicians.  
The point raised by the researcher whether issues of neo-patrimonialism, as its affects the 
appointees of the BOT who were politicians affected the mode of recruitment into the Fund. 
Interviewee G was of the opinion that this sort of thing is inevitable as the way politicians 
view things would be very different to that of technocrats. 
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According to Ayee (2008), neo-patrimonialism is an important, non-coercive form of 
consolidating power that relies on patronage. Therefore, political incumbency, public 
benefits and opportunities have been distributed along political lines. Thus, in their quest for 
self-preservation, state elites have dispensed government-controlled resources — jobs, 
licenses, contracts and credit to select political allies. They have mediated access to 
economic opportunities in favour of close associates, so as to enhance their hold over state 
power, (Ayee, 2008: 26). However, it should be noted that the Funds Enabling Act clearly 
specifies the disbursement ratio of funds to beneficiaries, so it was impossible for BOT of the 
Fund be they politicians or technocrats to favour one beneficiary over another.  More so the 
education tax collection every year is made public and the beneficiaries can easily calculate 
or determine what they are expected to get from the Fund at any given intervention year.  
Corruption and lack of accountability have been identified as problems within public sector 
reforms. Since the 1990s, levels of corruption have been attracting considerable attention in 
both developing and developing countries, (World Bank, 2008). According to the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) Handbook for Fighting Corruption 
(1999), corruption can assume various forms, “It encompasses unilateral abuses by 
government officials such as embezzlement and nepotism, as well as abuses linking public 
and private actors such as bribery, extortion, influence peddling and fraud. Corruption arises 
in both political and bureaucratic offices and can be petty or grand, organized or 
disorganized,” (cited in ICHRP, 2009). Corruption is the abuse of power for private gain, 
(ICHRP, 2009).  Whilst grand corruption is used to encapsulate high level corrupt practices 
involving people in high places such as government officials, petty corruption, also called 
“low” and “street” corruption, describes corruption that people experience in their encounters 
with public officials and when they use public services, (ICHRP, 2009:15).  According to 
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Kofi Annan, corruption is an insidious scourge that impoverishes many Countries, and 
affects us all. It creates discrimination between different groups in a society, feeds inequality 
and injustice, discourages foreign growth and it is indeed a major obstacle to political 
stability, and to successful social and economic development of any nation, (cited in 
Obasanjo, 2007: 2).  
 
In addition, there is political, administrative, corporate, and institutional corruption.  Political 
corruption involves politicians such as law-makers (monarchs, dictators, legislators) acting in 
their role as creators of the rules and standards by which a polity operates. In the course of 
their responsibilities, such officials seek bribes or funds for their political and personal 
benefit and provide favours to their supporters at the expense of broader public benefits 
(ICHRP, 2009). Administrative corruption includes the use of bribery and favouritism to 
lower taxes, escape regulations and win low-level procurement contracts, whilst corporate 
corruption occurs between private businesses and suppliers or private service providers. It 
also involves illegal behaviour by corporate officials for private monetary gain. 
Institutionalised corruption identifies the behaviour of those who exploit institutional 
positions to influence institutional processes and actions, such as law enforcement personnel 
and members of the judiciary; operational corruption, narrower, describes specific activities 
and goals, (ICHRP, 2009). 
 
In Africa, corruption has been identified as one of the major impediments to successful 
public sector reforms. In Nigeria, corruption in the public sector has been a challenge for 
various governments. The performance of public organisations can be affected if corrupt 
practices are left unaddressed. In his speech titled moving on: the significance of reform and 
change in Nigeria by (then) President Olusegun Obasanjo, (2007:3), who noted that: One of 
the greatest tragedies of military rule in recent times is that corruption was allowed to grow 
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unchallenged, and unchecked, even when it was glaring for everybody to see. The rules and 
regulations for doing official business were deliberately ignored, set aside or by passed to 
facilitate corrupt practices.  
The researcher explored the issue of corruption in relation to the Fund and how 
accountability is maintained and sustained in its operations. The interviewer raised the 
question on how the Finance and Investment Department operates, in such a way that 
corruption is avoided. Interviewee O is of the opinion that the main aspects of the funding 
agency are the issue of providing and managing funds. The interviewee noted that the agency 
keeps the fund and manages it in such a manner that fund is available as at when necessary 
and are put in the appropriate instruments. The way the agency processes the payment to 
beneficiaries allows for transparency. According to Interviewee O, once the fund is disbursed 
to the beneficiaries, we keep account in order to show good stewardship of the Fund.  The 
purpose of this process is to show how the funds have been used and how they are recorded 
properly to enable the BOT and Management take informed decisions. Interviewee O noted 
that the Finance and Investment Department provides the information to the Board, 
supported with statistics. The process used by the Agency will allow the Federal government 
and other Agencies such as the Accountant General of the Federal know how the funds are 
being used in terms of various interventions (Interviewee O). The comments from 
Interviewee G also indicates the level of transparency that exists in the Fund. For instance, 
the process of payments to the beneficiaries was explored in relation to the issues of 
corruption. Interviewee G states that the process starts from when the beneficiary sends a 
proposal to the Fund through the Executive secretary, which is then sent to the Project 
Management Department for vetting and other considerations after which recommendations 
are sent to the Director of Finance for release of Funds by the Executive secretary. Even the 
structure of the Finance Department allows for transparency (Interviewee G). For instance, 
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the Director of Finance has three Assistant Directors working with him. One is in charge of 
Treasury, another in charge of Management Accounting and the last in charge of Final 
Accounting. Interviewee G details the process of approval: The Finance Director sends 
recommendations and approvals for payments on proposals from beneficiaries from the 
Executive Secretary to the Assistant Director in charge of Management Accounts who will 
look into these and send them to staff under his supervision who will thereafter raise a 
payment voucher. A payment voucher will be raised in the name of the Institution concerned 
and sent to the Internal Audit (who will look at the voucher, the payee, the amount in words 
and figures), for vetting and auditing and thereafter, if satisfied, the voucher is stamped and 
sent back to the Finance Department for disbursement via e-payment. Disbursements and 
payments are only made after final authorisation by the Executive Secretary. Since 2009, the 
Nigerian government stopped cheque payments for all financial transactions in the Country 
so all our payments to our beneficiaries are electronic payments (e-payment) through the 
Fund’s designated banks, (Interviewee G). 
In addition, question was also raised in relation to how payments are processed. Interviewee 
G discussed the various systems ranging from beneficiary payments, consultant payments, 
staff loan payments, book development payments, research grant payments etc. Interviewee 
G observed that if an approval comes in from beneficiary institutions, we pay through the 
Funds account with the Central Bank of Nigeria and if it is staff loan we pay through the 
Funds account with the Guaranty Trust Bank. For book development interventions we pay 
through the Funds Enterprise Bank account while the Research Grants are paid through a 
Skye bank account. Payment to contractors for supplies and other services come through the 
Fund’s First Bank account, (Interviewee G). 
Similarly, questions were raised on how the payments are credited into beneficiary accounts, 
Interviewee G observed that when an approval comes, the Director of Finance and 
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Investment sends it to management Accounts Unit which raises a voucher, which is 
countersigned by other officers then sent to the Audit Unit. After it has been certified okay 
by Audit Unit it is then sent to the e-payment office which is under the Treasury Division. In 
addition, the e-payment office will raise the mandate schedule, which is sent to Final 
Accounts which will check the e-payment, the payee, the account details, the amount and 
purpose of the money.  The interviewee mentioned that if all the documentation is certified 
correct it is then passed to the Director of Finance and Investment who passes same to the ES 
after vetting to seek final approval for release of funds to the benefitting institution via e- 
payment by the bank, (Interviewee G) 
Identified in discourses on corruption are the issues of authorisation and signatories and this 
were raised with Interviewee G who pointed out that there are two categories of signatories: 
A and B: Category A is made up of the Executive Secretary and the Director of Corporate 
Planning while category B is the Director of Finance and Director of Project Management. 
The interviewee also noted that no payment can be made by the bank without any one of the 
signatories on category A endorsing the payment. This process is to ensure accountability 
and control, (Interviewee G) 
The researcher also examined how the money disbursed by the Fund and its beneficiaries 
were monitored. Interviewee O noted:  
Our external auditors do. They go to our beneficiaries; they open book of 
accounts to check if the money we disbursed to beneficiaries have been used 
for what was accounted for. Also, the office of the Accountant General of 
the Federation also monitors this money every year on our behalf. Even last 
year there was a query from the Accountant General’s Office that some of 
the money given to the beneficiaries was not judiciously used. The External 
Auditors also check our own accounts internally on a yearly basis. 
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To ensure probity and accountability, the Fund as a matter of policy decided that benefiting 
institutions must have dedicated accounts for all its disbursements to them. This is to avoid a 
situation where disbursements are deployed wrongly. These dedicated accounts are usually 
monitored by the staff of the relevant Departments and Units of the Fund and appropriate 
External Financial Consultants. Such Consulting Firms as well as those involved in 
monitoring projects must use Professionals that are registered with their respective 
Professional bodies for the purposes of sanctions in the event of collusions or Professional 
misbehaviour. At such monitoring the cash flow and account balances of the Institutions are 
matched against the implementation stages of the various projects to ensure that funds have 
been judiciously used. Similarly, the Fund has a dedicated account in the Central Bank for all 
education tax collections (as mentioned in earlier), which has provided a platform for 
avoiding diversion of collections to other areas or misallocation of funds from the Federation 
Account.   
 The Fund does not award contracts and its interventions are need- driven.  This is perhaps 
the first of its kind in the history of interventions in Nigeria. The beneficiaries award the 
contracts for their various projects through their internal systems, but the minutes of the 
meetings of relevant authorising organs have to be sent to the Fund in respect of each project, 
and duly endorsed by the Chairman of the Council of the Institution and the Registrar who is 
the Secretary of the Governing Council of the Institution. This further reinforces the point 
that all the intervention projects of the Fund are need-driven as they are identified by the 
beneficiaries based on their needs and never forced on them. By allowing the beneficiaries 
award contracts through their internal processes, tensions and expectations on the Fund have 
been considerably reduced. Furthermore, this gives the beneficiaries a sense of responsibility 
as they decide what they want to use their funds for, based on their needs -as long as these 
are consistent with the mandate and guidelines of the Fund. Similarly, it allowed for 
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participation of the various benefiting institutional Communities in decision making 
processes in respect of what projects to be executed with the Funds interventions.  The role 
of the Fund is to disburse, monitor the utilization of funds released and the projects and 
ensure that there is not only value for money, but also value to the core academic areas of 
need in the projects being executed. The Fund has a chain of guidelines and time lines in its 
project cycles for beneficiaries. Because of this policy the Fund does not have any abandoned 
project in any of its benefiting institutions. It only has delays in deploying projects which are 
occasioned by factors external to and beyond its control. Since the public knows that 
contracts for interventions are not awarded by the Fund the pressure on it is significantly 
reduced. It has also enshrined transparency and accountability as it is easier for the benefiting 
institutions to go through the due process themselves at the Bureau for Procurement than it 
would have been if the Fund was to pursue this for all its beneficiaries. In a way, it has also 
promoted efficient and effective service delivery and timeliness in the completion of projects. 
This policy has earned the Fund a lot of respect and confidence across the country (including 
the tax payers). 
The above are part of the Funds strategic management methods and approaches geared 
towards transparency and accountability and it also allows various beneficiaries claim 
ownership of their projects. However, in awarding the contracts for the projects and 
executing, them all guidelines of public procurements and other guidelines outlined by the 
Fund must be strictly adhered to.  These have helped in reducing expectations from the 
public and the various interest groups in Nigeria since they know that the Fund does not 
award contracts. In comparison to other interventionist agencies of government, both past 
and present, where there exist pressures for contracts; in the case of TETFund this problem is 
non-existent.  
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Quarterly publications in the Fund’s in-house Magazine, and in National Print Media, have 
helped in terms of the Fund’s accounting to the Public and making the beneficiaries also 
accountable. Unlike a situation where in-house magazines are only used to publicize 
activities of agencies, the Funds magazine includes all disbursements to institutions, all level 
of beneficiaries capacity utilization and un-accessed funds as a result of low capacity 
utilization, the total disbursements in a given year,  a summary of disbursements of the year 
to individual institutions, a summary of disbursements to all institutions in all Federal and 
State owned institutions in each State of the Federation as well as list of defaulting 
beneficiaries. This has not only provided information on the Fund’s activities but also make 
the Management of the various institutions held responsible by members of their individual 
Communities for any low capacity utilization.  
Another strategy which has helped the Fund avoid delays is that individual benefitting 
institutions must seek approval themselves from the due process office for their contracts 
before they are awarded. 
Another important aspect of strategic management used by the Fund is through regular 
annual disbursements which have ensured continuity in implementation as long as the 
beneficiaries met laid down procedures. The Fund’s collections are not appropriated but 
approved by the President and so there are no delays like if they were to come through 
budgetary allocations which would have to be appropriated and approved by various arms of 
Government. This has also helped a great deal as monies meant for disbursements or 
disbursed by the Fund are not mopped up at the end of the year for return to the Central 
Bank. 
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In finding out whether there has been money missing, or things done with the Fund’s money 
outside the law, Interviewee G noted that there has not been any case of missing 
disbursements and the Agency does not operate outside its mandate.  
Questions were also raised about when disbursement of funds to the benefiting 
institutions commenced, it was gathered from the comments from Interviewee O that 
the disbursement started in 1999. However, prior to that the collections between 1994 
and 1999, when disbursements of funds to beneficiaries commenced, were stashed in an 
ETF dedicated account in the Central Bank (Interviewee O). 
Although the Fund was established in 1993, collection did not commence until 1994. 
However, disbursement as mentioned above started in 1999 (as mentioned above); the 
interviewer raised the question on why this was so. Interviewee G retorted that this was due 
to the fact that there was no Board of Trustees in place. In fact, the 1st Board was constituted 
in 1998 by Abacha despite the fact that the Secretariat had been put in place and Directors for 
the Fund recruited in 1996 by the Federal Ministry of Education (Interviewee G). 
Furthermore, the researcher explored the procurement process within the Fund, following the 
introduction of the Public Procurement Act, 2007. Interviewee D mentioned that the 
procurement activities of the Fund are basically linked to the Public Procurement Act that 
stipulates what the responsibilities are, and we have to go by them.  Due to the fact that 
procurement is based on selection process, in particular the selection of contractors or 
vendors, or consultants for either goods and works or services as the case may be, the agency 
followed processes which are in line with the procurement Act 2007, (Interviewee D).  
The researcher explored what was in place before the introduction of the Procurement Act 
2007, to establish whether this was in response to issues of corruption. Interviewee F 
observed that before the advent of the Procurement Act in 2007 in the Country, procurement 
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was almost like open trading. For instance, a supplier would have been asked to give a 
quotation and the Agency would decide whether or not to purchase an item, within the limit 
set for each category. Some procurement that was not up to N2 million was normally done 
without any advertisement and at least three quotations or more would have been obtained 
before any purchase is made from a supplier. However, following the introduction of the 
Procurement Act, there are processes that stipulate which procedure the agency followed, 
(Interviewee D). The Procurement Act is geared towards ensuring transparency and reducing 
favouritism. However, even before the Act, the agency had had some procedures in place to 
promote transparency and accountability.  
In addition, the policy of the Fund on disbursements that requires beneficiaries to account for 
funds disbursed to them before further disbursements are made to them have made it easier 
for the Fund to ensure transparency. At first, it was strange to most beneficiaries, because it 
was ‘no more business as usual’. The names of defaulting institutions were published in 
newspapers -to not only shame them, but to let the public know of their actions. With this, it 
was easy for the public to understand the reasons why further funding has not been provided 
to these defaulting institutions.  
The waves of reform at the time of Obasanjo’s administration (1999 - 2007) also created an 
environment conducive for beneficiaries to embrace transparency and accountability 
entrenched in the Funds operations.  Similarly, the anti-corruption stance of the Fund which 
was strengthened by the anti-corruption agencies presentations on anti-corruption to 
beneficiaries at the Fund’s annual Strategic Planning Workshops with beneficiaries sent 
signals to the beneficiaries to enhance and embrace change. 
Similarly, the Fund in its drive for entrenching transparency and accountability in the 
utilization of its disbursements to institutions engaged with the various Unions of the 
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benefiting institutions with a view to briefing them on its activities, details of its 
disbursements and backlogs of disbursements to institutions. This has kept the Management 
of these institutions in check in terms of ensuring that funds disbursed to them are judiciously 
utilized to enable them draw on further disbursements. This is illustrative in view of the fact 
that one of these unions ASUU was instrumental in the creation of the Fund, and as such 
would do all that is necessary in their various institutions to ensure that transparency and 
accountability were upheld while utilizing TETFund disbursements.  
The commitment of the Fund to transparency and accountability is also acknowledged by one 
of the top policy makers in the supervisory Ministry who noted that the Board of Trustees, 
Executive Secretary and the entire Fund have guaranteed that transparency and accountability 
exists in its operation, (Interviewee S). 
5.6.2 Organisational Environment  
Within this framework of analysis, the environment can be classified as a more ‘immediate’ 
context (the here and now) and context itself connotes the broader context- that is, an object 
of undetermined extension. Invariably, context is more than the organisational environment; 
it extends to other broader fabrics of the society in which an organisation operates, (see, e.g. 
Ferlie and Ongaro, 2015). Therefore, the broader context is important to understanding an 
organisational behaviour because that is where action takes place, (see, e.g. Ferlie and 
Ongaro, 2015). 
As organisations are generally open systems, environmental forces can impact on the 
performance of agencies. Within this contextual framework, the onus is on the Managers to 
monitor the environment by seeking to tap aspects of it for organizational purposes or buffer 
organizational production processes from it (O’Toole and Meier, 2013). According to Osborn 
and Hunt (1972), the environment of a given organization consists of all those organizations 
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with which it must interact to grow and survive, (cited in O’Toole and Meier, 2013).  Indeed, 
the environment - whether it consists of many or few elements - influences the management 
and performance of an agency. With TETFund, it can be said that as the Fund did embrace 
reforms so too did all the Public Agencies in Nigeria and its supervisory Ministry, as well as 
those of its beneficiaries which are all Public Tertiary Institutions. This is because of the 
political commitment on Government’s part towards reforming the public service in Nigeria. 
It is known that complexity, turbulence and munificence are some of the dimensions of 
environmental contexts. Complexity is about the degree of homogeneity/heterogeneity and 
concentration/dispersion of the environment. The argument here is that the more different 
kinds of organizations occupy a public agency’s environment, the more complex it is. The 
more dispersed, rather than concentrated, these other organizations are, the more separate 
organizations that are clearly relevant to the core organization’s task, the more complex is the 
core organization’s environment, (O’Toole and Meir, 2013). According to Andrews (2009), 
greater environmental complexity is associated with lower organisational performance. 
O’Toole and Meir (2013) argue similarly that the more complex an organization’s 
environment, the more managerial effort we would expect is devoted to managing outward. 
With TETFund, the environment is not complex in that the enabling Acts of the Regulatory 
Agencies that relate with the Fund do not give powers of sanctions over it other than to 
submit reports to the Executive and Legislative Arms of Government on the activities of the 
Fund, and where issues are raised the Fund responds appropriately. 
According to Aldrich (1979), turbulence relates to externally driven changes that are 
obscure to administrators and difficult to plan for. Indeed, turbulences entail uncertainty; 
rapid changes that are completely unpredictable, and this can affect operations of an 
agency or organization to a great extent, (e.g. Andrews, 2008). Munificence entails the 
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availability of resources to the various arms of Government and Central Agencies that 
relate to another public organization in a given context. In the case of TETFund, there are 
no problems with resources in terms of budgeting and budgetary allocations that could 
impede on its performance. 
As discussed previously, the Fund does not rely on budgetary allocation from the Federal 
Government, as with other Agencies in Nigeria. As stated previously, the Fund derives its 
funding from the 2% education tax on all accessible profit collected by the FIRS from all 
registered companies in Nigeria. As Interviewee M noted:  
The law establishing the Fund is very clear and it has indicated how funds 
should be disbursed so the Fund is not supposed to be subjected to the 
National Assembly. Because the law has stipulated how allocations should 
be done by the Fund so there was no need for the National Assembly 
appropriating any fund to it again.  The education tax by law should be 
allocated and disbursed by the Board based on equality amongst states 
and geo-political zones. But the National Assembly felt that it is their 
constitutional duty to appropriate funds that are coming from the 
Federation Account, (Interviewee M) (as quoted above) 
Unlike some other agencies, the Fund is allowed, by its enabling Act, to invest its collections 
in appropriate and safe securities. Profits derived from such are then ploughed back into the 
dedicated account of the Fund, for further disbursement to beneficiaries.  For example, in 
Tanzania, Pollitt and Talbot (2003) noted that the reform took place in an environment of 
weak fiscal control. The release of budgeted funds to Ministries was problematic. Indeed, the 
unpredictability of resource flow from the Treasury impacts on both vocational and 
operational efficiency of an agency, (Pollitt and Talbot, 2003). 
Mentioned in the section on the organisational environmental context, is how broader context 
is central to understanding organisational behaviour. The argument here is that the more 
different kinds of organizations occupy a public agency’s environment, the more complex it 
is. According to O’Toole and Meir (2013), the more dispersed, rather than concentrated these 
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organizations are, the more separate organizations that a clearly relevant to the core 
organization’s task and the more complex is the core organization’s environment.  
As mentioned earlier this is not the case with TETFund. As already discussed in above, 
TETFund collaborates with a range of Federal Ministries and Agencies as well as the 
National Assembly and this has been explored in relation to structural disaggregation and 
autonomy. The Fund operates within a framework that is far from complex. The Tertiary 
Education Fund Act (2011) has provided a clear vision, goal and mission for the Agency and 
as a result, friction has been clearly reduced. 
Strategic Fora for Interactions 
Strategic management is important to understanding the behaviour and operations of a public 
organisation or agency, like the TETFund. In attempt to unravel whether there are strategic 
management initiatives in place within the Fund, various questions were asked, and 
information was sort from documents.  
Interviewer J was asked whether there exist Strategic Plans for the operations of the Fund 
and in response the comment below was made:  
Well there has been a plan in the sense that everything is working according to 
the plan, whether you call it strategic or not is another matter, but I tried in 2008 
to insist that the beneficiaries must submit a five-year strategic plan and a two-
year operational plan. I remember when xxxxx was the Director of Operations, I 
introduced it and then we even developed the template and gave the Universities, 
Polytechnics and Colleges of Education. But very few responded. You need the 
plan so that it is not when money comes, or money becomes available that you 
begin to think about what to do with it. For instance, over the next 10 years if you 
know you are going to get about N50million or N10milion from the Fund, you can 
have your strategic plan because you know that the money will come and the 
good thing with TETFund intervention is that unlike the National Budget the 
money is not mopped up at the end of the year. So, you are sure about the time 
you receive your letter of allocation, the money is in the kitty in the Central Bank. 
So we insisted that institutions have a five-year strategic plan in their own 
interest. For example, if a V.C or Rector or Provost is appointed for a period of 4 
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or 5 years as the case may be, there should be some vision, something that you 
will want to do within the 5-year period and therefore you should look at the 
basket of funds available from the National Budget, the internally generated 
revenue, intervention agencies, Alumni support, endowments etc so that you can 
have a strategic plan. My plan from TETFund intervention is to improve the 
teaching and learning environment so that no student sits on the floor at lectures 
and no student hangs on the windows and no science student goes into an empty 
laboratory, so we insisted that there has to be this kind of strategic plan.  
 
Public Relations and Corporate Planning Strategic Management initiatives were also 
introduced and mainstreamed into the operations and activities of the Fund. The Fund 
decided that to make its activities known to all beneficiaries, stakeholders, taxpayers and the 
general public decided to create fora for engagement of various interest groups. At such, 
meetings the intended interventions of the Fund in a given year and the allocations both new 
and, in the past, are spelt out. Similarly, at such meetings the Fund outlines its challenges and 
any perceived threats to its existence as a body. It also listens to feedback from all in respect 
of its interventions with a view to reviewing some or explaining rationale behind some of its 
policies or strategies. Example of such fora is: 
i) Yearly Strategic Planning Workshops with beneficiaries 
ii) Taxpayers Forum 
iii) Annual meetings with the leadership of the benefiting institutions and 
briefings at the National Congresses of the various Unions of these 
Institutions.  
iv) Zonal meetings with beneficiaries where exhibitions of their various 
projects with pictures and programmes implemented with TETFund 
interventions are displayed and explained to the general public and the 
media 
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v) Presence of the Fund in both the electronic and print media via interviews, 
jingles, adverts, documentaries etc. 
Top government functionaries, Politicians from the National Assembly, Captains of 
industries, Government Anti-Corruption Agencies like EFCC and ICPC etc., are also invited 
to these meetings to keep them abreast of the activities of the Fund in respect of promoting 
transparency and accountability.  
The Fund ensured that it established a strong collaborative relationship with the regulatory 
bodies of government like the Federal Inland Revenue Service charged with the 
responsibilities of tax collection and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Monitoring and 
Reconciliations of tax collections with the FIRS and the Central Bank have been a very 
important strategic tool employed by the Fund in ensuring that all records of collections are 
accurate, and collections are paid into the Funds account in the Central Bank as appropriate. 
In order to encourage the Federal Inland Revenue Service towards this initiative which is an 
ad hoc assignment, the Fund decided to pay some percentage of the collections from such a 
tax drive to the service. The Fund agreed on a fixed rate of 4% of the total collection, 
(Interviewee H). For instance, in 1999 the Fund had N10 billion as education tax collection 
and grew to N18 billion in 2002 and currently the total collection is around N183 billion 
annually (Interviewee O). 
To create impact through its interventions, the Fund strategically resisted including private 
institutions amongst its beneficiaries. The demand for this was opposed by the Fund at 
various levels within and outside government. The Fund received the support of the 
Academic Staff Unions of benefiting institutions and the National Assembly, which refused 
the enlistment of private tertiary institutions as its beneficiaries in the Amended Act of 2011. 
In a recent interview, the Executive Secretary noted that including private institutions would 
jeopardise the focus of the Agency. The Executive Secretary further added that the 
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government had been creating the enabling environment for private institutions to flourish as 
such there was no need to include them as beneficiaries of TETFund. The Executive 
Secretary further added:  
Our law is very clear in terms of their funding intervention; the private sector 
is privately owned. In reality that is in terms of demographic reality in Nigeria. 
In the education sector, the public tertiary institutions constitute a glaring 
majority. It constitutes the majority in terms of student population. If you take 
it out there you will discover that put together in terms of members the private 
tertiary institutions especially universities, have caught up, they are almost 
equal in numbers now with public tertiary universities. But by population I can 
tell you that the public tertiary institutions constitute more than three quarters 
of the population. So that tells you that the majority is there. And it has to do 
with the funding review and government intervention is aimed at doing the best 
for the largest segment of the population. Taking the demographic realities of 
Nigeria into consideration, we are in the right direction in funding public 
tertiary institutions. I don’t see it as funding the private sector in the real sense 
of it. Not funding the private sector but subsidizing it. We should use the word 
subsidizing the private sector. For example, the children of the less privileged 
are almost exclusively in the public tertiary institutions and this is a statement 
of fact. Nobody can contradict it. In this country, the privately owned tertiary 
institutions charge excessively and children of those people that earn N10, 000 
per month are not in these institutions. So, these are part of the demographic 
realities I’m talking about. I really don’t want to dwell on these issues. I know 
that these are demographic realities (Bogoro, 2015). 
 
For the Fund to grow its collections, it invests by buying Federal government bonds and 
making placements in selected and viable Commercial Banks. This has helped strategically 
in ‘growing’ collections as profits from these investments are ploughed into its account in the 
Central Bank. Such profits at the end of each year are reflected as earnings by the Fund in its 
audited accounts.  
The Fund has set up a stabilisation Fund in the Central Bank which is serviced with at least 
five per cent of the annual intervention budget of the Fund to take care of eventualities like 
drop in tax collections, the bulk of which are derived from oil based and communication 
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companies whose profits are dependent on prices in international markets and during national 
emergencies that might require the Funds intervention, and which fall within its mandate.   
In addition, the Fund has managed to remove a great deal of pressure on itself by 
strategically dealing with institutions only, rather than individuals. For instance, it neither 
deals with individual contractors handling its funded projects nor individual staff of 
benefiting institutions on its staff training and development programmes.  
An important aspect of strategic management deployed by the Fund is through regular annual 
disbursements which have ensured continuity in implementation as long as the beneficiaries 
met the laid down procedures of the Fund. The Funds collections are not appropriated, but 
approved, by the President and so there are no delays like if they were to come through 
budgetary allocations which would have to be appropriated and approved by various arms of 
government. This has also helped a great deal as monies meant for disbursements or 
disbursed by the Fund are not mopped up at the end of the year for return to the Central 
Bank. 
To meet expectations and responsibilities of the Fund, Management decided to invest in 
Human Resources as it applies to its employees. Such investments have been in the area of 
staff training and retraining within and outside the Country. For instance, Interviewee A 
commented that the Fund has development programmes for its members of staff who want to 
pursue Ph.D, Masters, Higher Diploma and National Diploma and first Degree programmes. 
This is supported by annual budgetary allocation every year. There is also the strategic staff 
training and development policy in the areas of short courses for officers from levels 10 and 
those who have spent at least five years in the service of the Fund. Even junior members of 
staff are sent for local trainings regularly, (Interviewee A).  
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The statement above by Interviewee A on staff development and training was corroborated 
by Interviewee E, who categorised the issue into two categories. The first category is that the 
vision and mission of the Fund is to have highly competent staff, and this can only be 
achieved through investment in staff training and re-training both within and outside the 
country. The second category covers the idea of sponsorship of staff for post graduate studies 
abroad.  
With the knowledge of time and space in strategic management, the interviewer raised this 
question with the Project Management Department Staff. Interviewee L note that the Fund 
operated a time limit according to project time, because it would have been very difficult to 
assign the same time space to the vetting of a building proposal or library procurement or a 
book proposal. For instance, the time spent on vetting books, depending on the list of books, 
may be such that one required twenty-four hours work which equates to about three working 
days yet, a building presented on ten sheets of drawing could be vetted in a shorter time. The 
flexibility of our system did not allow the excessive bureaucracy of having to wait for an 
absent officer for an action to be taken. In fact, most of our processes were project-driven and 
on the basis of which line staff were available to treat. For instance, if proposals came in 
from a beneficiary, for the development of laboratory and a level of authority in the decision-
making process proved to be absent on, say, a field trip, what usually happened was that 
somebody else would sign for the line authority so that the file would move forward, and the 
project would be attended to, and executed, on time. So as much as possible, we maintained 
something very in between the traditional hierarchy of organisations and a flat organisation, 
(Interviewee L).  
Indeed, the selection and tenure of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees since the inception 
of Civilian Administration in Nigeria has helped to stabilize the Fund. Although this relates 
to steering and control, it has set a precedent for the strategic positioning of the Fund.  Since 
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1999, when the 2nd BOT was appointed, the Fund has only had two Chairmen heading the 
different Boards. The Chairman of the 2nd Board served out a two term of eight years with all 
her original Board members. The 3rd Chairman of the Board was reappointed for another 
term of four years after the expiration of his tenure, but with the replacements in the original 
members of the Board appointed along with him. The personalities of these chairpersons and 
the continuity of their tenure unlike frequent changes of other Boards of Agencies in Nigeria, 
have helped the Fund in no small measure. While the Chairman of the 2nd Board was an 
astute technocrat with several years of experience on financial and Board politics and a 
renowned Chartered accountant with direct access to the President, the current Chairman has 
several years of banking experience at top management level and was in recent past a 
National official of the ruling party in Nigeria. They both brought their individual 
personalities, experiences and contacts to bear positively on the Fund. This is supported by 
the point made by Interviewee X who noted that the 1st Board was Chaired by a Professor 
with experience in University administration and structure. The second Chairman was a 
chartered accountant chosen because of her pedigree in the field of political connections. We 
had little or no problem on so many of her projects, in terms of obtaining approval from 
government. The 3rd Board was headed by xxxxx, a seasoned administrator and a Ph.D. 
holder who was able to combine his experience with academics, banking and politics, 
thereby giving the Fund the needed cloud to carry out its programs and projects. Because of 
their performance, when all Boards of all government agencies were dissolved in Nigeria, the 
Board was recalled to complete its tenure.  After the completion the first four years of their 
tenure, the Chairman was reappointed but other members on the Board dropped and replaced 
by new ones. 
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The interviewer probed interviewee X further whether the Personality of the Chairman of the 
Board of Trustees and the Members of the Board affect the general administration and 
management of the Fund, interviewer X noted:   
I don’t know about personality. But what I can say for a definite unlike what 
is happening now we didn’t have a Board full of politicians. We had mostly 
technocrats, teachers and professionals. Like the Board was chaired by a 
professional lady an accountant, a chartered accountant. So we didn’t have 
issues with politicians and their antics and their intrigues. The Board 
operated almost independent of other influences and also allowed 
Management free hands so long as we are always reporting back to the 
Board on steps we are taking, our limitation processes and so on. We 
definitely had a fantastic Board. 
 
Although the above describes the strategic management initiatives of the Fund, nonetheless 
the narratives on agencification and TETFund have embedded in them elements of strategic 
management. 
5.6.3. Internal Context 
Internal organisational context can impact significantly on the success of policy interventions 
and reforms.  Three key elements of context are important to internal organisation: goal; 
hierarchy/ centralisation, and, professionalization. Rainey (2009) notes that organisations are 
goal-oriented collectives and they exist to achieve some expressed purpose, although these 
goals can often be ambiguous. According to O’Toole and Meier (2013), such goal ambiguity 
can arise from two main sources, which is goal conflict and inherent ambiguity in some 
goals. Public organisations have multiple masters and these masters - particularly when 
political power is not concentrated - can have conflicting goals for organisations, (O’Toole 
and Meir, 2013). The conflict of goals can affect the performance of an organisation. With 
the TETFund, there is no conflict in the goals of the Fund as the enabling Act is clear on this. 
This informed restricting intervention to tertiary institutions.  
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Hierarchy/centralisation is an important element of internal organisational context. In relation 
to TETFund, the roles of the BOT and the Management are clearly spelt out in its enabling 
Act - so there are no conflicts. According to O’Toole and Meir (2013), the degree of 
hierarchy and centralisation affect both where management will matter in the organisation 
and also the form that management will take.   
Professionalism as an internal context is important in any public sector organisation, as it is 
upon this that successes and failures are pinned. Professionalism also impacts on external 
work. Mosher (1982) argues that public service is both professionalised and has itself 
become a profession. Unlike other countries where civil servants were transferred to agencies 
as a result of reforms, the TETFund members of staff   during the tenure of the 2nd BOT were 
recruited through competitive means from both the public and private sectors, by an 
independent consulting firm, Arthur Andersen Consulting but subsequently by other 
reputable consulting firms and in-house panels on behalf of the Board of Trustees. The 
members of staff of TETFund are public servants and the Board of Trustees introduced some 
incentives and allowances which made service in the Fund attractive to professionals from 
both the private and public sector.  This is in variance to the practice in Countries such as 
Tanzania, where most of the staff in the created agencies resulted from reform initiatives 
making them Civil Servants drawn from Ministries and other Departments and Agencies. 
Indeed, goals, hierarchy and professionalism are all key elements of the internal organisation 
of context that can impact on management and performance, on the one hand, and on the 
success of reforms on the other hand.  
O’Toole and Meir (2013) note that there are three key elements of context which are 
important to internal organisation: goals, hierarchy/centralisation and professionalization (as 
discussed in section 6.1.3). Figure 1 represents the management structure of the TET Fund, 
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(as detailed in the Chapter Five). The researcher explored the Fund’s behaviour in terms of 
its goals, hierarchy and professionalization.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Organisational Structure of the TET Fund 
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An organisation must have a goal and vision for it to fulfil its mandate. This was 
explored in the data collection process as represented in the following interview. 
Interviewee C noted:   
The ETF, now the TETFund, was conceived as an Intervention Agency. It was never 
conceived of as an alternative proprietor to do everything in the Institutions that it 
intervenes in.  In other words, the Government was making resources available and 
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from the available resources government was supposed to take care of the 
Institutions it established. In the case of Nigeria, we operate a Federal system, the 
States and the Federal Governments have Universities and therefore they are the 
proprietors to provide for these Institutions. But the TETFund was established to 
assist in specific areas, basically, physically infrastructure for teaching and 
learning, learning resources and capacity building especially the post graduate 
training of academic staff. Beyond that, other matters like municipal facilities and 
hostel accommodation and what have you were are supposed to be handled by the 
proprietors. So, we provided assistance to the proprietors. 
 
The process of attainment of the agency goal came up in the interview. This is imperative in 
the sense that the agency has evolved considerable over the years. Interviewee B observed:  
What the Fund has been trying to do over the years is to bring about the reforms in 
all aspects of our operations. Every year we did a retreat whereby we looked at 
how we had performed and saw where we can do better. For example, we 
intervened in the area of academic staff training and development as well 
Research. A department was handling both aspects of our operations along with 
other related activities. After appraising our performance over time in this regard 
it was decided that there was need to split the department into two namely:  
Education Support Services and Academic staff training and development to meet 
the expanding demands as the quantum of work in these areas of our intervention 
has increased tremendously. We have sponsored close to about nine thousand 
academic staff to various Universities in the world for their Masters and Ph.D.s 
within a few years on embarking on these area of interventions. 
Interviewee F noted: 
The Fund has changed its name from ETF to the TETFund. This is part of our re-
focusing on our mandate. When we were ETF, we were intervening in projects and 
programmes of the entire education sector and the resources available were thinly 
spread in a manner that will not make positive impact. It also amounted to 
duplication of efforts because we had other government agencies that were 
intervening in the same subsector as we were doing. For example, the Universal 
Basic Education and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - were intervening in 
primary and secondary subsector of education in Nigeria along with our own 
interventions. So, with the change in mandate and name to TETFund, our 
operations have been streamlined as we will now have to intervene only at the 
tertiary level of education in Nigeria.   
 
Interviewee T noted: 
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From the beginning, the Fund was just small, but gradually it started expanding.  
As at the time the whole staff were not up to 30, but now we are about three 
hundred, so you see that it is growing, so also the work.   It then became necessary 
for change from the way we were doing things from the beginning and now that 
things are growing fast.  
 
It was important to also explore how the internal organisation has changed over the years, in 
particular the creation of new Departments.  Interviewee T observed that there have been 
changes over time and now we have about eight Departments with some other specialized 
Units under the Office of the Executive Secretary. For example, at inception it was five, later 
on it was increased to about eight and we may have more depending on needs. Therefore, the 
Departments were created out of needs, (Interviewee T). 
Interviewee F also noted that there are now additional (new) departments and this was 
informed by the core mandate and functions of the Fund as specified in its enabling Act. The 
Fund has seen an expansion in the scope of its interventions as its new mandate includes 
among others Academic Staff Training and Development, Research Funding, Library 
Development, Conference Attendance, (Interviewee F). 
 
The Fund, at inception, started with five Departments namely: Departments of Finance, 
Management and Legal services, Corporate Affairs, Project Management, and Monitoring 
and Evaluation.  Following the reforms by the 2nd BOT, the structure of the Fund was 
streamlined into four Departments: Administration and Personnel, Finance, Fund 
Generations, and Operations, while the Corporate Affairs Department became Public 
Relations Unit, (initially under Administration and Personnel and later under the Executive 
Secretary’s Office). In addition, Audit and Legal Units were also created under Executive 
Secretary’s Office. This was followed by another restructuring by the same Board after 
reviewing its activities and programmes as follows: Department of Administration and 
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Procurement which had four Divisions under it - Personnel, General Services, Pension and 
Insurance, Procurement Division; Department of Finance and Accounts had three Divisions 
namely Management Accounts, Final Accounts, Treasury and Investment; Department of 
Planning Research and Assessment which  had three Divisions namely, Strategic Planning, 
Revenue, Evaluation and Impact Assessment; and finally Department of Operations which 
had three Divisions namely, Technical Education, Projects, Registry and Documentation. The 
development described above can be seen as part of the strategic management initiatives of 
the Fund towards meeting its obligations to its beneficiaries and the general public.  
Presently, there are eleven Departments created on the basis of necessity, in view of the 
various programmes introduced by the Fund as part of its interventions, (see Figure 1). 
Clearly, this shows that the Fund is responsive to the needs of the |Tertiary Education Sub 
Sector in the line Federal Government’s vision of Nigeria becoming one of the top 20 
economies in the world in the year 2020. This corroborates what Interviewee T mentioned. 
An assessment of the performance of the agency was provided by Interviewee A: 
 The TETFund today is an Agency of the future.  It is one of Nigeria’s export 
brands. It is one of the most successful and most outstanding public institutions 
in Nigeria. We took the awards in 2011, 2012 and in 2013 we came second, 
but we took the 1st position for accountability and integrity, because we are the 
only public institution in Nigeria today that has an audited 2012 account. So 
these are the major milestones in the history of the Fund. The award on 
transparency and integrity is much more important than any other award for 
an institution that is charged with the responsibility of managing huge volume 
of financial resources. That is our pride. That is what makes our Fund an 
export brand for this country. It is an export brand I said primarily because 
the Ghanaians came, they copied our model. Ghana today has the GAET 
Fund, Sierra Leone has also established their version of TETFund and the 
education authority of Tanzania came to study TETFund and now they have 
Tanzania Education Trust Fund. We have exported our brand to the West 
Coast. We say it without any fear of contradiction that the TETFund is one of 
the foremost interventionist agencies in the educational sector - not only in 
Nigeria and Africa, but probably in the whole World.  We have disbursed to 
date more than N600billion in the last three years alone towards our 
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revitalisation of our decayed infrastructure in all the 3 levels that I had 
mentioned. 
 We have embarked from 2010 to date on one of the most imaginative capacity 
building initiative in the history of Nigeria’s educational system. Our 
academic staff training and development programme to date has over 8,610 
scholars studying for the Master’s and Doctorate degrees across the world. 
We have invested so far, N32billion on this programme alone. Over 1000 of 
our scholars have completed their Doctorate or Master Degrees programme 
and have returned to their respective institutions adding value to knowledge 
and scholarship. Over 13,000 academics have attended conferences both in 
Nigeria and abroad. We have funded over 12,000 workshops for academics 
both outside and within the Nigerian nation. I have talked to you about the 
researches that have recently been funded. Under our book initiative, we have 
developed into books 8 Ph.D. thesis and presently the University of Ibadan 
press is rolling out 32,000 volumes of such books for distribution free of 
charge to all the tertiary institutions in Nigeria. 
Prior to 2010, we had only two professional academic journals in Nigeria that 
were considered and approved as reference materials for our scholars and 
other users of Nigerian educational extraction materials worldwide. To date 
we have funded additional 100. So, 100 new professional journals have been 
funded by us and now back into our book shops, back into our libraries 
nationwide and we are doing more.  
 Currently, in our efforts to enhance the level of quality of teacher education, 
we embarked on the construction and equipping of 61 academic micro 
teaching laboratories in all the 60 Federal and State-owned Colleges of 
Education nationwide. These projects have reached an advanced state.  We 
are 70 to 95 per cent confident that we have reached our completion level. 
 
Indeed, as mentioned previously the vision and mission of the Fund is clear and the degree of 
professionalism is high in view of the fact the Fund, during the 2nd Board (which re-
organised the Fund), recruited qualified staff through competitive exercises handled by 
consultants. The government resolve on public sector reforms in Nigeria after the 2009 
created the right environment for the TETFund interventions to succeed. All government 
MDAs were galvanised towards embracing the reforms of government both at the central 
government and agency levels. The commitment and professionalism of the Fund was also 
acknowledged by the beneficiaries. For instance, Interviewee R noted that the agency’s 
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interventions have moved his institution forward and this is also enhanced by the fact that 
there is a purposeful interaction between the agency and the institutions in particular, with 
supporting projects and other key areas of interventions.  
5.7. Summary of Findings on Contexual Issues  
“An institution public administration functions very much like such an open 
system, with one of the requisite functions being maintaining its boundary against 
those who would erode its role in governing and it capacities to perform its 
appropriate tasks, while at the same time also depending upon imports of energy 
(in this case personnel and budgets) from its relevant context,” (Peters, 2013, 
p101).  
 
As it has been discussed in detail above, contextual issues are important to understanding 
public policy interventions, as well as public administration reforms.  
In the part two of this chapter, the author used the work of O’Toole and Meir (2013), Pollitt 
and Bouchaert (2011) and Ferlie and Ongaro (2015) to explore the contextual issues in 
relation to the Tertiary Education Trust Fund.  
Firstly, it examined the political context in relation to the operations and behaviour of the 
Fund. The key points that can be identified in this section, drawing on the fieldwork and 
literature, are that there has been some degree of political interference and tension in relation 
to the functions and operations of the Fund. The dispersion of authority and power as detailed 
in the enabling Act functions at a vertical level. Corruption is not a major problem with the 
Fund.  
Secondly, the part also explored the environmental context, and this somewhat challenges the 
conventional presuppositions that an organisation which collaborates with a range of 
organisations can be affected by complexities, turbulence and munificence. However, in the 
case of the TETFund, environmental contexts have not been a major problem. This is 
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because the government initiated sweeping reforms that were adhered to by politicians, 
public officers and citizens, possibly as a result of prior long periods of military regimes (see 
Chapter One).  
Thirdly, the internal context argument was explored in relation to the TETFund.  The finding 
shows that the Fund has clear goals which were implemented, based on the needs of the 
beneficiaries and in line with the mandate of the Fund. In terms of hierarchy, the agency was 
set up with a clear administrative structure, functions and responsibilities. In relation to 
professionalism, members of staff of the Fund were recruited from both the private and 
public sectors, based on competitive selection processes. Even the few members of staff that 
were seconded from the Federal Ministry of Education at the inception of the Fund had to go 
through the same process of selection before they were absorbed into the service of the Fund.  
The next chapter will provide a conclusion to this research, drawing on range of themes, 
theoretical arguments, concepts and analysis that have been explored in the previous 
chapters. The chapter, in addition, will revisit pertinent issues that came up in the course of 
the research in terms of contextual issues and the idea of agencification, (as detailed in 
section 7.2.) 
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
This thesis set out to answer two main research questions: first, to understand the behaviour 
of a New Public Management (NPM)-inspired agency in the context of a Developing 
Country, and, second, to explore the impact of New Public Management Reforms on Public 
Sector Management in Nigeria.  In order to answer the research questions, the following 
research objectives were set: first, to examine literature in order to establish the behaviour, 
principles and doctrines of NPM driven agency; second to detect the extent to which NPM 
doctrines have penetrated and shaped the organisational life of the organisation (TETFund), 
or rather have been factually rejected- albeit nominally adopted- as they are spurious to the 
organisation and its context; and third, to explore the mainstreaming of NPM into public 
sector management in Nigeria. 
 
Indeed, both NPM and NPM- agency continue to have impact on public sector management 
across the world, as detailed in the literature. In the process of scrutinising the literature, 
some interesting ideas were uncovered in relation to the emergence and introduction of NPM 
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reforms and creation of agencies across the world which is worth reiterating here.  Although, 
in different countries around the world, the power, size, functions and power of agencies 
vary, the reasons for its introduction are similar. According to McGauran et al. (2015, p4), 
the reasons for the growth in such agencies can be grouped into five factors namely: 
economic/efficiency reasons; changing societal expectations; political reasons; requirements 
for specialisation, and, isomorphic factors. In terms of economic/ efficiency reasons, it is 
argued that the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and the needless bureaucratic measures (defined as 
the clogged up’ in red tape) impacted on the functions of public sector. As such, NPM was 
seen as an effective tool to improve efficiency and revitalise the public sector.  Changes in 
societal expectations have been expressed in the form of the expectations of citizens in the 
form of delivery of goods and services. The idea of active citizens emerged at this point in 
time.  Political reasons given for the proliferation of agency has much to do with unbundling 
of civil service. The removal of the implementation of policy programmes from civil service 
bureaucracies (McGauran et al.., 2015, p4). It is also argued that this is to give politicians 
some sense of credibility and commitment to addressing a range of social issues confronting 
the society. According to Gains (2003), setting up an independent agency to deal with 
political ‘hot potatoes’ can help the political administration to deal with problematic policy 
areas without being seen as directly responsible for this (cited in McGauran et al.., 2015, p4).  
Another political reason offered is that by setting up agencies government can have more 
firm control over various programmes. In relation to requirements of specialisation, agency 
creation was seen as possessing a tool to address specialist issues, thereby freeing-up 
principal ministries. According to Talbot et al. (2000), this is a sort of functional 
specialisation, where policies on specific issues are handed over to agencies. According to 
McGuaran et al. (2014), isomorphic facts are based on the notion that, ‘everyone is doing it 
so why don’t we?’- This is called the, ‘mimetic isomorphism’ as if everyone is doing it, so 
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you must- the ‘normative isomorphism’ There is also the coercive isomorphism which 
focuses on how international organisations force countries to adopt the NPM style agency in 
order for them to receive support.  
 
Whilst the above are related to OECD and other Developed Countries, it is important to 
stress here that the above factors, which are exogenous and endogenous in nature, are, in fact, 
the reasons for the introduction of NPM and NPM agencies in Nigeria (as discussed in 
Chapter One and Chapter Two). What has been uncovered in the literature, is that Public 
Management Reforms are having marked impact across various countries in the world- and  
no Country is immune - whether they operate in an NPM or non-NPM setting. This can be 
associated with globalisation and the pursuit of neoliberal agendas which know no 
boundaries.  In the case of Nigeria, the NPM-driven reforms were introduced under different 
politico-administrative models. An important discovery, and contribution to knowledge, 
would be that the politico-administrative setting of a Country does not have direct bearing on 
whether an NPM-driven reform will work or not. However, the success of those reforms are 
shaped by contextual issues which in the case of Nigeria, has been covered in Chapter Six of 
this work 
One of the research questions is to examine the impact of New Public Management on public 
sector management in Nigeria. In Chapter Two, the concept of NPM was discussed. 
However, whilst in the case of Nigeria, it did not follow a particular format as detailed in the 
literature, it is worth noting that the impact could be seen in the various public sector reforms 
embarked upon from the 1990s through to 2005. For instance, the Dotun Phillips Panel of 
1986 attempted to reform the civil service as part of the structural adjustment programme of 
government. The commission was set up to study the structure, staffing and operations of the 
federal civil service (Anazodo et al.., 2012). The recommendations of the Phillips panel 
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were: to enhance professionalism; to align with the presidential system of government; to 
decentralize and delegate; to combine authority with responsibility; to enhance 
accountability; to enhance checks and balances; to implement a general modernisation of the 
service, and, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency as well as speed of operation. What 
is clear is that the mandate is based on ‘coercive isomorphism’, that is, the influence of the 
International Monetary Fund. The language and the wording used are that of NPM.   The 
public-sector reforms from 1999- 2007 also had NPM settings embedded within.  For 
instance, in 2003, National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 
was established. It was a national strategy for public sector reforms that involved partnership 
working amongst Stakeholders, States and Local Governments, as well as the National 
Assembly. It was deemed as a pre-requisite to good governance, and sustainable National 
Development. As a macroeconomic framework, NEEDS has three main priorities: (1) job 
creation, provision of affordable housing, improving health care services, strengthening the 
skill base, protection of the vulnerable and promoting peace and security; ( 2) promoting and 
encouraging private enterprise by creating an enabling environment for business to thrive, 
stabilizing the value of the Naira, diversifying the economy to reduce dependency on oil, 
privatizing, de-regulating and liberalizing government-owned industries, developing 
infrastructure, improving agriculture and promoting other key sectors such as information 
and communications technologies, tourism, entertainment and financial services, protect the 
environment and ensuring sustainable management of natural resources, and, ( 3)  changing 
the way government operates by identifying the core business of government and adhering to 
this while allowing other stakeholders to run businesses and provide other services for which 
they have comparative advantage over government. Others include implementing 
accountability, transparency and anti- corruption measures and curtailing unbridled waste in 
the public service through pension reform, modernization of fringe benefits, national health 
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insurance scheme and budgetary discipline (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar 
on Nigeria’s Public Service Reform, 2006:44). What is obvious is that the reforms 
recommended by National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 
are based on the New Public Management doctrines.  
Research Question 1 (What is the Influence of NPM on Public Sector Management in 
Nigeria) and Contribution to Knowledge 
Within the various recommendations of the civil service reform committees introduced from 
the 1980s, are  NPM doctrines and principles  - such as value for public money, 
responsiveness, outcome and output, contracting, purchaser/provider, autonomy, 
entrepreneurial management culture, steering, transparency, accountability, budget and 
financial management, human resources, enhanced checks and balances, general 
modernization of the service, and enhanced effectiveness and efficiency, training and 
development, and the professionalization of the service as well as speed of operation. In 
addition, elements such as scrapping of Ministries, Departments, Agencies, as well as 
mergers and acquisitions, the creation of Ministries, Departments, Agencies and Parastatals 
as well as the actual restructuring of existing Ministries, Departments, Agencies and 
Parastatals have dominated the reforms from the 1980s to 1999 and onwards. The 1990s, in 
particular, witnessed the restructuring, privatization, merging and scrapping of public 
organisations with a view to enhance service delivery. The various measures introduced, 
albeit at different periods and forms, have a strong leaning towards the ideological position 
of neoliberalism- encapsulated in the free market doctrines and principles. 
In relation to Nigeria, since 1980, different NPM reforms have been mainstreamed into civil 
service (see Chapter Two- section 2.2.). For example, Section 2.2. the Dotun Phillips 1986 
panel made the following recommendations: to enhance professionalism; to align with the 
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Presidential System of Government; to decentralize and delegate; to combine authority with 
responsibility; to enhance accountability; to enhance checks and balances; to implement a 
general modernisation of the service, and, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency as well 
as speed of operation. In addition, the Public Sector Reforms 1999- 2007 were driven by both 
internal and external pressures. New Public Management measures introduced are:  Budget and 
financial management: procurement system review, institutionalization of fiscal 
responsibility, accounting reforms and audit reforms; Accountability: due process, 
transparency and accountability in government transactions, establishment of Service 
Charters and institutionalization of compliance enforcement; Human Resources 
Management: decentralization of human resources management from the Federal Civil 
Service Commission to ministries, departments and agencies, personnel records and payroll 
cleaning, staff cadre reviews, remodelling of recruitment and promotion procedures of the 
civil service, including the injection of competent professionals, young and bright people, 
experts with rare skills; introduction of a new performance management scheme; creation of 
professionally-manned human resources management departments, competent in manpower 
planning, career and succession manning, training and development etc., undertaking pay 
reforms, as a strategy for attracting and retaining talents in the service, massive capacity 
development and training and organisational culture change; Operation and system: 
organizational restructuring and right-sizing, work process redesign and information and 
technology applications; and Value reorientation and integrity reforms: This involves the 
development of a new generation of leaders of high integrity and a service driven by a culture 
of integrity (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on Nigeria’s Public Service 
Reform, 2006:44). 
Similarly, the reforms affected Agencies, Parastatals and their Managements. For instance, 
there were over 500 government-owned Agencies, Parastatals and Corporations in Nigeria. 
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Over the years, they have haemorrhaged government resources. The following are some of 
the measures taken in relation to the functions of the parastatals: accelerated privatization 
through the Bureau of Public Enterprises(BPE); scrappage and/ merger of some parastatals; 
review of mandate and amendment to the legal instruments through the adoption of 
incorporated legal forms to replace the legal status of statutory corporations; possible 
conversion of some parastatals to executive agencies; total removal of subvention for certain 
categories of parastatals; reorientation of management of Parastatals towards self- 
sustenance,  profit making, cost effectiveness and cost consciousness; establishment of 
benchmarks of recruitment/overhead ratio to capital expenditure; redundancy management 
and right-sizing; and re-professionalization, and, strengthening of the evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism of parastatals through the introduction of such accounting instruments 
such as service charter. In addition, regular survey of stakeholders’ perception and service 
delivery, peer review, as well as league-ranking parastatals based on predetermined corporate 
performance indicators is recommended (Report of In-Country Senior Executive Seminar on 
Nigeria’s Public Service Reform, 2006:44). 
The key point here is that the mainstreaming of NPM principles and techniques are politico-
administrative resilient. Within international and sustainable development narratives they 
are the importance of institutions, e.g. political institutions and economic institutions (see, 
e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, p8). Although a non-NPM State, the research discovered 
that New Public Management principles and techniques have been embedded in public sector 
reforms in Nigeria since 1980s.  However, whilst it is clear that the above is the case, it is 
imperative to note that some of these NPM principles are evident in the behaviour and 
operations of TETFund, and this is covered in the section on the research questions. What 
has been witnessed so far, with the various public sector reforms, has been the formal and 
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nominal adoption of NPM. Nonetheless, it is imperative to note that NPM is the lymph system 
of the Nigerian public sector.  
Research Question 2 (Understand the Behaviour of a New Public Management (NPM) 
Driven Agency in the Context of a Developing Country) and Contribution to Knowledge 
Addressed in Chapter Three is the core element of agencification. Structural disaggregation, 
autonomy and performance contracting in the literature are addressed. In other to address 
research question two, the author used the Tertiary Education Trust Fund as empirical 
evidence. The proliferation of NPM agency was largely influenced by both endogenous and 
exogenous factors. In relation to the TETFund, it was uncovered that its establishment was as 
a result of both internal pressures (that is social factors, political factors such as the strike by 
the Academic Staff Union of University and Strike action by other union against the adoption 
of the structural adjustment programme) external pressures, such as the influence of funding 
organisations such as IMF, and World Bank, (that is coercive isomorphism).  
The author detected in relation to TETFund all three the key features of agencification, that 
is, structural disaggregation, autonomy and steering and control by the parent administration. 
TETFund is structurally disaggregated, partially autonomous, but regulated/controlled in 
other areas through oversight functions from different organs of the state like the National 
Assembly, regulatory agencies and parent ministry, (the Federal Ministry of Education).  
Similarly, employees of the Fund are Public Servants; however, they are subjected to the 
rules and regulations as well as conditions of the Federal Civil Service such as Pension, 
National Health Insurance, annual and maternity leave, etc. The Fund has allowances and 
other benefits that are special to its employees in view of the nature of their duties and 
responsibilities.  
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One of the reasons provided for the creation of Agencies is that of political expediency, that 
is, they are set up to achieve particular policy programmes and interventions by the 
government: they represent a form of organisational specialisation.  
 
This research has been able to establish that the Fund has national acceptability across the 
board in view of the visibility and impact of its intervention projects, which could be 
attributed to streamlining its interventions to tertiary institutions by the 2011 Amendment 
Act. As such, the Fund operates with clear vision, missions, goals and objectives. The 
Agency can serve as a major reference point for other Agencies in the Country, based on its 
various successful interventions. The Fund’s operations and activities are anchored on 
creativity and innovations which are evidenced by its various interventions and cutting-edge 
programmes. The programmes key into the National Education Policy of Federal 
Government of Nigeria. 
 
In addition, the Fund exhibited some degree of accountability and transparency, to a point 
that appears not to have been reached by other NPM-inspired Agencies in other (relatively) 
similar contexts. Literature on agencification in Africa has identified that the failure of 
Agencies could be linked to issues of corruption and lack of accountability, (as in the case 
with first agencification agenda in Tanzania). The Fund has a functioning policy of attracting 
professional staff from other public sector organisations and agencies, which has helped in 
what may be deemed to be an effective and efficient delivery of services. This is 
complemented by various staff training and retraining of staff geared towards a more 
effective manpower.  
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Contrary to the situation in some Developing Countries, where Agencies had problems with 
funding for their operations and interventions, TETFund, due to its enabling Act, has 
sustained sources of funding which does not go through the rigours of budgetary allocations. 
The source of funding is from the 2% education Tax on the accessible profit of all registered 
companies in Nigeria. The fund produces its audited account annually and reports on its 
activities. This has been the determining factor in terms of the success of the agency.  
The key contribution to knowledge in relation to agencification is that all the three elements 
can be present in the operation of an agency; such ‘NPM-style’ agency may provide levels of 
service delivery comparable to ‘similar’ agencies elsewhere, thereby including also the 
developed world (OECD countries). Key factors that seem to contribute to this behaviour 
include a ring-fenced funding, financial independence, autonomy, strategic management 
initiatives and policy making independence and strategic monitoring processes. 
Some lessons that can be drawn – by means of analogical reasoning based on the analysis of 
the behavioural dynamics of TETFund – for the development of NPM-inspired Public 
Agencies in jurisdictions in sub-Saharan Africa, include financial independence, strategic 
management initiatives, adoption of working contextual political arrangements, (in the case 
of Nigeria- the use of Federal Character Concept, and the establishment of Regulatory 
Agencies to monitor the activities of an Agency). 
For further research it would be interesting to focus on other Agencies within the same 
setting, (in this case Nigeria,) to see whether the result would be different in terms of the 
presence of the key elements of agencification.  
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Appendix III 
 
Sample of Interview Protocol 
 
Interviewer: Good afternoon Sir. My name is Jacob Alada a PhD research student at 
Northumbria University Newcastle UK. The topic of my research is New Public 
Management (NPM) Agency and Public Sector Reforms: A Case study- Tertiary Education 
Trust Fund (TETFund), Nigeria.  Thank you for signing the consent form, thus agreeing to 
take part in the interview. As you are aware the details in respect of the aims and objectives 
of the research are contained in the written notification to you in respect of this interview and 
I want to reconfirm from you that I still have your consent for the interview. 
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 Interviewee: It is my pleasure to grant the interview strictly speaking covering the period I 
served as an xxxxxxx in what was called ETF and later TETFund that is, the period of from 
xxxxxx to xxxxx. So my responses will be confined to my 5 year of tenure. 
Interviewer: Can we briefly know your Sir? 
Interviewer: As a former xxxxx could you briefly describe your role in the Fund? 
Interviewer: What in can say about the establishment of the Fund? 
Interviewer:  Could the creation of the agency be as a result of other factors and not only the 
pressures by the academic Unions given the economic situation in the Country then?  
Interviewer: As you mentioned earlier the xxxxxx is responsible for the day to day 
administration of the Fund on behalf of the BOT. Who appointed you as the xxxxx xxx and 
did you report to any other authority other than the BOT?  
Interviewer: Has there been any tension or conflict in line of reporting between the xxxxxx 
reporting to the Board then reporting to the Ministry of Education because it looked like the 
xxxxx had so many principals? 
Interviewer: In terms of policy making and implementation in the Fund what was the role of 
the Ministry? Was there any interference or overbearing influence from the Ministry on the 
Fund? 
Interviewer:  So the Fund was to a certain degree autonomous of the Ministry in terms of 
policy formulation and implementation? 
Interviewer: Did the personality of the Chairmen of the Board of Trustees and its member 
affect the general administration and management of the Fund? 
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Interviewer: When you came on board what was the style of operation and the structure of 
the Fund? Did anything change in these regards during your tenure? 
Interviewer: With all these programs that you implemented where there any mechanism for 
monitoring and evaluation? 
Interviewer: Were there Strategic plans in relation to the operations of the Fund? 
Interviewer: With all these innovations in terms of structures and programs, did you envisage 
when you were restructuring that there will be increase in collections or were there deliberate 
attempts to collaborate with the Federal Inland Revenue Service to boost collection? 
Interviewer: With the changes in the structure and introduction of programs, what was done 
in terms of staff development and recruitment for the Fund’s staff to cope with the 
challenges? 
Interviewer: Were there any recruitments or secondments to the Fund during your tenure? 
Interviewer: Pressure from whom Sir?  
Interviewer: When you were appointed were you given any performance target? Was there 
any contract between you and government or the Federal Ministry of Education whether 
written or verbally? 
Interviewer: Are there other things that you will want to add that we have not discussed? 
Interviewer: During your tenure was the government making provisions for the Fund in its 
budgetary allocations? 
Interviewer: Were you investing given the nature of TETFund’s revenue? 
Interviewer: During your tenure, was TETFund different from other public agencies in 
Nigeria in terms of its operations? 
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(* please note that some of the questions from the interviewer were follow up questions from 
the answer provided by the interviewee).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix IV 
Interview Questions/ Guide 
Group 1: Respondents: Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education 
1. What are the processes and operations in TETFund over the years?  
2. What were the processes and operations in the Fund from1993-1999 under the 
military administration and from 1999 to date under a democratic government? 
What are the Changes that took place? How and why did the changes take place? 
What are the drivers of these changes? 
3. What changes took place under the different Chairmen and Board of Trustees as 
well as the Executive Secretaries the Fund has had? What influence did they have 
on the Fund? 
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4. How has the changes in the name of the Fund affected the relationship between it 
and your institution? 
5. What and who are the drivers of these changes? 
6. What have been the leadership styles in the Fund over the years? 
7. What impact did the various changes in the leadership and enabling Acts of the 
Fund have on its operations and processes? What and who are the drivers of these 
changes? 
8. What are the channels through which your voice is heard as a beneficiary and 
stakeholder? 
9. What are the issues you want to talk about that are not covered by these 
questions? 
   
Group 2: TETFund  
i). what are the factors that led to the establishment of TETFund and what were the 
instruments used to achieve this? Who and what are the drivers for its establishment? 
 ii). what work do you do in the Fund and how do you do it?  
iii).what Changes took place in the Fund from 1993 to date and how and why did they 
happen? What and who are the drivers of these changes? 
iv). Kindly explain the Mandate, Goals, Vision, Mission and Objectives of the Fund. Does 
the Fund have a service charter?  
v). which roles and actions did the staff of the Fund play in delivering on the Mandate of the 
Fund? What did they do and how? 
vi). Explain the factors that led to the change in the Mandate of the Fund? What were the 
driving forces for these changes? 
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vii). How has the administrative structure of the Fund been over years and how was it 
constituted?  What had been the nature of this composition? What had the functions and 
responsibilities of the various components of the structure performed?  
viii) What are the changes in the administrative structure of the Fund over time? What led to 
these changes? Who and what are the drivers of the changes? 
ix). what have been the leadership styles of the respective Chairmen and Executive 
Secretaries of the Fund? What influence did they have on the operations of the Fund? what 
was the relationships between the respective Chairmen and the successive Executive 
Secretaries?  
What are the operations and processes in the Fund during the Military regime compared to 
those under a democratic regime?  
vii). How did the Fund evolve and what were the transformations that occurred in the Fund?  
Who are the players in this transformation? What role did the Fund itself play in this 
transformation? 
viii). what has been the modus operandi of the Fund and how and when were this put in 
place? Who and what were the drivers? 
ix). what changes happened in the internal processes and operations of the Fund? How and 
why did they happen? Who and what were the driving forces for these changes?  
x). How had the organisation been funded for its capital and recurrent expenditure as well as 
its interventions and what were its scope, area(s) of operation as well as target population? 
How had the Fund related to its target population? 
xi). what has been the relationship between the Fund and the Federal Ministry of Education, 
Parliament, the Federal Government and other Central Agencies of Government 
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respectively? What had been the changes in this relationship over the years and why did the 
changes occur?   
xii). what have been the conditions for staff recruitments and what are the processes involved 
in this respect? What had been the status of the Staff of the Fund and how were they 
recruited?  What were the changes in the recruitment process? 
xvii) Are there other issues you wish to highlight which had not been captured by this 
interview?  
Group 3: Federal Level 
 i). what informed the formation of TETfund? What were the drivers? 
ii).what informed the changes in the laws of the Fund and how did these changes impact on 
its relationship with your organisation? Why and how did the changes occur? 
iii). what role had your organisation played over time in policy formulation and 
implementation, recruitments, Board constitution, selection of Executive Secretary 
deployment of staff, budgeting  and general management of the Fund? What informed this 
role? 
iv). what had been the behaviour of the Fund over the years? 
iv). Are there areas you will want to elaborate on which are not captured in this interaction? 
Group 4: Association of Academic Staff of Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of 
Education 
i). what informed the establishment of TETFund?  Who and what were the drivers for the 
establishment of the agency? 
ii). what had been the behaviour of the Fund over the years? 
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iii). are there issues you will want to elucidate on in terms of the behaviour and operation of 
the Fund that have not been brought to fore in this discussion? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix V 
Sample of Interview Format 
              POSITION                                          DATE  
Executive and Board Members 
1. Former Federal Minister of Education 4th Dec. 2013 
2. Former Executive Secretary               17th Nov. 2013 
3. Former Executive Secretary                20th Dec. 2013 
4. Former Chairman of BOT                     17th Mar. 2014 
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Executive Management Cadre 
5. Current Director Project                      17th Dec. 2013 
6. Current Director Human Resources  10th Oct.2013 
7. Current Director Education support service  22nd Dec.2013 
8. Director of Finance     6th Sep. 2013 
9. Deputy Director Procurement   17th Dec. 2013  
10. Head, ICT     9th Sep. 2013 
11. Deputy Director Academic Staff Training 16th Dec. 2013 
12. Head, Audit     17th Dec. 2013 
13. Deputy Director Public Relations   9th Sep. 2013 
14. Acting Director Monitoring and Evaluation  10th Oct. 2013 
15. Deputy Director Finance    9th Sep. 2003 
16. Assistant Director Legal    10th Oct. 2013 
 
Management Cadre 
17. Head, SERVICOM    12th Dec. 2013 
18. Deputy Director Admin.   27th Nov. 2013 
19. Principal Personal Officer    2nd Oct. 2003 
20.  Assistant Director Procurement   4th Dec. 2013 
 
Senior and Middle Officers Cadre 
21. Senior Officer Account    9th Oct. 2013 
22. Senior Officer SERVICOM   5th Dec. 2013 
23. Senior Officer ICT    3rd Sep. 2013  
24. Senior Admin Officer   3rd Sep. 2013 
 
Principal Officers of Tertiary Institutions  
25. Former Bursar    17th Dec. 2013  
26. Provost Osun State College of Education Ilesa 16th Dec. 2013  
27. 2 Rectors of Polytechnics that want to remain anonymous 
28. 3 Vice Chancellors of Universities that want to remain anonymous     
29. 2 Directors of Federal Ministry of Education that want to remain anonymous  
 
 
 
